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Case No. 20140753-SC
INTHE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plain tiffIPeti ti oner,

v.
ADAM HOWARD JONES,
Defendant/Respondent.

Brief of Petitioner
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The magistrate refused to bind Jones over for trial on official
misconduct and wih1ess tampering. The State appealed to the court of
appeals, which affirmed the magistrate's ruling. See State v. Jones, 2014 UT
App 142, 330 P.3d 97 (Addendum A). This Court issued a writ of certiorari
to review the court of appeals' decision, and thus has jurisdiction under
Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-3-102(5) (West 2009).
STATEMEf"1T OF THE ISSUES

The existence of probable cause at the preliminary hearing stage often
turns on reasonable inferences from the evidence. And the evidence often
supports more than one reasonable inference. When reasonable inferences
conflict, the magistrate must adopt the one favoring the prosecution. As

this Court recently made clear in State v. Maughan, a magistrate may not
weigh inferences in light of the totality of the evidence- that is, adopt a
defense-friendly inference on the basis that it is just as likely or even more
likely true than a prosecution-friendly one. A magistrate who does that
oversteps his bounds and usurps the jury's role.
Here, both the magistrate and the court of appeals refused to draw
prosecution-friendly inferences on the basis that they were less or "just as
likely" as defense-friendly inferences in light of the "totality of the
evidence."
This Court granted review on two issues:
1. "Whether the court of appeals erred in determining [the State]
presented insufficient evidence at Uones's] preliminary hearing to warrant
inferences that he committed official misconduct."
2. "Whether the court of appeals erred in determining [the State]
presented insufficient evidence at Uones's] preliminary hearing to warrant
inferences that he tampered with a witness."

Standard of Review. This Court reviews the court of appeals' decision
for correctness, "recognizing that the correctness of its decision turns in part
on whether it applied an appropriate standard of review in affirming the
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magistrate's decision," which is "a mixed determination ... entitled to some
·..;j

limited deference." State v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,I12, 305 P.3d 1058.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum B: 1
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-201 (official misconduct);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (witness tampering);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.1, -2.2 (relevant portions of Cohabitant
Abuse Procedures Act).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of facts. 2

Alleged official misconduct. Kamas City Police Chief Adam Jones had a
long history of dealing with his alcoholic brother Travis. When drunk,
Travis

acted

II

stupid,"

"unreasonable,"

and

II

extremely

violent,"

particularly toward his girlfriend Darcy Martinez. R29:5-8, 25; State's Exh. 1
at 6-17. Darcy sometimes called Jones to calm Travis when he was drunk.
R29:5, 7-8, 25; State's Exh. 1 at 3-4, 11.

Before February 2011, Darcy

1

Unless otherwise noted, the State cites the current versions of
statutes for the Court's convenience.
2

' .'.1

vii

Because Jones has not been convicted, he retains the presumption of
innocence. Consistent with the bindover standard, the facts are stated "in
the light most favorable to the prosecution," with all "reasonable
inferences" drawn in favor of the prosecution. See State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,
110, 20 P.3d 300 (citation and quotation omitted). The State has attached the
preliminary hearing transcript and police interview transcript as Addenda
Cand D.
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"luckily" had always called Jones when he was off-duty. State's Exh. 1 at
11.
But this time, Darcy called Jones on his personal cell phone at about
9:45 p.m., when Jones was on duty, in uniform, and in his office. R29:4,
State's Exh. 1 at 3-4. According to Jones, Darcy said that he "needed to
come over and talk [to] or take care of" Travis. R29:3-5, 56-57. 3 Jones
"didn't want to deal with" the fighting between Travis and Darcy; he had
dealt with it "a hundred times before." R29:4-5; State's Exh. 1 at 9. But he
immediately drove his patrol car the four blocks to their home. R29:4-5;
State's Exh. 1 at 5.
Jones was met by a drunk and underwear-clad Travis. State's Exh. 1
at 6-7. Travis pointed to scratches on his chest and said, ,.,look what she did
to me." R29:4-6; State's Exh. 1 at 5-7. He insisted that Jones speak to Darcy
about it. R29:4-6; State's Exh. 1 at 5-7.
Jones found Darcy in the garage. State's Exh. 1 at 7. She said that
II

Travis can't do this to me anymore." R29:5-6, State's Exh. 1 at 7. She said
II

that Travis was out of control" and had kicked her in the leg. R29:5-6;

3

Jones later changed his story, telling investigators that Darcy did not
tell him why she wanted hiin to come over, and that he had assumed she
wanted help with her ten-year-old son. R29:4; State's Exh. 1 at 4.
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State's Exh. 1 at 7. Jones said he looked at her leg, but claimed he saw no
injury. R29:6; State's Exh. 1 at 8.
Travis then came into the garage and repeated, "look what she did to
me." State's Exh. 1 at 8. Darcy insisted that Travis had scratched himself
and she asked Jones to "calm him down." State's Exh. 1 at 7-8.
Jones replied, "he's my brother; ... I cannot deal with him." Id. at 7.
Jones asked Darcy if she wanted to call the sheriff's office to "file a report,"
but she declined because she could not "afford" to have Travis go to jail
"again." Id. at 8. Jones left the garage to speak with Travis, who admitted
to scratching himself to get Darcy arrested. R29:6; State's Exh. 1 at 8.
Jones put Travis-who was "on the verge of[] passing out" -to bed,
and told the couple to stay away from each other. R29:23; State's Exh. 1 at 9.
He told them that if they wanted file a police report, they would have to call
the Summit County Sheriff's Office because Jones could not be
professionally involved where his family was concerned. R29:6-7, 22, 66.
Jones left without arresting or citing Travis, writing a report, or giving
Darcy written notification of her rights as required by the Cohabitant Abuse
Procedures Act. See R29:13-14; State's Exh. 1 at 10, 12-13.
Jones then returned to the station, where he clocked out from his shift
shortly after 10:00 p.rn. State's Exh. 1 at 12.
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About 45 minutes later, Jones saw on his home computer that Summit
County Sheriff's deputies had been dispatched to Travis's home on a 911
call. State's Exh. 1 at 14. Jones listened to the unfolding events on his police
radio. R29:35-36, 59; State's Exh. 1 at 14. Darcy called Jones later that night,
but he "knew that she was calling" about Travis, so did not answer. R29:59.
When deputies arrived at the home, Darcy was "crying" and
"obviously distraught." Id. at 36. Travis was "loud," vulgar, and "[v]ery
aggressive," to the point that they had to handcuff him. Id. at 36, 45. The
deputies saw "injuries on both Darcy" -including bruising on her leg-and
her ten-year-old son. Id. at 46, 51; State's Exh. 1 at 1. They arrested Travis,
who "kept up with a violent, vulgar tirade the whole way to the jail."
R29:46. Around midnight, the deputies learned that Jones had been to the
home earlier. Id. at 48.

Alleged witness tampering. The next morning, Jones visited Travis in
jail. Id. at 53-54. Because Travis's cell was near the booking counter, the onduty deputy overheard their conversation:

Jones told Travis that he had

been to the home the night before, but that Travis was "passed out on his
bed." Id. at 55-56, 63-64. Jones told Travis that he needed to" do something
about his drinking." Id. at 56.
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After talking to Travis, Jones told the on-duty deputy that Darcy had
called him the night before to "come over and talk [to] or take care of his
brother"; that Travis was "passed out, intoxicated in his bed" when Jones
arrived; and that Jones had "instructed her not to wake him up." Id. at 5657, 63-64.
B.

Summary of proceedings.
The State charged Jones with three counts: (1) official neglect and

misconduct, a class A misdemeanor; (2) in the alternative, official
misconduct, a class B misdemeanor; and (3) witness tampering, a third
degree felony. R30-33, 58. Only counts (2) and (3) are at issue here. 4
Both remaining counts relate to Jones's alleged failure to comply with
the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act (the Act), Utah Code Ann.§ 77-36-1 et

seq. Under the Act, when a peace officer "responds to a domestic violence
call and has probable cause to believe" that someone has committed
domestic violence, he must arrest or cite the alleged offender. Id. § 77-362.2(2) (a). If the officer "has probable cause to believe that there will be
continued violence against the alleged victim," he must arrest the alleged
offender.

Id. § 77-36-2.2(2)(b)(i).

Where-as here-two or more parties

4

Although the State appealed the magistrate's ruling refusing to bind
over on (1)-official neglect and misconduct-it did not seek (and this
Court did not grant) certiorari review on the court of appeals' affirmance on
that count.
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complain of domestic violence, the officer must determine who the
"predominant aggressor was," taking into account any prior complaints,
current injuries, the likelihood of future injury, and the possibility of selfdefense. Id. § 77-36-2.2(3). Once the officer has made that determination,

G

he must arrest or cite accordingly. Id.

If the officer does not arrest or cite an alleged offender, he must
nevertheless "notify the victim of the right to initiate a criminal

.

.

'

proceeding," and "the importance of preserving evidence"; give the victim
"written notice" of their "rights and remedies" under the Act; and "submit
a detailed, written report specifying the grounds for not arresting any
party." Id. §§ 77-36-2.2(2)(c) & (5)(a)-(b); -2.1(2)(a).
Jones filed a motion to dis1niss the charges after preliminary hearing.
R34-49. The State opposed the motion. R51-69.

Arguments on official misconduct.

A (1) "public servant" commits

official misconduct when he (2) "knowingly refrains from performing a
duty imposed on him by law" (3) with the intent "to benefit himself or
another." Id. § 76-8-201. A "public servant" is "any officer or employee of
the state or any political subdivision of the state .... " Id. § 76-8-101(5).
Jones conceded in the trial court that as a police officer, he "was a
public servant." R44. But he argued that the State had not shown probable
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~

cause for official misconduct because the evidence showed that he
responded to his brother's home not in his capacity as a police officer, but as
a private citizen and brother; that he was not "responding" to a domestic
violence call because the girlfriend did not allege domestic violence when
she called Jones; and that he did not have probable cause to believe that his
brother committed domestic violence where his girlfriend had no mark on
her leg. R44-45, 47-48. Thus, defense counsel argued, he had no duty to
comply with the Act. R46-48. He also argued that he did not act to benefit
himself or another because he repeatedly offered to call the sheriff's office,
but the girlfriend refused. R45-46.
The State's theory on official misconduct was that Jones-a police
officer-was a public servant who was aware of domestic violence, but who
knowingly refrained from performing the duties that the Cohabitant Abuse
Procedures Act imposed on him and that he did so with the intent to benefit
himself and/ or his brother. See R60-66.
The State argued that the evidence- Jones being on duty, in uniform,
in his police car, and being met with his brother's allegation of domestic
violence when he arrived-supported a reasonable inference that Jones was
acting as a police officer rather than as a brother. R60.
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The State further argued that the evidence supported a reasonable
inference that Jones had "refrained from performing" his duties under the
Act because Jones had probable cause to believe that his brother had
committed domestic violence against his girlfriend where Darcy alleged
that Jones had kicked her, yet he did not cite or arrest his brother, did not
give the alleged victim written notice of her rights and remedies under the
Act, and did not submit II a detailed, written report specifying the grounds
for not arresting any party." R62-66.
The State also argued that the evidence supported a reasonable
inference that Jones refrained from complying with the Act with the intent
to benefit himself or another by saving himself and/ or his brother the
embarrassment, trouble, and expense of complying with the arrest, citing,
and reporting requirements. R61-62.

Arguments on witness tampering. A person commits witness tampering
when (1) he believes that" an official proceeding or investigation is pending
or about to be instituted,'' or intending "to prevent an official proceeding or
investigation," he (2) '' attempts to induce or otherwise cause another person
to" either "testify or inform falsely" or "withhold any testimony [or]
information." Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-S0S(l)(a)-(b).
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Jones argued that he lacked the mental state to commit witness
tampering because (1) he did not believe that an investigation into his
conduct was proceeding because he visited his brother so soon after the
previous night's events; and (2) that Jones's lie to his brother was "not
inconsistent" with what Jones told investigators, but rather was "nothing
more than an explanation of the events the night before," because the
brother was in bed asleep before Jones left. R41-43.
The State's theory on witness tampering was that Jones knew that he
had failed to comply with the Act and also knew - from monitoring his
computer and police radio- that Sheriff's deputies responded to the house
on a domestic violence call 45 minutes after he left. R67-68. Thus, he could
reasonably believe that they would discover his failures and launch an
"official proceeding or investigation," or at least that he "intend[ed] to
prevent" such an investigation. To hinder or prevent that investigation, he
then tried to induce his brother to testify or inform falsely by suggesting
(falsely) to his brother that he had been passed out the entire time Jones had
been at his house the night before. R66-69.
The State argued that the most reasonable inference from Jones' s lie to
his brother-repeated to the on-duty jail deputy-was that Jones wanted his
brother to back up this false story either to prevent an investigation into
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Jones's handling of the call or to influence its outcome. R68. Indeed, the
State argued, it was difficult to conceive of another motive for making the
patently false statement to his brother and then ensuring that the on-duty
jail officer heard it. Id. ("Jones's false statement has no rational purpose but
to influence his brother's memory and hinder any potential investigation.").

Magistrate's ruling. 5 After hearing the preliminary hearing evidence,
the magistrate granted Jones's motion to dismiss all charges. R75-85. The
magistrate refused to bind over on official misconduct because-although
Jones had conceded that as a police officer he was a public servant-it
found that Jones had not gone to the house as a police officer. Rather, he
had gone to the house as a brother.

R80.

Though the magistrate

acknowledged that Jones was in uniform, on duty, and driving his police
car, he dismissed the import of that evidence because Darcy called him on
his personal cell phone and he went II a few minutes before the end of his
shift." Id. The magistrate opined that if Jones had appeared "at a stranger's
door," the State's argument "might have some merit." Id. The magistrate
concluded that because Jones was not then acting as a police officer, he was
not a public servant with any legal duties to carry out.

RB0-82.

The

magistrate also found "no evidence" that Jones was "respond[ing] to an
5

The Magistrate's bindover ruling is attached as Addendum E.
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allegation of domestic violence," Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.1(1), reasoning
that Darcy's phone call did not mention domestic violence, there was "no
altercation in progress when he arrived," and "no sign of a previous
altercation." Id. at 80-82.
The magistrate refused to bind over on witness tampering because he
concluded that nothing showed that Jones believed an investigation into his
conduct was pending or that he intended to prevent an investigation. R83.
The magistrate did not address the alternative "intent to prevent an
investigation" element. R82-83. On the element of "induc[ing] another to
testify or inform falsely" or "withhold" information or testimony, the
magistrate reasoned that Travis's being awake or asleep had nothing to do
with whether Jones had complied with the Act because, the magistrate
believed, the only statutory duty at issue was Jones' s failure to give Darcy
victim information, which rendered Jones's lie to Travis "immaterial." R8384.

Court of appeals decision. The State appealed the dismissal, and the
court of appeals affirmed.
On the official misconduct count, the court of appeals agreed with the
magistrate that Jones was not acting as a police officer- and therefore not as
a public servant-when he responded to (and while he was at) his brother's
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house. Jones, 2014 UT App 142, if28. The court of appeals acknowledged
that some evidence "viewed in isolation" -such as Jones's being on duty, in
uniform, and driving his patrol car- could support an inference that Jones
was acting as a police officer when he first "became aware" of a domestic
violence allegation.

Id. at

,r,r22, 24, 28.

But instead of adopting this

prosecution-friendly inference, the court of appeals found it unreasonable in
light of the "totality of the evidence." Id. at

,r,r24, 28, 33.

The court instead

adopted a defense-friendly inference, under the "totality of the evidence,"
that Jones was not acting as a police officer, but "solely as a family
member," when he responded to his brother's home. Id. at if if 24, 33. The
court of appeals drew this inference from the fact that once Jones learned of
the domestic violence allegation, he-with the victim's assent- decided not
to "spring into action" or to

II

treat the situation as a law enforcement

matter." Id. at if if 24, 28, 33.
The court of appeals also agreed with the magistrate that because
II

Jones did not make an official police response," he had not "responded" to
a domestic violence report for purposes of the Act, and that the Act's
requirements were therefore not triggered. Id. at 121. Though the court of
appeals agreed with the State that "the Act is not limited to situations where
a call to authorities specifically alleges domestic violence," it did not find an
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"official" respon~e here because Darcy called Jones on his personal cell
phone and both Jones and Darcy told the investigator that Jones was not
called in his official capacity. Therefore, the court reasoned, his response
was" solely in his capacity as Travis's brother." Id. at ,r,r21 n.6, 22-24.
In reaching this conclusion, the court took "some guidance" from two
cases that neither the magistrate nor the parties had cited: State v. Gardiner,
814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991) and Salt Lake City v. Christensen, 2007 UT App 254,
167 P.3d 496. The majority believed that Gardiner and Christensen stood for
the proposition that whether an officer is on duty is not dispositive of
whether he is acting as an officer. Rather, the question was whether an
officer was acting as an officer or was on a "personal frolic." Jones, 2014 UT
App 142, if28. Because the majority believed that Jones was acting as a
brother rather than an officer, it characterized his on-duty, in-uniform
response in his patrol car as a "personal frolic to attend to family matters."
Id. at ,r,r20, 28.

Judge Christiansen dissented from this part of the opinion.

She

reasoned that even if Jones was not initially responding to a report of
domestic violence, Darcy's later allegation that Travis had kicked her
triggered Jones's duties as a police officer under the Cohabitant Abuse Act.
Id. at ,I42.

Judge Christensen read the Act as removing "some of the
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discretion a police officer" otherwise might have "in responding to
allegations of domestic violence" by requiring "certain procedures on the
part of those police officers." Id. Because- as all agreed, id. at if 14 n.4 Jones had not complied with the Act, Judge Christensen would have bound
over on the official misconduct charge. Id. at if 42.
The court unanimously affirmed the magistrate on the witness
tampering count.

On the believing-an-investigation-was-pending prong,

the court declined to infer that Travis's later arrest on domestic violence
charges "would have necessarily led to an investigation of Jones's actions,"
even though it acknowledged that the inference was a "reasonable" one. Id.
at if32. Rather, based on its prior holding that the "totality of the evidence"
showed that Jones was on a "personal frolic," it concluded that Jones could
not have believed that an investigation into his actions was likely. Id. at
'if33. By reiterating its prior holding that Jones had no duties with which to
comply, the court of appeals implicitly held that he had no reason to expect
an investigation into what he did or did not do.
The court of appeals also refused to infer Jones' s belief in a pending
investigation from the fact that he lied to Travis at the jail. Id. at 134.
Rather, court of appeals chose the "just as likely" inference that Jones lied as
a social courtesy-presumably to avoid an awkward conversation with his
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rs.
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brother. Id. at 136. The court stated that it might have adopted the State's
proposed inference if there were "independent evidence" to support it. Id.
But because Jones's belief in an investigation was "not the only possible
explanation of Jones' s" lie, the inference that Jones lied because he believed
an investigation was pending was "speculation rather than reasoned and
logical deduction." Id. at 1133-36. Like the magistrate, the court of appeals
did not address the "intent to prevent an investigation" prong of witness
tampering. The court of appeals also did not reach the question of whether
Jones had tried to induce his brother to testify or inform falsely.
The State timely sought a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted.
Order of November 25, 2014.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At preliminary hearing, magistrates consider the full evidentiary
picture before them in deciding what inferences from the evidence are
reasonable. But this Court made clear in State v. Maughan that considering
the "totality of the evidence" is not license to weigh the relative merits of
reasonable inferences. Yet that is precisely what the court of appeals did
here when it refused to adopt the State's reasonable inferences in favor of
other inferences it deemed "just as likely" or more likely in light of the
"totality of the evidence."
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Official misconduct. To show probable cause for official misconduct,
the State had to present evidence which supported reasonable inferences
that Jones (1) was a public servant; (2) who "knowingly refrain[ed] from
performing a duty imposed on him by law"; (3) "with intent to benefit
himself or another."
The State presented evidence that Jones was the Kamas City police
chief; his brother's girlfriend called and asked him to "take care of" his
brother; he immediately responded to this call while on duty, in uniform
and in his police cruiser; he knew that his brother and the girlfriend had a
history of domestic violence; he knew that his brother abused alcohol and
when doing so became violent; his brother was drunk when Jones arrived;
both his brother and the girlfriend alleged domestic violence while Jones
was present; he investigated the allegations and found his brother's
allegation to be false; and he did not comply with the requirements imposed
on police officers under the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act.
This evidence gave rise to the reasonable inferences that Jones was
acting as a police officer and not just a brother; Jones had a duty to- but did
not-comply with the Act; and that Jones swept his brother's wrongdoing
under the rug to benefit himself and/ or his brother.
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©

Rather than drawing these reasonable inferences in favor of the
prosecution, the court of appeals weighed competing inferences under the
"totality of the evidence" and determined that other inferences were more
reasonable.

For example, the court of appeals refused to adopt the

reasonable inference that Jones was acting as a police officer. Instead, it
gave greater weight to the competing inference that Jones was at the house
merely as a brother because the girlfriend had called Jones on his personal
cell phone and did not want the brother arrested.

It also improperly

disregarded Jones's statement to a jail deputy that the girlfriend had called
Jones and asked him to "take care of" his brother, focusing instead on
Jones's later self-serving statement to investigators that the girlfriend did
not say why she wanted him to come.
In holding as it did, the court of appeals effectively rendered an
officer's duties in domestic violence cases discretionary, which undermines
the legislature's purpose in passing the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act.

Witness tampering. To show probable cause for witness tampering,
the State needed to present evidence and reasonable inferences that Jones
(1) believed "that an official proceeding or investigation [was] pending or
about to be instituted" or "inten[ ded] to prevent an official proceeding or
investigation"; and (2) "attemp[ed] to induce or otherwise cause another
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person to" either "testify or inform falsely" or "withhold any testimony [or]
information."
The State presented evidence that Jones knew that sheriff's deputies
responded to Travis's home 45 minutes after Jones left and arrested his
brother for domestic violence; the deputies saw an injury to the girlfriend's
leg; Jones did not comply with his duties under the Act; Jones went to visit
his brother in jail the next day; and Jones lied to his brother and the jail
deputy, saying that his brother had been asleep the whole time that Jones
was there. If investigators believed that Travis had been asleep the whole
time, they would have had no basis for believing that Jones had violated the
Act.

And the existence of this case showed that there in fact was an

investigation into Jones's conduct.
The court of appeals again failed to draw reasonable inferences in
favor of the State-for example, that Jones believed his failure to comply
with the Act would or could come under investigation, or that he at least
wanted to prevent any investigation into it. Instead, the court of appeals
believed that the "totality of the evidence" showed that Jones was acting as
a brother, not a police officer, and thus had no reason to fear an
investigation into his failures. As for Jones' s lie itself, the court of appeals
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refused to adopt the State's reasonable inference that by lying, Jones was
trying to convince his brother to repeat the lie to investigators.
The court of appeals twice erred on this count by (1) analyzing the lie
under only one alternative of the first prong of witness tampering-that is,
whether the lie showed that Jones believed an investigation into his conduct
was pending; and (2) rejecting a reasonable inference in favor of bindover
on the basis that it was "just as likely" that Jones lied to his brother as a
social courtesy.
This Court should reverse and order the magistrate to bind over
Jones on official misconduct and witness tampering.

ARGUMENT
I.
The court of appeals erred in this case-just as it did in State
v. Maughan- by weighing competing reasonable inferences.

The court of appeals here repeated the same error that it made in State
v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,I17, 305 P.3d 1058: searching the "totality of the

evidence" to find what it considered to be the most reasonable inferences
from the evidence.
Though courts certainly consider the entire evidentiary picture at
preliminary hearings, this Court made clear in Maughan that this is not
license to weigh competing reasonable inferences and to reject those that
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run in the State's favor. This Court should reverse and reaffirm the proper
standard articulated in Maughan.
A. Though courts look to the "totality of eviden°ce" at
preliminary hearings, this does not permit them to weigh
competing reasonable inferences.

"To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show 'probable
cause' at a preliminary hearing by 'present[ing] sufficient evidence to
establish that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant
has committed it.

111

State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ,r10, 20 P.3d 300 (citations

omitted). The probable cause standard is "relatively low" -the same as that
for obtaining an arrest warrant. Id. at

ilif 10,

16 (quotation and citation

omitted); see also State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, if 18, 137 P.3d 787. Under both
standards, the prosecution must present evidence sufficient only to
"'support a reasonable belief" that the defendant committed each element of
the charged crime. State v. Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, if9, 289 P.3d 444 (quoting

Virgin, 2006 UT 29, if17). When determining probable cause, a magistrate
"must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." Clark,
2001 UT 9, ,r10 (quotation and citations omitted); see also Virgin, 2006 UT 29,
if24 (same); State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, 'ff3, 26 P.3d 223 (same).
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An inference differs from speculation in that for an inference, there is
a "'foundation in the evidence upon which the ultimate conclusion is based;
in the case of speculation, there is no underlying evidence to support the

conclusion."' State v. Garcia-Vargas, 2012 UT App 270, if 17 n.5, 287 P.3d 474
(quoting Harding v. Atlas Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2012 UT App 236, if 7, 285
P.3d 1260).
An inference is reasonable if a "reasonable jury could accept it."

Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ifl4 (citing Virgin, 2006 UT 29, if22). This includes
inferences based on circumstantial evidence- which is often the only kind
of evidence available. See Maughan, 2013 UT 37, if 15; Ramirez, 2012 UT 59,
,I12. An inference is umeasonable only if it falls "to a 'level of inconsistency
or incredibility' that no reasonable jury could accept it." Ramirez, 2012 UT
59, ,I14 (quoting Virgin, 2006 UT 29, if22). Because the existence of probable
cause is such a fact-intensive issue, the reasonableness of a given inference
will depend upon the "totality of the circumstances." In re I.R.C., 2010 UT
41, iJ22, 232 P.3d 1040.
But considering the totality of the evidence "does not encompass an
assessment of whether [one] inference is more plausible than" another.

Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ,IlO. The "bindover standard does not call for an
evaluation of the totality of the evidence in search of the most reasonable
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inference to be drawn therefrom." Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ifl7. Indeed, a
court must accept a prosecution-friendly reasonable inference even where a
defense-friendly inference appears more likely in light of the "totality of the
evidence." Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,r17; see also Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, if9-10.
Where there are competing, conflicting inferences, the magistrate must
accept the prosecution-friendly inferences and reject the defense-friendly
inferences. See, e.g., Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, if20 (reversing refusal to bind
over "[a]lthough defendants' characterizations of the facts may also be
plausibly inferred from the evidence").
As this Court has repeatedly recognized, preventing magistrates from
weighing the merits of competing reasonable inferences protects the jury's
role. See, e.g., Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,r21 (citing Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ifl0).
When a court looks to the "totality of the evidence" to choose among
competing inferences, it usurps the jury's role and "overstep[s] [its]
bounds." Maughan, 2013 UT 37 ,r16.
Drawing inferences is an exercise in logic, and formal logic illustrates
the different roles of magistrate and jury. The magistrate's task of drawing
inferences is a matter of inductive logical reasoning-taking a set of
premises (pieces of evidence) and detennining what possible reasonable
conclusions may be drawn from them.
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See generally James Hawthorne,

[';

lolllil

Inductive Logic, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Oct. 29, 2012)
http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/logic-inductive/.

Thus, an "inductive

logic is a system of evidential support that extends deductive logic to lessthan-certain inferences." Id. For example, consider the following premises:
(1) Adam has smiled a lot today.
(2) Ada1n has not frowned at all today.
(3) Adam has said many nice things to people today, and no
unfriendly things.
(4) Adam's dog died today.
(Modified from Paul Teller, A Modern Formal Logic Primer, Volume I: Sentence

Logic 2 (1989); available at tellerprimer. ucdavis.edu/ pdf/ lchl. pdf (last
accessed February 4, 2015)). There are a number of conflicting reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from this evidence, including: Adam is happy
that his dog died; Adam is happy for another reason, even though he knows
his dog died; Adam is in denial about his dog's death; Adam is really sad
that his dog died and is feigning happiness; or Adam does not yet know
that his dog died.
In many cases, magistrates are faced with alternative and similarly
conflicting inferences from the evidence. But at the preliminary hearing
stage, the magistrate merely asks whether an inference supporting guilt is
reasonable. If it is, the magistrate must adopt it. To add to the example
above: if Adam ran over his dog and were charged with the dog's death, the
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magistrate would have to adopt the reasonable inference in support of
guilt-that Adam is happy that his dog died, which supports a guilty
mental state-even though other inferences may be appear to be just as
reasonable or even more reasonable.
The jury's task, on the other hand, is a matter of abductive logical
reasoning-actually choosing which inference(s) best explain the evidence.
Igor Douven, Abduction, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Mar. 9, 2011)
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abduction/

(citing sources for

pro-

position that "trust in other people's testimony ... has been said to rest on
abductive reasoning"). To again use the example of Adam and his dog, it
would be up to a jury to decide how Adam actually felt about his dog's
death, and whether he intended it.
Preserving these distinct roles is important in a system of increasing
burdens. Probable cause is about reasonable possibilities, and preliminary
hearings

exist

only

to

"ferret

out

groundless

and

improvident
1.:::.
VtV

prosecutions." Virgin, 2006 UT 29, if20. If a reasonable inference supports
bindover, then the prosecution is by definition not "groundless," and the
Q

matter proceeds to the next stage.
Guilt is about the truth, which the State must prove at trial beyond a
reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). When a magistrate
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chooses what he believes is the most reasonable inference, he in effect
decides what the truth is.

This effectively raises the State's burden at

preliminary hearing to guilt beyond a reasonable doubt-a burden that the
State manifestly does not bear at that stage. Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ,I9 ("[T]o
justify binding a defendant over for trial, the prosecution need not present
evidence capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.") (citation and quotation omitted).
Recognition of these differing roles is apparent- if unexpressed- in
setting different standards of review for bindover and jury decisions.
Magistrates get "limited" or no deference because, absent credibility
::,

(
\fJiil

findings, the appellate court is in just as good of a position as they are to
reason inductively. Cf Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ,I7 (explaining that magistrate's
ability to make credibility findings is "limited," which limits bindover
discretion).
Juries get near-absolute deference because they are uniquely tasked
with determining guilt, which relies on abductive reasoning. Courts lack a
set of agreed-upon standards by which to judge abductive reasoning,
because though "there exists a great deal of practical wisdom about how to
evaluate" the relative merits of inferences, "no one has been able to
formulate the exact theory which tells us exactly when an [inference] is
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really good." Teller at 3. Thus- absent a flagrant due process violation
such as deciding guilt on a coin toss-appellate courts do not review a
jury's reasoning, only whether there is a rational basis for the verdict. See

generally State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, if 68, _ Utah Adv. Rep._ (explaining
that review of jury verdicts is "highly deferential").

Maughan makes plain that at preliminary hearings, magistrates may
not reason abductively-that is, choose among reasonable inferences which
it believes best explains the evidence. 2013 UT 37, if 14. Maughan and his
friend Glenn Griffin were charged with aggravated murder. Id. at ,r,r3-4, 15.
Maughan was initially cooperative with police and implicated Griffin in the
murder. Id. at

,r,r4, 9.

Griffin was tried first. The State granted Maughan

use immunity and called him as a witness at Griffin's trial. Id. at

,rs.

But

Maughan refused to testify against Griffin, even after the court informed
him that he risked a finding of contempt or prosecution for obstruction of
justice. Id. at ,r 6.
The State charged Maughan with obstruction justice for refusing to
testify. Id. at ,r1. After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate refused to bind
over because, in its view, the State presented no evidence that Maughan
acted to obstruct Griffin's prosecution. Id. at
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,rs.

Rather, the magistrate

believed that Maughan had acted to benefit himself by not giving
incriminating testimony before his own trial. Id. at ,r9.
The State appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. Though the
court of appeals agreed with the State that it had presented some evidence
that Maughan acted to benefit Griffin, it believed that the more reasonable
inference was the one the magistrate adopted-that Maughan acted to
benefit himself. Id. at ,Ill.
This Court unanimously reversed, holding that that there was "no
room

in

the

liberal

bindover

standard

for

second-guessing

the

reasonableness of" a state-friendly inference, and that "evidence of a
friendship between Maughan and Griffin supported a reasonable inference
that Maughan wished to impede Griffin's prosecution." Id. at

,r,r13,

15.

This Court also explicitly rejected a totality analysis: "[I]t may be arguable
that the 'totality of the evidence' even weighs in favor of the conclusion"
put forth by defense counsel, "[b]ut our bindover standard does not call for
an evaluation of the totality of the evidence in search of the most reasonable
inference to be drawn therefron1." Id. at ,rl7.
The court of appeals has fallen into that error here. It began by citing
State v. Graham, 2013 UT App 109, 302 P.3d 824, for the proposition that it

"evaluate[s] proposed inferences under the totality of the circumstances, not
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just those circumstances that support the inference." Jones, 2014 UT App
142, if 22.

That may be true where a magistrate is deciding the

reasonableness of an inference by reasoning inductively. But it does not
give the magistrate license to weigh the inferences by reasoning
abductively.

Indeed, the Graham court itself recognized this, citing this

Court's decision in I.R. C. for the proposition that courts may only decline
bindover "when the evidence, considered under the totality of the
circumstances, 'is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to
prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim."' 2013 UT App
109, if9 (quoting I.R.C., 2010 UT 41, if22).

B.

Because the court of appeals weighed competing reasonable
inferences, it erroneously rejected reasonable inferences that
established probable cause for the charged offenses.

Rather than looking to the totality of the evidence to determine
whether an inference was reasonable, the court of appeals looked to the
totality to determine which inferences were most reasonable.

That is

precisely what this Court forbade in Maughan. Viewed in the proper light,
the evidence here permits reasonable inferences that Jones committed both
official 1nisconduct and witness tampering.
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1. There was probable cause for official misconduct because
it is reasonable to infer that Defendant received an
allegation of domestic violence while on duty, yet failed
to act on it.

For purposes of this case, official misconduct required evidence that
Jones (1) was a public servant who (2) "know:ingly refra:in[ed] from
perform:ing a duty imposed on him by law" (3) "with an intent to benefit
himself or another." Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-201. Jones conceded in the trial
court that a police officer qualifies as a public servant. R44.

Public servant element. The State presented evidence that Jones was on
duty, in uniform, and driv:ing his police cruiser when he responded to
Travis's house that night; Jones responded immediately to Darcy's call;
Darcy called him to "take care of" Travis; when Jones arrived, he separated
Travis and Darcy to :investigate what happened; Travis alleged that Darcy
scratched him; Darcy insisted that Travis scratched himself and alleged that
Travis had kicked Darcy in the leg; Travis admitted to scratch:ing himself;
and Jones did not arrest or cite Travis, write a report of the incident, or give
Darcy any victim information. R29:3-7, 14, 56-57; State's Exh. 1 at 3-5, 7, 9.
This evidence supports the reasonable inference that Jones was acting
as a police officer when he went to his brother's house and heard allegations
of domestic violence, thereby satisfying the first element. Indeed, the court
of appeals correctly held that Darcy made an "allegation of domestic
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violence" to Jones. See Jones, 2014 UT App 142, if28; cf Coffey v. Superior

Court of Sacramento County, 82 P. 75, 77 (Cal. 1905) (permitting prosecution
of city police chief for failure to enforce gambling laws where he had
"knowledge of the facts calling for official action"). And that Jones went
immediately gives rise to the reasonable inference that Jones perceived the
situation to be more urgent than he later would have had the investigators
believe.
Duty element.

The evidence also supports the reasonable inference

that Darcy's allegations-combined with Jones's knowledge of Travis's
history of drunken violence with Darcy-triggered Jones's duties under the
Act.

There was thus probable cause to believe that Jones had failed to

comply with a duty imposed on him by law, which satisfied the second
element. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-201.
The court of appeals acknowledged that the State presented evidence
that Jones was acting "in a law enforcement capacity": he was "on duty, in
uniform, and driving a police vehicle;" he "responded immediately to
[Darcy's] call rather than waiting the fifteen minutes until he went off
duty;" and he "investigated the incident at Travis's house 'as a police officer
would."' Jones, 2014 UT App 142, ,r22. But-just as it had in Maughan - it
held that this prosecution-friendly inference was unreasonable when
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compared with the defense-friendly inference.

Id. at 124.

Because it

believed that "undisputed testimony" showed that Jones was responding
"purely to an unofficial family matter," the court concluded that Jones was
not acting as a public servant, but as a brother, and thus had no legal duties
with which to comply. Id. at ,r,r22-24.
This was error on two levels. First, it was not "undisputed" that
Jones went to his brother's home merely on family business. Though Jones
told investigators that Darcy did not tell him why she wanted him to come
over, and that he assumed it was to talk about problems with her son, Jones
told the jail deputy that the girlfriend called and asked him to "talk or take
care of his brother." Compare R29:3-5, 56-57; State's Exh. 1 at 3-5 with R29:4;
State's Exh. 1 at 5.

Both the magistrate and the court of appeals were

required to accept that statement as true for purposes of bindover.

Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,I17.
Second, the court of appeals turned a totality-of-the-evidence search
for a reasonable inference into a search for the most reasonable inferenceconducting an abductive search in the guise of an inductive one. Because it
0

acknowledged that the State's inference that Jones was acting as an officer
had evidentiary support, Jones, 2014 UT App 142, ,J22, it should have found
this inference reasonable.
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In holding that Jones was acting as a brother rather than an officer,
the court of appeals relied on cases - which the parties did not cite discussing the scope of a police officer's authority. See Jones, 2014 UT App
142, ,r,r25-28 (discussing State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991) and Salt

Lake City v. Christensen, 2007 UT App 254, 167 P.3d 496).

It relied on

Gardiner and Christensen to hold that an officer could engage in a "personal
frolic" - and thus act in a non-law enforcement capacity, even when onduty- provided that he decides not to "spring into action" as an officer.

Jones, 2014 UT App 142, ,r,r27-28 (citation omitted).
Neither Gardiner nor Christensen support the court of appeals'
holding. Indeed, if anything, they actually support the State's proposed
inference that Jones was acting in a law enforcement capacity.
In Gardiner, officers responded to a noise complaint at the Vernal City
Airport and a tip that minors were consuming alcohol. 814 P.2d at 569.
When they arrived, they found a party, smelled alcohol, and saw people
who appeared to be minors. Id. One officer tried to go inside, but Gardiner
stopped him and asked if he had a warrant. Id. The officer said he did not,
but tried to go in anyway. Id. Gardiner punched the officer in the face. Id.
When the officer told Gardiner that he was under arrest, Gardiner again
punched him in the face. Id.
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The State charged Gardiner with, among other things, two counts of
assaulting a police officer.

Id.

Gardiner claimed that the officer was

attempting an unlawful warrantless entry, and was thus not acting as a
police officer. Id. This Court disagreed, holding that, even assuming that
the entry would have been unlawful, the officer was "'acting within the
scope of his authority'" because he responded to a call complaining of noise
and reporting underage drinking; he was "in uniform and on duty" at the
time; and he was attempting to perform a police function. Id. at 575.

If the officer in Gardiner was acting as a police officer, then Jones
was - both responded to calls for assistance; both were on duty; both were
in uniform; and both performed a police function on arrival.
Likewise, Christensen.

There, an officer - though in uniform and

monitoring a police radio-was working as a security guard at LDS
hospital. 2007 UT App 254, ,I3. The officer received word over his radio
that Christensen was coming to the emergency room from a domestic
violence incident.

Id. Christensen arrived acting "belligerent, loud, and

rude." Id. at iJ4. When the officer and another man tried to subdue him,
Christensen "clenched his fists" and "cursed at" one of the men. Id. at

,rs.

The officer was able to take Christensen to the ground and handcuff him, all
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while Christensen swung his fists and kicked his legs at him and the other
man. Id.
The State charged Christensen with assaulting a police officer.
Christensen claimed that the officer was acting as a security guard, and was
thus on a "personal frolic." Id. at if 12. The court of appeals disagreed,
holding that even though the officer was initially working as a security
guard, he acted as a peace officer in subduing Christensen because he
"spr[a]ng into action" in order to "preserve law and order." Id. at iJ14.
The court of appeals here interpreted this language to mean that an
officer could decline to "spring into action," even while on duty. Jones, 2014
UT App 142, if28. But it cited no affirmative authority for this proposition.
Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the Christensen court intended such a
result where it emphasized that the "'nature of a policeman's job is that he
be fit and armed at all times, whether on or off duty, and subject to respond
to any call to enforce the laws and preserve. the peace,"' and that "'any
action taken by him toward that end, even in his official off-duty hours, falls
within the performance of his duties as a police officer."' Christensen, 2007
UT App 254, ,I14 (quoting Banks v. Chicago, 297 N.E.2d 343, 349 (Ill. App.
1973)).
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If this is true where an officer is off-duty, it is doubly true where, as
here, he is on-duty. And as Judge Christiansen recognized in dissent here,
even if Jones's response to Travis's home began as a personal frolic, it
changed entirely once Darcy alleged that Travis had committed domestic
violence against her, triggering Jones's duties under the Act. Jones, 2014 UT
App 142, ,r,r40-41 (Christiansen,

J.,

dissenting). Indeed, it changed even

earlier, when Travis alleged that Darcy had assaulted him. R29:4-6; State's
Exh. 1 at 5-7.
Further, the notion that an on-duty officer can decline to "spring into
action" to enforce the law is a dangerous one - particularly in the domestic
violence context, where an officer's discretion is severely limited- and
would undermine the purposes of the Act.
The Act requires that an officer "shall give written notice to the
victim, in simple language," describing victim's rights, services, and
resources, Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.1(2). This protects victims by helping
them understand how to escape abusive situations. The Act also requires
that officers in domestic violence cases "shall arrest" offenders for whom
they have probable cause and "shall submit a detailed, written report
specifying the grounds" for their action/inaction. Id. at § 77-36-2.2(2), (5).
This protects victims by removing abusers, or at least ensuring that they
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will answer for their abuse. This is crucial in the domestic violence context,
where victims often protect their abusers by lying and refusing to cooperate
with law enforcement. See, e.g., State v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, 232 P.3d 519
(child sex abuse victim refuses to testify against defendant/father); State v.

Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, 218 P.3d 590 (spousal rape victim refused to testify
against defendant/husband); State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, 314 P.3d
1014 (domestic violence victim repeatedly lied and refused to testify against
defendant/boyfriend based on fear of retaliation).
The Act's reporting requirements also provide critical information to
police.

Domestic violence cases present "one of the most potentially

dangerous, volatile arrest situations confronting police." State v. Vallasenor-

Meza, 2005 UT App 65, if16, 108 P.3d 123 (citations and quotation omitted).
The more complete the record of an offender's and victim's police
interactions, the better prepared officers will be able to anticipate problems
and seek peaceful resolution of volatile situations. Indeed, the Act requires
officers to consider prior complaints and the likelihood of future injury in
their investigations, which they cannot adequately do without that
background information. See Utah Code Ann.§ 77-36-2.2(3).
Legislative history illustrates the importance of requiring on-duty
officers to comply with the Act. See generally Soriano v. Graul, 2008 UT App
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188, if 8, 186 P.3d 960 (consulting legislative history where it supported plain
reading of statute). The Act came about in response to an "epidemic" of
domestic violence. House Floor Debate on H.B. 314/5.01, February 21, 1995,
at 1:35:10-15. 6

Lawmakers were concerned about the high number of

domestic violence assaults, their effect on children, and the high rate of
unreported incidents. Id. at 1:32:45, 1:33:51-1:35:07. They passed the Act to
combat the root causes of these problems. Id. at 1:41:27-47; see also House
Floor Debate on H.B. 314/5.01, February 22, 1995 at 1:35:02-34. 7 They later
required reporting to provide crucial information to those who study the
causes of domestic violence in order to understand and prevent it.

See

Senate Floor debate on S.B. 242, March 5, 2008, at 1:03:30-4:18. 8

6

1995 General Legislative Session, Representative Marda Dillree,
available
at
http:/ /utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlay.php?clip
_id=9328&1neta_id=406185 (last accessed Feb. 6, 2015).
7

1995 General Legislative Session, Representative Marda Dillree,
available at http://utahlegislature.graicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id
=9330&meta_id=406212 (last accessed Feb. 6, 2015).
8

General Legislative Session, Senator Jon Greiner, available at
http:/ /utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=17332&met
a_id=512158 (last accessed Feb. 6, 2015).

-39-

The legislature also stressed the importance of compliance with the
Act to obtain and retain federal grant funds. 9 See House Floor Debate on
H.B. 314/S.01, February 22, 1995, at 23:10-24:25.
In deciding that an on-duty officer could choose not to comply with
the arresting, citing, and reporting duties, the court of appeals effectively
rendered these mandatory duties discretionary suggestions-even for onduty officers. This undercuts the legislature's express desire to remove
officer discretion in domestic violence cases, protect and inform victims,
and obtain funding to investigate and prosecute offenders-effectively
eviscerating the Act.

In.tent to benefit element. Though the court of appeals' holding made
reaching the third element unnecessary, the State also showed probable
cause that Jones acted "with an intent to benefit himself or another." Utah
Code Ann.§ 76-8-201. The State presented evidence that Jones was tired of

9

See generally 42 U.S.C. § 13925(b)(6) (requiring state agencies
receiving grant funds to provide report detailing use and "additional
information as the agency shall require"); Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance, "Violence Against Women Act Court Training and
Improvement
Grants,"
https://www.cfda.gov/?s=program&mode=
form&tab=step 1&id =ed04daa1e78505f2363e13ee0376c74a (last accessed
4/11/2013) (listing approved uses of grants from United States Department
of Justice under the Violence Against Women Act, including "infonnation
about perpetrator behavior," law enforcement h·aining, and "issues relating
to victim's needs").
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Q

dealing with his brother and his domestic violence issues. R29:4-5, 7; State's
Exh. 1 at 9. This relationship supported the reasonable inference that Jones
acted to benefit himself by sparing himself the time and effort required to
comply with the Act, as well as avoiding the potential embarrassment and
family friction associated with arresting one's own brother. Cf Maughan,
II

2013 UT 37, ,r1s (holding that evidence of a friendship between Maughan
and [his co-defendant] supported a reasonable inference that Maughan
wished to impede Griffin's prosecution").
The State also presented evidence that Travis had a history of
II

domestic violence and that he and Darcy could not afford" to have Travis
II

go to jail again." R29:7; State's Exh. 1 at 8. This supported a reasonable
inference that Jones refrained from performing his duties to benefit Travis,
who would be spared the time and expense of another arrest and court
proceeding, as well as the consequences of an additional domestic violence
conviction. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §922(d)(9) (2013) (prohibiting gun possession
by person convicted of misdemeanor domestic_ violence);_ Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-3-204 (setting maximum six month term of imprisonment for class B

1nisdemeanor); 76-3-301 (setting maximum $1000 fine for class B
misdemeanor);

76-5-102

(designating
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simple

assault

as

class

B

misdemeanor); 77-36-1.1 (providing enhanced penalties for subsequent
domestic violence convictions).

***
In sum, the State adduced sufficient evidence to show probable cause
that Jones committed official misconduct.

The evidence supports the

inferences that he acted while on duty, learned of alleged domestic violence,
investigated as an officer would, and refused to comply with his statutory
duties out of a desire to help himself or others. In holding to the contrary,
the court of appeals weighed the relative merits of competing reasonable
inferences, usurped the role of the jury, and undermined the purposes of
the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act.
2. There was probable cause for witness tampering because
it is reasonable to infer that Defendant lied to his brother
in an attempt to get his brother to repeat the lie to
investigators.

As charged in this case, witness tampering has two elements: (1) a
belief "that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be
instituted" or an "intent to prevent an official proceeding or investigation";
and (2) an" attempt[] to induce or otherwise cause another person to" either
"testify or inform falsely" or "withhold any testimony [or] information."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(1)(a)-(b).
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Essentially, the statute prohibits efforts to influence another from
telling the truth when those efforts are calculated to interfere with the
criminal justice process. The statute applies whether or not those efforts are
successful, and whether or not the process has started, or will ever start. See

State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, ,I,I14-15, 42 P.3d 1248 (holding that threat
subsection of statute does not require proof of actual or pending
investigation, but only proof of "a credible threat of bodily harm to another
based on that person's status-past, present, or future- as a witness"); State

v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876-77 (Utah 1985) ("The statute requires no more
than a defendant believe an official proceeding or investigation to be
underway."); see also Carlsen v. Morris, 556 F.Supp. 320, 322 (D. Utah 1982)
("The intent of the statute is to prevent interference with the fair
administration of justice .... "). 10
Both elements concern a defendant's mental state, which is "rarely
susceptible of direct proof," but may "be inferred from conduct and
attendant circumstances in the light of human behavior and experience."

State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1981), overruled on other grounds as

10

Bradley and Carlsen focused solely on the victim's belief in a

pending investigation because the statute did not yet have the alternative
element of "intent to prevent an official proceeding or investigation," which
was added in 2004. See 2004 Utah Laws 594-95.
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recognized in State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ,r32 n.56, 279 P.3d 371. Context
11

matters. For example, an apparently innocent statement such as, 'I'd be
careful crossing the street if I were you,' can be merely helpful advice to a
senior citizen," but spoken "in another context it may well be perceived ...
as a threat." State v. Spainhower, 1999 UT App 280, ,r7, 988 P.2d452 (citation
and quotations omitted).
The court of appeals concluded that the State's proffered inferencethat Jones lied to Travis in jail in the hope that Travis would repeat that lie
to investigators-was umeasonable in light of "the totality of the evidence."

Jones, 2014 UT App 142, ,r,r32-36. The court reasoned that this inference was
"not the only possible explanation" for Jones's lie, and was "speculati[ve]"
in the absence of "independent evidence" that Jones knew an investigation
into Travis's conduct would lead to an investigation of Jones' s conduct. Id.
The court of appeals instead adopted the "just as likely" defense-favorable
inference that Jones was politely avoiding conversation about the previous
night's events. Id. at if 133-36. In so holding, the court of appeals made the
same error that it made in Maughan: mischaracterizing as "speculative"
what was actually an inference from circumstantial evidence. See Maughan,
2013 UT 37, ,r,rll-15; see also Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ,r,r6, 11-12.
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Investigation element. The evidence showed that Travis had a history
of being a violent drunk and committing domestic violence against Darcy;
Jones immediately responded to Darcy's request that he "take care of"
Travis; when Jones arrived, Travis was drunk; Darcy said that Travis kicked
her and was "out of control"; Travis initially accused Darcy of assaulting
him, but soon thereafter admitted having scratched himself and lied to try
and get Darcy arrested; and Jones had to put Travis to bed warned the two
to stay away from each other. R29:3-7, 7-8, 23, 25, 57; State's Exh. 1 at 3-9,
11, 15-17.
This evidence permits the reasonable inference that Jones had
probable cause to believe that Travis assaulted Darcy, thereby triggering the
Act's duties. As explained, once an officer has probable cause to believe
that an act of domestic violence has occurred, the Act requires an officer to
arrest or cite an offender, or write a report explaining why he did not, and
provide certain information to the victim. Utah Code Ann.§ 77-36-2.2(2)(a).
And if a police officer fails to perform a necessary duty, he may face
prosecution for official misconduct. Id.§ 76-8-201.
The State presented evidence that Jones was the Kamas City police
chief; Jones did not arrest Travis, cite him, or write a report saying why he
did neither; Jones did not provide Darcy with any victim information; and
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Jones learned that night that sheriff's deputies arrested Travis for domestic
violence and saw injury to Darcy's leg. R29:14, 35-36, 59; State's Exh. 1 at 12,
14.

This evidence supported the reasonable inferences that as a police
chief, Jones knew about the Act and his duties; he developed probable cause
to believe that Travis committed domestic violence against Darcy; he knew
that he should have complied with the Act, but did not; Jones's failures
would likely come to light as the sheriff's office investigated Travis, which
in turn would prompt an investigation into Jones's handling of the matter;
and that an investigation into Jones' s failures could result in fines, jail time,
and the likely loss of position, thereby giving Jones a motive to try to cover
his tracks. The State thus showed probable cause that Jones believed "that
an official investigation" was

II

pending or about to be instituted" - as

indeed it was- or at least that he intended to

II

prevent" such an

investigation. Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-508(1).

Inform falsely element. The State also presented evidence that Jones
went to visit Travis in jail the next morning; that Jones told both Travis and
the jail deputy-contrary to Jones's later statements-that Travis had been
asleep while Jones was there the night before.

R29:53-57, 63-64.

In

connection with the totality of other evidence discussed above, this
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evidence supports the reasonable inference that Jones lied to Travis-who
was likely hung-over, and possibly memory-impaired-in an attempt to get
Travis to repeat the lie to investigators.
Jones could have believed that he could prevent an investigation into
his own conduct if he could persuade Travis to say that Travis was asleep
while Jones was there. If that had been the case, then Jones arguably would
not have had probable cause to believe that Travis had committed domestic
violence or that there was any reason to believe that Darcy was in any
future danger.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.2(2).

If Travis had been

sleeping as Jones had suggested to him, nothing would have supported
Darcy's claim that Travis had kicked her or that she was in any kind of
danger, since he claimed he saw no visible injury to Darcy-even though
sheriff's deputies saw bruising on her leg 45 minutes later.
And absent probable cause, Jones would not have had a duty to
comply with the Act. See id. (mandating arrest or citation if probable cause
to believe act of domestic violence committed and mandating arrest if
probable cause to believe there will be continued violence against alleged
victim). The State thus showed probable cause that Jones "attempt[ed] to
induce or otherwise cause" Travis to "inform falsely ... [or] withhold any ..
. information." Id. § 76-8-S0S(l)(a)-(b).
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Although the evidence might also support other explanations for
Jones's lie to Travis, the court of appeals "jumped the gun" by choosing
among those reasonable inferences.

Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,r21.

The

decision of whether the evidence supporting a defense-favorable inference
renders the prosecution's theory unworthy of belief should have been left to
a jury, not to the magistrate or the court of appeals. See Virgin, 2006 UT 29,
if 24 (explaining magistrate duty to view all reasonable inferences in favor of
prosecution at preliminary hearing stage); cf State v. Norton, 2000 UT App
307U, *1 (holding evidence sufficient for witness tampering even though
uthere was more than one way a jury could have deciphered defendant's
comments"); Spainhower, 1999 UT App 280, if14 (holding evidence sufficient
for witness retaliation where defendant told victim, "I'm going to get you"
and followed her through a grocery store).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse and remand with
a mandate to the magistrate to bind Jones over on official misconduct and
witness tampering.
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330 P.3d97
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant,
V.

Adam Howard JONES, Defendant and Appellee.
June 19, 2014.

No. 20120754-CA.

Synopsis
Background: Defendant, a police chief, was charged with
official neglect and misconduct, official misconduct, and
witness tampering arising from his handling of a call from his
brother's girlfriend who had been involved in prior domestic
violence incidents with brother. The Third District Court,
Silver Summit Department, No. 111500107, L.A. Dever, J.,
dismissed the charges. State appealed.

GREENWOOD, Senior Judge:

1

I The State appeals from the magistrate's dismissal of
criminal charges against defendant Adam Howard Jones.
The State charged Jones with one count of official neglect
and misconduct, a class A misdemeanor, see Utah Code
Ann. § 10-3-826 (LexisNexis 2012); one count of official
misconduct, a class B misdemeanor, see id. § 76-8-20 I; and
one count of tampering with a witness, a third degree felony,
see id. § 76-8-508(1 ). The magistrate dismissed all three
counts after a preliminary hearing. detem1ining that there was
insufficient evidence to bind Jones over for trial on any of the
three counts. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

1 2 At the
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, Senior Judge,
sitting by assignment, held that:

[l] evidence was insufficient to bind over defendant on
official neglect and misconduct charge;
[2] evidence was insufficient to bind over defendant on
official misconduct charge; and
[3] evidence was insufficient to bind over defendant on
witness tampering charge.

time of the events giving rise to this case, Jones
was the police chief of Kamas, Utah. Jones's brother, Travis,
lived in Kamas with his girlfriend (Girlfriend). Jones knew
that Travis had a history of alcohol abuse and resulting violent
behavior and that Travis's alcohol abuse had led to incidents
of domestic violence with Girlfriend. In the past, Girlfriend
had called Jones for help with Travis when Travis was drunk,
although these calls had previously occurred only when Jones
was off duty. Some of these calls occurred as much as six
years earlier, when Travis and Girlfriend lived in West Valley
City. Girlfriend had not called Jones about problems with
Travis for approximately one year.

13 On February 15, 2011, Jones was on duty in his office. His
Affirmed.
Christiansen, J ., filed an op1mon concurring m part,
concmTing in the result in part, and dissenting in part.

Attorneys and Law Firms
*98 Sean D. Reyes and John J. Nielsen, for Appellant.

shift was to end at 10:00 p.m. At about 9:45 p.m., Girlfriend
called Jones on his personal cell phone and asked him to
come to the house that she *99 shared with Travis. Jones
later told the State's investigator that he asked Girlfriend why
she wanted him to come over, but she did not give him a
reason, and that he assumed the call was about problems
concerning her son. In any event, Jones immediately left his
office, in unifmm, and drove his police cruiser the four blocks
to Travis's house.

Ronald J. Yengich, for Appellee.
Senior Judge PAMELA T. GREENWOOD authored this
Opinion, in which Judge JAMES Z. DAVIS concmTed. 1
Judge MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN concurred in part,
concurred in the result in part, and dissented in part. with
opinion.
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When Jones arrived at the house, he was met by a
drunken Travis clad only in his underwear. Travis was calm,
although inebriated. Travis pointed to scratch marks on his
chest and told Jones, "[L]ook what [Girlfriend] did to me."
Jones then located Girlfriend in the garage, where she told
Jones, "[Travis] can't do this to me anymore," that Travis

.

..:Jl'

State v. Jones, 330 P.3d 97 (2014)
763 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 2014 UT App 142

was "out of control," and that he had kicked her in the leg.
Jones examined Girlfriend's leg but observed no injury or
impainnent in her ability to walk.

indicated in the phone call that he needed to come over to
"talk or take care of' Travis.

19
~

5 While Jones and Girlfriend were talking, Travis entered
the garage and again accused Girlfriend of scratching his
chest. Girlfriend told Jones that Travis had scratched himself
and asked Jones to calm Travis down. Jones responded that
he could not deal with Travis because the two were brothers
and asked Girlfriend if she wanted to call the Summit County
Sheriff's Office to file a rep011. She declined, telling Jones that
she was not afraid of Travis. Jones then spoke with Travis
alone, and Travis admitted that he had scratched himself in
an effort to get Girlfriend an-ested.

,r 6 Travis

appeared to be on th~ verge of passing out, so
Jones put him to bed and told the couple to stay away from
each other. Jones also told them that if they wanted to make
a police report they would have to call the sheriffs office
because Jones could not become professionally involved in
his own family matters. Jones left Travis's house after being
there a total of fifteen to twenty minutes and clocked out from
his shift a little after 10:00 p.m. Jones did not arrest or cite
Travis, write a report about the incident, or give Girlfriend
written notice of her rights as a domestic violence victim.

,r 7 A short time later, Jones observed on his home computer
that sheriffs deputies had been dispatched to Travis's house.
When the deputies an-ived there, they found Girlfriend crying
and obviously distraught, with injuries that included bruising
on her leg. Girlfriend's ten-year-old son had also suffered
injuries. The deputies an-ested Travis, who was loud, vulgar,
~nd very aggressive. Deputies also learned that Jones had
been at the house earlier. Jones monitored the situation on
his police radio, but the detai]s of what he may have heard
are unknown. Later that night, Girlfriend called Jones again.
Jones assumed that Girlfriend was calling about Travis and
did not answer his phone.

,i 8 The next morning, Jones went to visit Travis in jail.
Travis was in a holding cell near the booking counter, and
the sheriffs deputy working at the counter overheard parts of
their conversation. Jones told Travis that Jones had been at
Travis's house the night before, that Travis was passed out in
his bed while Jones was there, and that Travis needed to do
something about his drinking. As Jones was leaving, he spoke
with the deputy directly about the prior evening's events and
repeated his statement that Travis was passed out while Jones
was at the house. He also told the deputy that Girlfriend had

As a result of these incidents, the State charged Jones
with official neglect and misconduct-or, in the alternative,
the lesser offense of official misconduct-for his handling
of the incident between Travis and Girlfriend on the night
of February 15. The State's theory of misconduct under
both counts was that Jones had failed to comply with the
requirements imposed on law enforcement officers by Utah's
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, see Utah Code Ann. §§
77-36-1 to -10 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp.2013). The State
also charged Jones with witness tampering because of his
statements to Travis during the jail visit the next morning,
where he told Travis that he had been passed out during
Jones's visit.
10 At Jones's preliminary hearing, the State called only three
witnesses. Craig Gibson, the State's investigator, testified
about *100 his March 7, 2011 interview of Jones, a

4U

transcript of which was admitted into the record. 2 Sheriffs
Deputy Richard Jones described his response to the dispatch
call from Travis's house on the night of February 15 after
Jones had been there. And Sheriffs Deputy Trace Thomsen
testified about statements that Jones made to both him and
Travis at the jail on the morning of February 16.

1 11

After the preliminary hearing, Jones fi1ed a motion to
dismiss, which the magistrate granted as to all three counts.
In its dismissal order, the magistrate ruled that the State had
failed to demonstrate probable cause to believe that Jones had
committed any of the three charged crimes. As to the official
neglect and misconduct charge, the magistrate ruled that
Jones was only alleged to have violated his duty as a police
officer, not as a municipal officer as required by Utah Code
section I 0-3-826, and that the appropriate misconduct charge
was therefore official misconduct pursuant to section 76-8201. As to the official misconduct charge, the magistrate ruled
that Jones was under no obligation to comply with the duties
imposed upon police officers responding to domestic violence
incidents because he went to Travis and Girlfriend's house as
a family member, Girlfriend's call did not mention domestic
violence, and there was no altercation occun-ing when Jones
arrived at the house. Finally, as to the charge of witness
tampering, the magistrate ruled that there was no evidence
of one of the elements of the crime: that Jones believed that
an official proceeding relating to his actions was pending or
about to be initiated at the time he spoke to Travis in the jail.
The State appeals from the magistrate's dismissal order.

r
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1 15 In dismissing the official neglect and misconduct charge,
ISSUE AND STAND ARD OF REVIEW

the magistrate concluded that Utah Code section 10-3-826
"talks about official neglect and misconduct and encompasses
the special functions of the municipal officer'' and that

[11
[2]
[3) ,r 12 The State argues that the magistrate "[t]hose types of functions do not relate to the general duties
erred in dismissing each of the three charges against Jones
of a police officer." The magistrate also referred to Karnas
City Ordinance # 02-1, which governs the Kamas police
at the bindover stage. The magistrate's bindover decision
"is a mixed determination that is entitled to some limited
deference." State v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,r 12, 305 P.3d
1058; see also State v. Machan, 2013 UT 72, ,r 18, 322 P.3d
655 (describing the magistrate's discretion at the bindover
stage as "limited discretion"). The State is entitled to have
a defendant bound over for trial if it presents "evidence
sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the defendant
committed the charged crime," and in making its bindover
detem1ination the magistrate "must view all evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." Maughan,
2013 UT 37, ,r 14, 305 P.3d 1058 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

,r

13 The magistrate dismissed the three counts against
Jones on three distinct rationales. We examine each of the
magistrate's rulings in turn and determine that each ruling
was an appropriate exercise of the magistrate's "limited
discretion." See Machan, 2013 UT 72, ,r 18, 322 P.3d 655.

I. Official Neglect and Misconduct

,r

14 The magistrate first addressed the charge of official
neglect and misconduct. Official neglect and misconduct, a
class A misdemeanor, occurs when "any municipal officer
shall at any time wilfully omit to perfonn any duty, or
wilfully and corruptly be guilty of oppression, malconduct,
misfeasance, or malfeasance in office." Utah Code Ann.§ 103-826 (LexisNexis 2012). 3 The State charged Jones with one
count of official neglect and misconduct, alleging that, as the
Karnas police chief. Jones was a municipal officer and that
he failed to perfonn his duties when he did not comply with
the requirements of the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act (the
Act) while responding to an incident of domestic violence at
Travis's *101 house. 4

department, 5 to determine that Jones was alleged to have
violated not his duties as the police chief but rather his general
duties as a police officer under paragraph 3 of the ordinance.
See Kamas, Utah, Ordinance# 02-1, para. 03 (May 28, 2002)
(enumerating the additional powers and duties of policemen).
Accordingly, the magistrate concluded that the appropriate
charge was official misconduct under Utah Code section 768-201 and declined to bind Jones over on official neglect and
misconduct under section 10-3-826.
[4] ,r 16 We agree with the magistrate's legal ruling
regarding the meaning of the statute and ordinance. There was
no evidence that Jones was acting in his capacity as the police
chief-i.e., failing to perfonn a duty arising exclusively from
his status as the police chief-when he went to Travis's
house on the night of February 15. Cf State v. Tolman.
775 P.2d 422, 425 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (interpreting official
misconduct statute to apply only to public servants acting in
their capacity as public servants). Any duties under the Act
arose only due to Jones's general status as a police officer.
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.1 (1 )(LexisNexis 2012)
("A Jaw enforcement officer who responds to an allegation of
domestic violence shall use all reasonable means to protect
the victim .... " (emphasis added)). Further, to the extent that
Kamas City Ordinance # 02-1 imposed an independent duty
on Jones to comply with the Act, that duty applied to all
Kamas police officers and not exclusively to the police chief.
See Kamas, Utah, Ordinance # 02-1, para. 03 (''The chief
of police and all police officers of the City shall have the
following powers and duties .... ").
[51 ,r 17 In sum~ the magistrate correctly interpreted Utah
Code section 10-3-826 as being limited to acts or omissions
relating to the special functions of a municipal officer in his
or her capacity as a municipal officer. The magistrate also
properly detern1ined that there is no evidence that Jones failed
to perfonn any duty imposed upon him by virtue of his status
as the Kamas police chief, as opposed to his status as a Kamas
police officer or a police officer generally. Accordingly, the
magistrate appropriately declined to bind Jones over for trial
on the charge of official neglect and misconduct under Utah
Code section 10-3-826.
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*102 II. Official Misconduct

1 18

The magistrate next addressed the State's alternative
charge of official misconduct, a class B misdemeanor. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-201 (LexisNexis 2012). Official
misconduct is committed when "[a] public servant ...
knowingly refrains from perfonning a duty imposed on him
by law or clearly inherent in the nature of his office" and does
so "with an intent to benefit himself or another or to hann
another." See id. The State's theory of official misconduct
against Jones was that he was a public servant by virtue of
his status as a police officer, that he failed to comply with
his law enforcement duties under the Act when he responded
to Girlfriend's allegation of domestic violence against Travis,
and that he did so to benefit either himself or Travis.
1 19 The magistrate dismissed the official misconduct charge,
stating that a police officer's duties under the Act "are
predicated on the ... officer responding to an allegation of
domestic violence." The magistrate dete1mined that Jones
was not responding to an allegation of domestic violence
because Girlfriend called him as Travis's brother, not as a
police officer; Girlfriend's call did not mention domestic
violence; and there was no ongoing altercation when Jones
arrived at Travis's house. The magistrate concluded that
"[t]here is no showing that [Jones] was responding to an
allegation of domestic abuse, [and] therefore the [Act] and the
duties arising under it have no application to [Jones] in this
incident."

[7] 121 Although the Act does not provide a definition of the
type of police response that triggers the Act's various duties,
a reading of the Act as a whole indicates that it is intended to
apply only to official police responses to domestic violence.
For example, the Act refers variously to "respond[ing] to
an allegation of domestic violence," Utah Code Ann. § 7736-2.1 ( 1); "domestic violence call[s]," id. § 77-36-2.2(1)
(Supp.2013); and "complaints of domestic violence," id. §
77-36-2.2(3). Read in the context of a statute governing the
activities oflaw enforcement officers, the language employed
by the legislature indicates that the Act's duties apply only
when a police officer is making an official police response to
a domestic violence incident. 6

[91 1 22 The State argues that the circumstances
[8]
surrounding Jones's visit to Travis's house give rise to a
reasonable inference that Jones was responding in a law
enforcement capacity. These circumstances include the facts
that Jones was on duty, in unifom1, and driving a police
vehicle; responded immediately to Girlfriend's call rather
than waiting the fifteen minutes until he went off duty;
and investigated the incident at Travis's house "as a police
officer would." We must accept an inference as reasonable
"unless it falls to a level of inconsistency or incredibility that
no reasonable jury could accept it." State v. Machan, 2013
UT 72, 1 8, 322 P.3d 655 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). However, we evaluate proposed inferences
under the totality of the *103 circumstances, not just
those circumstances that support the inference. See State v.
Graham, 2013 UT App 109, 19, 302 P.3d 824 (stating that
inferences to support a bindover must be evaluated "under the
totality of the circumstances").

[6]

1 20 Again, we agree with the magistrate. The Act does
not impose its duties on all police officers at all times but
rather on police officers who are responding to allegations of
domestic violence. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.1 ( 1)
(LexisNexis 2012) ("A law enforcement officer who responds
to an allegation of domestic Fiolence shall use all reasonable
means to protect the victim .... " (emphasis added)). Further,
this com1 has previously determined that a public servant
does not commit the crime of official misconduct unless he
or she acts in the "capacity" of a public servant. See State
v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 425 (Utah Ct.App.1989) ("[T]he
prosecution was required to prove that Tolman ... acted in
his capacity as a public servant .... "). Thus, Jones committed
official misconduct under Utah Code section 76-8-201 only
if he failed to perform a duty in his "capacity" as a police
officer. See id.

,I 23 The totality of the circumstances of the February 15
incident includes undisputed evidence that Girlfriend called
Jones on his personal cell phone and that Jones responded to
that personal call solely in his capacity as Travis's brother.
Gibson, the State's investigator, testified that he interviewed
both Jones and Girlfriend and that both of them indicated
that Jones was not called there in his police capacity. Thus,
neither Jones nor Girlfriend believed Jones was present as
a police officer. The evidence further indicates that Jones
informed Girlfriend at the scene that he could not become
professionally involved because he was Travis's brother and
that Jones repeatedly offered to contact the sheriff's office if
Girlfriend desired official law enforcement involvement.

,r

24 Under the totality of the circumstances, we cannot
accept as reasonable the State's proposed inference that

Q
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Jones responded to Girlfriend's personal call as a police

from that of a security guard to that

officer making an official response to a domestic violence
call. The undisputed evidence is that Jones was summoned
and responded solely as a family member. The evidence
that the State relies on-Jones's police unifonn and other
accoutrements of official involvement-are consistent with
an inference of official capacity when viewed in isolation but
not when viewed in light of the undisputed testimony that
Jones's visit to Travis's house was purely an unofficial family
matter. In other words, in light of all of the evidence presented
to the magistrate, the inference presented by the State "falls
to a level of inconsistency or incredibility that no reasonable
jury could accept it." Machan, 2013 UT 72,, 8,322 P.3d 655
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

of a peace officer. It was in his
law enforcement capacity that [the
officer] took Defendant under control
and prevented the escalation of further
violence.

~

25 In reaching this conclusion, we take some guidance
from two Utah cases addressing the crime of assaulting a
peace officer and, in particular, that crime's element that an
assaulted officer be "acting within the scope of authority as
a peace officer" at the time of the assault. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-102.4(2)(a) (LexisNexis Supp.2013). In State
v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), a divided supreme
court affim1ed the defendant's conviction despite the fact that
the assault occun-ed as the defendant was resisting an illegal
search by the officer. See id. at 570-75. The court held that,
despite the illegality of the search the officer was still acting
within the scope of his authority at the time of the assault. See
id. at 575. In analyzing the scope of authority question, the
court employed the test of "whether an officer is doing what
he or she was employed to do or is 'engaging in a personal
frolic of his [or her] own.'" Id. at 574 (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2d
Cir.1967)).

1 26

In Salt Lake City 11• Christensen, 2007 UT App 254,
167 P.3d 496, this court affirmed a conviction for assaulting
a peace officer that arose from a uniformed officer's off-duty
employment as a hospital security guard. Id. ,1 12-13. The
court concluded that the officer was acting within the scope
of his authority as a peace officer at the time of the assault
despite his private employment status, explaining,
It is true that upon Defendant's atTival
at the emergency room, [the officer]
was acting as [a hospital] employee
and not as a peace officer. But
when Defendant took a defensive
stance, clenched his fists, and made
verbal threats of physical violence,
[the officer's] primary role shifted

r\ i,---.

Id. , 14. The court ultimately held that "when a law
enforcement officer responds to preserve law and order or to
detect and deter crime, he is acting 'within the scope of his
authority as a peace officer' even though he may be working
at another job." Id. (citation omitted).
4j\ 27 Thus, at least for purposes of the crime of assaulting a

peace officer, 7 we know *104 that even a uniformed, onduty police officer is not acting within the scope of his law
enforcement capacity while he engages in a "personal frolic."
Gardine1~ 814 P.2d at 574 (citation and intemal quotation
marks omitted). Conversely, even off-duty officers may act
within the scope of their law enforcement capacity when they
act "to preserve law and order or to detect and deter crime."
Christensen, 2007 UT App 254, 4il l 4, 167 P .3d 496; see also
id. ("[E]ven peace officers who are 'off duty' will typically
sp1ing into action when circumstances so require, i.e., when
the law has been or is about to be broken.").
, 28 Analyzing the evidence presented below through the
lenses of Gardiner and Christensen, Jones's initial decision to
go to Travis's house in response to Girlfiiend's personal call
can be reasonably characterized only as a personal frolic to
attend to family matters. When Jones arrived at the house and
became aware of Girlfriend's allegation of domestic violence,
he declined to "spring into action" and treat the situation as
a law enforcement matter. See Christensen, 2007 UT App
254, , 14, 167 P.3d 496. To the contrary, Jones advised
Girlfriend that he could not become professionally involved
because of his relationship to Travis, and he repeatedly
offered to involve the sheriffs office to respond to the incident
in an official law enforcement capacity. Girlfriend did not
object to Jones's statements and, in fact, endorsed those
statements. Furthermore, Jones observed no visible signs of
domestic abuse-other than Travis's self-inflicted scratches
-and, when Jones left the house, all was calm and Travis
was sleeping in his bed. In short, nothing occurred during
Jones's visit to the house to conve1t the incident from a purely
personal incident into a law enforcement matter. 8
,i 29 For all of these reasons, we agree with the magistrate that
it cannot be reasonably inferred from the State's evidence that

: '
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Jones's interaction with Travis and Gir]friend on the night of
February 15 was anything other than a family matter. Because
the evidence below, presented as a whole, does not suppo11 a
reasonable inference that Jones was responding to a domestic
violence allegation in his officia] capacity, we affirm the
magistrate's refusal to bind Jones over for trial on the charc1e
::>
of official misconduct.

III. Witness Tampering
~

30 Finally, the magistrate addressed the charge of witness
tampering.
A person is guilty of the third degree
felony of tampering with a witness if,
believing that an official proceeding or
investigation is pending or about to be
instituted, or with the intent to prevent
an official proceeding or investigation,
he attempts to induce or otherwise
cause another person to ... testify or
infom1 falsely ....
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(1) (LcxisNexis 2012). The
State's the01y of witness tampering against Jones was that
Jones believed that there would be an official investigation
into his handling of the incident with Girlfriend and Travis.
Jones then attempted to get Travis to cover up the events of
that incident by te11ing Travis the next morning that he had
been passed out during the time that Jones was at his house.
~

31 The magistrate dismissed the witness tampering charge
after detem1ining that there was no evidence that an official
investigation into Jones's actions was pending or *J 05
about to be instituted at the time he spoke with Travis.
Perhaps more importantly, the magistrate found no evidence
that Jones believed such an investigation was pending. See
Melessa v. Randall, 121 Fed.Appx. 803,807 (10th Cir.2005)
(interpreting Utah Code section 76-8-508(1) as requiring
a defendant's subjective belief "that an official proceeding
or investigation is cutTently pending or will be initiated in
the future"); State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876-77 (Utah
1985) (per curiam) ("The statute requires no more than that
a defendant believe an official proceeding or investigation
to be underway."). In the absence of evidence that Jones
believed that an official investigation into his actions at
Travis's house was underway or would be initiated in the
future, the magistrate concluded that the State had failed

to adequately establish an element of the crime of witness
tampering and declined to bind Jones over on that charge. 9

fl OJ ,r 32 On appeal, the State argues that Jones knew that
Travis had been arrested for domestic violence shortly after
Jones left the house. The State asks us to draw a reasonable
inference that the resulting investigation of Travis would have
necessarily led to an investigation of Jones's actions. The
State also argues that the evidence that Jones "falsely told a
certainly hung over and possibly memory-impaired Travis"
that he was passed out during the incident gives rise to a
reasonable inference that Jones wanted Travis to repeat the
lie to investigators. We cannot accept either of the State's
proposed inferences.

,r 33 As discussed above, the totality of the evidence presented
at the preliminary hearing shows that Jones went to Travis's
house on the evening of February 15 solely on a family matter
or "personal frolic" that did not constitute an official response
to a domestic violence allegation. See State v. Gardiner, 814
P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1991) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Further, there is nothing in the evidence to
support an inference that, at any time during Jones's visit, his
"primary role shifted from that of a [family member] to that
of a peace officer." See Salt Lake Oty v. Christensen, 2007
UT App 254, ,r 14, 167 P .3d 496. Thus, the mere fact that
Jones knew of both his own actions and Travis's domestic
violence mTest provided Jones with no reason to be1ieve that
his actions were like1y to be the subject of any sort of official
investigation. We cannot infer Jones's belief of an official
investigation from his actions when-based on the evidence
presented below-those actions did not constitute a crime or
othenvise suggest the likelihood of au investigation.

,r

34 We also cannot agree that the mere fact that Jones
told Travis that he was passed out gives rise to a reasonable
inference that Jones be]ieved an investigation was impending.
See generally State v. Garcia-Vargas, 2012 UT App 270, ii
17 n. 5, 287 P.3d 474 ("[A]n inference is a deduction as to
the existence of a fact which human experience teaches us
can reasonably and logical1y be drawn from proof of other
facts." (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)). If there was some independent reason for
Jones to believe that there would be an investigation, then his
statement to Travis might give rise to an inference that he
lied to Travis in order to impede that investigation. But in the
absence of other evidence that Jones believed an investigation
was likely, we cannot "reasonably and logically" deduce that

;.:.
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Jones believed that an investigation was pending merely from
the evidence that he told Travis that he was passed out. See id.

against Jones, the magistrate properly declined to bind Jones
over for trial on the witness tampering charge.

[111

,i 35 "Under Utah law, a magistrate is 'free to decline
bindoverwhere the facts presented by the prosecution provide
no more than a basis for speculation-as opposed to providing
a basis for a reasonable belief.'" State v. Graham, 2013 UT
App 109, ,i 17, 302 P .3d 824 (quoting State v. Virgin, 2006
UT 29, ,r 21, 137 P.3d 787). "[S]peculation is defined as the
'act or practice of theorizing about matters over which there
is no certain *106 knowledge.' " State v. Hester, 2000 UT
App 159, iJ 16, 3 P.3d 725 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary
1407 (7th ed.1999)), abrogated on other grounds by State v.
Clark, 2001 UT 9, 20 P.3d 300. In the absence of any other
evidence that Jones believed that he would be subject to an
official investigation, the State's proposed inference of Jones's
belief from his alleged falsehood to Travis constitutes such
speculation.
~

,i 36 The State's proposed inference is also not the only
possible explanation of Jones's statement such that the
inference might be supported as the only explanation
available. Indeed, it seems just as likely that Jones visited
Travis in jail simply to check on his condition and told Travis
that he had passed out-which Travis had apparently done
before Jones left the house-so as not to prompt a discussion
of the prior evening's events. If there was independent
evidence to support the State's proposed inference, then
there would be a question for a jury to resolve. See State
v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,i,r 15-21, 305 P.3d 1058. But
we see no other evidence to support the theory that Jones
sought to impede an investigation of his actions. 1o In the
absence of such evidence, the State's proposed inference asks
us to infer Jones's belief in an investigation merely from the
allegation that Jones told a falsehood about the past event that
would have been the subject of the purported investigation.
This represents speculation rather than reasoned and logical
deduction. See generally Garcia- Va1gas, 2012 UT App 270,
117 n. 5,287 P.3d 474 (recognizing the "difference between
drawing a reasonable inference and merely speculating about
possibilities").

ii

37 For these reasons, the magistrate appropriately
detem1ined that the State failed to produce evidence that Jones
believed that there was, or would be, any official investigation
into his actions at the time he made the alleged false statement
to Travis. Because belief in a present or pending investigation
is an element of the crime of witness tampering as charged

CONCLUSION
, 3 8 The magistrate appropriately concluded that the State
did not present "evidence sufficient to support a reasonable
belief' that Jones violated any official duties during his visit
to Travis's house on February 15 or that he believed that
he would face official investigation when he falsely told
Travis the next morning that Travis had been passed out
during the visit. See Maughan, 2013 UT 37, 114, 305 P.3d
1058 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
magistrate therefore acted within its "limited discretion" in
dismissing the charges of official neglect and misconduct,
official misconduct, and witness tampering against Jones.
See State v. Machan, 2013 UT 72, ~ 18, 322 P.3d 655.
Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate's dismissal order.

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge (concurring in part, concurring in
the result in part, and dissenting in part):
,r 39 I concur in the lead opinion's analysis in Section I
regarding official neglect and misconduct in violation of
Utah Code section 10-3-826 and concur in the result as
to the conclusion reached in Section III regarding witness
tampering in violation of Utah Code section 76-8-508(1 ). I
disagree, however, with the lead opinion's determination in
Section II that the magistrate correctly dismissed the charge
of official misconduct in violation of Utah Code section 768-201, which provides that "[a] public servant is guilty of
a class B misdemeanor if, with an intent to benefit himself
or another, he ... knowingly refrains from performing a duty
imposed on him by law or clearly inherent in the nature of
his office." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-201 (LexisNexis 2008).
The magistrate determined, and the lead opinion agrees, that
because Jones did not initially respond as a police officer
to his brother's house on a domestic-violence call but rather
as Travis's brother, and because no altercation occmTed in
Jones's presence between *107 Travis and Girlfriend, Jones
was not acting in his official capacity as a law enforcement
officer and was thus not required to perfom1 the duties
imposed on law enforcement officers by the Act. See id. §
77-36-2.1 (1) ("A law enforcement officer who responds to
an allegation of domestic violence shall use all reasonable
means to protect the victim and prevent further violence .... ");
id. § 77-36-2.2(2)(a) (providing that an officer responding
to a domestic violence call "shall arrest without a warrant or
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shall issue a citation to any person that the peace officer has
probable cause to believe has committed an act of domestic
violence''). I respectfully dissent as to Section II.

,r 40 To begin, I agree that the Act "does not impose its duties
on all police officers at all times, but rather on police officers
who are responding to allegations of domestic violence.,,
See supra ,r 20. I also agree that the circumstances that
prompted Jones's visit to Travis and Girlfriend's house on
Febmary 15, 2011, even while he was on duty, in uniform,
and traveling in his police vehicle, do not alone give rise to
a reasonable inference that Jones was responding in a law
enforcement capacity to a domestic-violence call. And I agree
that Jones's visit to Travis's house was initially "a purely
unofficial family matter." See supra,r 24. However, I disagree
with the magistrate's and the lead opinion's conclusion that,
once he atTived at his brother's house and was informed of
the situation for which it tums out he had been summoned
'
Jones did not at that point have a duty to officially respond as a
law enforcement officer to Girlfriend's allegation of domestic
violence. See id. § 77-36-2. I (I).

,r

41 In my view, the lead opinion incorrectly concludes
that "nothing occuned during Jones's visit to the house to
conve1t the incident from a purely personal incident into a law
enforcement matter." See supra ,r 28. Rather, what admittedly
started out as a "personal frolic" turned into a situation
requiring Jones to respond as a law enforcement officer once
he discovered the situation at Travis and Girlfriend's house.
Specifically, Jones arrived at his brother's residence anned
with the know ledge of the violent history between Travis
and Girlftiend and of Travis's tendency to become violent
after consuming alcohol. Upon his arrival, Jones observed
that Travis was intoxicated, found Girlfriend in her car talkinob
on the phone, and learned from Girlfriend that "Travis was

duty as a sworn peace officer "to preserve law and order [and]
to detect and deter crime, [and act] within the scope of his
authority as a peace officer.'' Salt Lake City v. Christensen,
2007 UT App 254, ,r 14, 167 P.3d 496 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Jones was therefore obligated to
discharge his duties under the Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§
77-36-2.1, -2.2.

,r

42 In passing the Act, our legislature has removed
some of the discretion a police officer has in responding
to allegations of domestic violence and has statutorily
mandated certain procedures on the part of those police
officers. "[B]ecause domestic violence is serious in nature
and has a high likelihood of repeated violence, incidents
of domestic abuse require the mandatory and immediate
attention oflaw enforcement." State v. Farrow, 919 P.2d 50,
54 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (discussing the policy underlying the
legislature's enactment of Utah Code title 77, chapter 36, then
called the Spouse Abuse Procedures Act); see also Utah Code
Ann. § 77-36-2.2( I) ("The primary duty oflaw enforcement
officers responding to a domestic violence call is to protect
the victim and enforce the law."). Given the mandatory
*108 response required by law, once he became aware of
Girlfriend's allegation of domestic violence, Jones had a duty
to use all reasonable means to protect her and to prevent
fmther violence between Travis and Girlfriend that night.
Whether Jones failed to comply with his law enforcement
duties as required by the Act, and whether such failure was
committed knowingly and with the intent to benefit himself
or Travis, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-201, are ultimately
questions for the fact-finder. Consequently, I would reverse
the magistrate's dismissal of the official misconduct charge
and remand for further proceedings. I therefore dissent from
the lead opinion on this point.

out of control," had allegedly kicked Girlfriend in the leg, 11

Parallel Citations

and had hanned himself. 12 Once he received Girlfriend's
statement that Travis had allegedly assaulted her, Jones had a

763 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 2014 UT App 142

Footnotes
The Honorable Pamela T. Greenwood, Senior Judge, sat by special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code Jud
Admin. R. 11-201(6).
.

2
3
4

-- ----

The interview focused on Jones's actions on the night of February 15, and there were no questions or discussions about his visit to
Travis in jail the next moming.
In addition to constituting a class A misdemeanor, conviction of a municipal officer for official neglect and misconduct also mandates
removal ~rom office ~nd inel!gibility "for any municipal office thereafter." See Utah Code Ann.§ 10-3-826 (LexisNexis 2012).
The Act imposes various duties on law enforcement officers responding to reports of domestic violence. Amono these duties arc that
"'[a] law enforcement officer who responds to an allegation of domestic violence shall use all reasonable mean:to protect the victim

-··---~-
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and prevent further violence," Utah Code Ann.§ 77-36-2.1(1) (LexisNexis 2012), and "shall give written notice to the victim in
simple language, describing the rights and remedies available" to the victim under Utah statutes addressing cohabitant abuse and
child protective orders, id. § 77-36-2.1 (2)(a). The Act requires that a law enforcement officer responding to a domestic vio1ence call
"shall arrest without a warrant or shall issue a citation to any person that the peace officer has probable cause to believe has committed
an act of domestic violence." Id.§ 77-36-2.2(2)(a) (Supp.2013). The Act also imposes certain reporting requirements, including

{j

5

6

7

8

Although we determine that the Act's duties arc triggered only by official responses to domestic violence, we agree with the State
that the Act is not limited to situations where a call to authorities specifically alleges domestic violence. Police officers have many
different types of official interactions with the public, and whether any particular incident triggers the Act's duties depends on the
circumstances.
In Christensen. the comt expressly stated,
Questions about the scope of a peace officer's authority arise in many different contexts, including respondcat superior, workers'
compensation, and civil rights cases. We specifically note that our analysis and holding in this case should not be construed as
applying in all contexts in which the question of an officer's authority may arise.
Salt Lake City v. Christensen, 2007 UT App 254, ~ 13 n. 3, 167 P.3d 496.
We note that the officer in Christensen was not deemed to be acting in a law enforcement capacity until he reacted to the defendant's
threat of immediate physical violence. See 2007 UT App 254, ,i 14, 167 P.3d 496. The officer initially remained in his unofficial,
security guard capacity despite his knowledge that the defendant was a suspect in a recent and serious domestic violence incident.
Id. , 3. The officer also remained in his unofficial capacity as he endured fifteen to twenty minutes of the defendant's "obscene
outbursts," twice heard the defendant threaten to kill his brother upon being released from the hospital, and requested police backup
due to the defendant's "large size, belligerent behavior, and the fact that he was a suspect in a domestic violence incident.'' Id. 14.

9

The magistrate also ruled that Travis's potential testimony would have been in-elevant to any investigation into Jones's actions because
Girlfriend was the only witness to Jones's allegedly improper response to her allegation of domestic violence against Travis. We do
not address this po11ion of the magistrate's mling, but we note that Girlfriend and Jones both told the State's investigator that Travis
was awake when Jones arrived at the house.

10

To the contrary, Jones freely discussed the events at Travis's house with the State's investigator, including the fact that Travis was
not passed out when Jones an-ived at the house.
A criminal assault is, among other things, "an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another
or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-102(1){c) (LcxisNexis 2012). An allegation of a
kick in the leg can therefore constitute an allegation of assault.

~

11

vu

the requirement that an officer "who does not make an arrest after investigating a complaint of domestic violence ... shall submit a
detailed, written report specifying the grounds for not arresting any party." Id.§ 77-36-2.2(5)(a). Additionally, "[a] law enforcement
officer responding to a complaint of domestic violence shall prepare an incident report that includes the officer's disposition of the
case." Id. § 77-36-2.2(6)(a). It is undisputed in this case that Jones did not give Girlfriend written notice of her rights and remedies,
did not arrest or cite Travis for domestic violence, and did not file either a failure-to-arrest report or an incident report.
Kamas City Ordinance # 02-1 establishes both the Kamas Police Department and the position of chief of police. See Kamas, Utah,
Ordinance# 02-L para. 01 (May 28, 2002). Certain duties under the ordinance are exclusive to the municipal office of police chief,
including the duty to "organize, supervise, and be responsible for all the activities of the police department'' and to "execute all lawful
orders of the Mayor and City Council." See id. para. 02.

12

It is less clear what duty Jones may have had in response to Travis's initial allegation of domestic abuse against Girlfriend, given
Travis's later admission that the allegation was false. See supra~ 5. However, because Girlfriend's allegation was sufficient to trigger
Jones's duties under the Act, I express no opinion as to whether Travis's initial allegations would have also triggered those duties.
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Addendum B

§ 76-8-201. Official misconduct--Unauthorized acts or failure of duty, UT ST § 76-8-201

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 8. Offenses Against the Administration of Government
Part 2. Abuse of Office

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-201
§ 76-8-201. Official misconduct--Unauthorized acts or failure of duty

Currentness
A public servant is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, with an intent to benefit himself or another or to harm another, he
knowingly commits an unauthorized act which purports to be an act of his office, or knowingly refrains from performing a duty
imposed on him by law or clearly inherent in the nature of his office.

Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-8-201.

Notes of Decisions (1)
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-201, UT ST§ 76-8-201
Current through 2012 Fourth Special Session.
Entl ofDo<"umt>nt

t) 20\ 3 Thomson Rcutl:rs. No claim to c1riginal U.S. Governmeni Wo,ks.

1

\Nestl~NNexr © 2013 ihomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government \AJorks.

§ 76-8-508. Tampering with witness-Receiving or soliciting a bribe, UT ST § 76-8-508

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 76. Utah Ctiminal Code
Chapter 8. Offenses Against the Administration of Government
Part 5. Falsification in Official Matters (Refs & Annos)
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-508
§ 76-8-508. Tampering with witness--Receiving or soliciting a bribe

Currentness

@

( 1) A person is guilty of the third degree felony of tampering with a witness if, believing that an official proceeding or
investigation is pending or about to be instituted, or with the intent to prevent an official proceeding or investigation, he attempts
to induce or otherwise cause another person to:

(a) testify or inform falsely;

(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, or item;

(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or

(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has been summoned.

(2) A person is guilty of the third degree felony of soliciting or receiving a bribe as a witness if he solicits, accepts, or agrees
to accept any benefit in consideration of his doing any of the acts specified under Subsection (1).

(3) The offense of tampering with a witness or soliciting or receiving a bribe under this section does not merge with any other
substantive offense committed in the course of committing any offense under this section.

Credits

Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-8-508; Laws 1988, c. 175, § 1; Laws 2000, c. I,§ 115, eff. May l, 2000; Laws 2004, c. 140, § 3,
eff. May 3, 2004.

Notes of Decisions (27)
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-508, UT ST§ 76-8-508
Current through 2012 Fourth Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 77-36-2.1. Duties of law enforcement officers--Notice to victims, UT ST § 77-36-2.1

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
Chapter 36. Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act (Refs & Annos)

U.C.A. 1953 § 77-36-2.1
§ 77-36-2.1. Duties oflaw enforcement officers--Notice to victims

Currentness
( 1) A law enforcement officer who responds to an allegation of domestic violence shall use all reasonable means to protect the
victim and prevent further violence, including:

(a) taking the action that, in the officer's discretion, is reasonably necessary to provide for the safety of the victim and any
family or household member;

(b) confiscating the weapon or weapons involved in the alleged domestic violence;

(c) making arrangements for the victim and any child to obtain emergency housing or shelter;

(d) providing protection while the victim removes essential personal effects;

(e) arrange, facilitate, or provide for the victim and any child to obtain medical treatment; and

( f) arrange, facilitate, or provide the victim with immediate and adequate notice of the rights of victims and of the remedies
and services available to victims of domestic violence, in accordance with Subsection (2).

(2)(a) A law enforcement officer shall give written notice to the victim in simple language, describing the rights and remedies
available under this chapter, Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 2, Child
Protective Orders.

(b) The written notice shall also include:

(i) a statement that the fonns needed in order to obtain an order for protection are available from the court clerk's office
in the judicial district where the victim resides or is temporarily domiciled;

(ii) a list of shelters, services, and resources available in the appropriate community, together with telephone numbers, to
assist the victim in accessing any needed assistance; and

(iii) the infonnation required to be provided to both parties in accordance with Subsection 77-36-2.5 (8).

WesttawNeX'.f © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

§ 77-36-2.1. Duties of law enforcement officers--Notice to victims, UT ST § 77-36-2.1

Credits

Laws 1995, c. 300, § 18, eff. July 1, 1995; Laws 1998, c. 13, § 92, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2003, c. 68, § 8, eff. May 5, 2003;
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 260, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2011, c. 113, § 2, eff. May l 0, 2011.

U.C.A. 1953 § 77-36-2.1, UT ST§ 77-36-2.1
Cllrrent through 2012 Fourth Special Session.
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§ 77-36-2.2. Powers and duties of law enforcement officers to ..., UT ST§ 77..JS-2.2

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
Chapter 36. Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act (Refs &Annos)
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-36-2.2
§ 77-36-2.2. Powers and duties of law enforcement officers to arrest--

Reports of domestic violence cases--Reports of patties' marital status
Currentness
(1) The primary duty of law enforcement officers responding to a domestic violence call is to protect the victim and enforce
the law.

(2)(a) In addition to the arrest powers described in Section 77-7-2, when a peace officer responds to a domestic violence call
and has probable cause to believe that an act of domestic violence has been committed, the peace officer shall arrest without
a warrant or shall issue a citation to any person that the peace officer has probable cause to believe has committed an act of
domestic violence.

(b)(i) If the peace officer has probable cause to believe that there will be continued violence against the alleged victim, or
if there is evidence that the perpetrator has either recently caused serious bodily injury or used a dangerous weapon in the
domestic violence offense, the officer shall arrest and take the alleged perpetrator into custody, and may not utilize the option
of issuing a citation under this section.

(ii) For purposes of Subsection (2)(b)(i), "serious bodily injury" and "dangerous weapon" mean the same as those terms
are defined in Section 76-1-601.

(c) lf a peace officer does not immediately exercise arrest powers or initiate criminal proceedings by citation or otherwise,
the officer shall notify the victim of the right to initiate a criminal proceeding and of the importance of preserving evidence,
in accordance with the requirements of Section 77-36-2.1.

(3) If a law enforcement officer receives complaints of domestic violence from two or more opposing persons, the officer
shall evaluate each complaint separately to determine who the predominant aggressor was. If the officer determines that one
person was the predominant physical aggressor, the officer need not arrest the other person alleged to have committed domestic
violence. In determining who the predominant aggressor was, the officer shall consider:

(a) any prior complaints of domestic violence;

(b) the relative severity of injwies inflicted on each person;

(c) the likelihood of future injury to each of the parties; and

WestlawNexr@ 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim lo original U.S. Governrnent Works.
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(d) whether one of the parties acted in self defense,

(4) A law enforcement officer may not threaten, suggest, or otherwise indicate the possible arrest of all parties in order to
discourage any party's request for intervention by law enforcement.

(5)(a) A law enforcement officer who does not make an arrest after investigating a complaint of domestic violence, or who
arrests two or more parties, shall submit a detailed, written report specifying the grounds for not arresting any party or for
arresting both parties.

(b) A law enforcement officer who does not make an arrest shall notify the victim of the right to initiate a criminal proceeding
and of the importance of preserving evidence.

(6)(a) A law enforcement officer responding to a complaint of domestic violence shall prepare an incident report that includes
the officer's disposition of the case.

(b) From January l, 2009 until December 31, 2013, any law enforcement officer employed by a city of the first or second
class responding to a complaint of domestic violence shall also report, either as a part of an incident report or on a separate
fonn, the following information:

(i) marital status of each of the parties involved;

{ii) social, familial, or legal relationship of the suspect to the victim; and

(iii) whether or not an arrest was made.

(c) The information obtained in Subsection (6)(b):

(i) shall be reported monthly to the department;

(ii) shall be reported as numerical data that contains no personal identifiers; and

(iii) is a public record as defined in Section 63G-2-l03.

(d) The incident report shall be made available to the victim, upon request, at no cost.

(e) The law enforcement agency shall forward a copy of the incident report to the appropriate prosecuting attorney within
five days after the complaint of domestic violence occurred.

WestlawNexr@ 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government V\Jorks.

©

iii)

§ 77-36-2.2. Powers and duties of law enforcement officers to .•. , UT ST§ 77-36-2.2

(7) Each law enforcement agency shall, as soon as practicable, make a written record and maintain records of all incidents of
domestic violence reported to it, and shall be identified by a law enforcement agency code for domestic violence.

Credits
Laws 1995, c. 300, § 19, eff. July 1, 1995; Laws 1998, c. 105, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2008, c. 375, § 2, eff. May 5, 2008.

G¼)

Notes of Decisions (1)
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-36-2.2, UT ST§ 77-36-2.2
Current through 2012 Fourth Special Session.
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1

SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH - NOVEMBER 28, 2011

2

JUDGE L.A. DEVER PRESIDING

3

(Transcriber's note: speaker identification

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)
P R O C E E D I N G S

5
6

(Whereupon a sidebar was held - inaudible}

7

MR. BATES: We will invoke the exclusionary rule.

8

THE COURT: Okay.

9
10

Who all is going to be witnesses

in this case?
MR. BATES: I have three witnesses here, Your Honor.

11

One of them is the case agent, Craig Gibson, and I ask that

12

he be allowed to remain throughout the proceeding.

13

THE COURT: Very well.

14

(Inaudible)

15

THE COURT: You have no witnesses, Mr. Yengich?

16

MR. YENGICH:

17

THE COURT: Okay.

18

MR. BATES: The State would call Agent Craig Gibson.

19

(Inaudible conversation)

20

MR. YENGICH: Do you have the amendments to that

21
22

23
24
25

(Inaudible).
Call your first witness.

(inaudible)?
MR. BATES: I believe I amended that information
[inaudible].
MR. YENGICH: If he did so I have no objection to
that, Your Honor.
1

THE COURT: Very well.

1

CRAIG GIBSON

2

3

Having first been duly sworn, testified

4

upon his oath as follows:

5

THE COURT: Please state your name and spell your

6

name for the court clerk.

7

MR. GIBSON: Craig Gibson, C-R-A-I-G G-I-B-S-0-N.

8

THE COURT: Thank you.

9

You may proceed, counsel.
DIRECT EXAMINATION

10
11

BY MR. BATES:

12

Q

Agent Gibson, what's your current occupation?

13

A

I'm an investigator with the Utah Attorney

14

General's office.

15

Q

How long have you been doing that?

16

A

Two years.

17

Q

What did you do.before you were at the Attorney

18
19

General's office?
A

Immediately prior I retired, but prior to that that

20

I was in the Layton Police Department for four years,

21

West Valley Police Department for 20 years, University of

22

Utah for three years, and U.S. Air Force for four years.

23

law enforcement.

24

Q

In law enforcement.

25

A

Thirty-two years.

the

In

So total law enforcement -

2

1

Q

Thirty plus years?

2

A

Yes, sir.

3

Q

Do you know the defendant in this case, Adam Jones?

4

A

I met Chief Jones on March 7 th when I interviewed

6

Q

And what was the subject of your interview?

7

A

I was looking into a possible neglected (inaudible)

5

him.

8

case and wanted to interview Chief Jones regarding his

9

response to a domestic violence case involving his brother

10

and I guess now his sister-in-law.

11

Q

Who is Mr. Jones's brother?

12

A

Travis Jones.

13

Q

Who's his sister-in-law?

14

A

Darcy Martinez Jones.

15

Q

Let's just start at the beginning of that

16

interview.

17

you ask him to start the interview?

18

A

What kinds of questions - sort of questions did

I initially wanted to establish whether or not he

19

was on duty, so I asked him if he was on duty, what time his

20

shift began, where he was, how he received a call from Ms.

".,
L.L

Martinez.

22
23

Q

And what was the date of this incident, if you

recall?

24

A

It was February 15 th •

25

Q

And what were the - what were his answers to those
3

1

2

questions [inaudible]?
A

He indicated that he was at his office in Kamas. He

3

received the - a phone call and didnrt recognize the number.

4

He answered the phone call, and it was on his personal phone.

5

He - it was Ms. Martinez. She requested that he come over.

6

At the time he thought that he wanted to ask her some - or

7

she wanted to ask him some questions about her son that they

8

were having some problems with, he responded to the home, and

9

when he arrived he found that - they encountered his brother

10

11

Travis (inaudible).
Q

Now did he indicate to you whether he was attired

12

in uniform, or if he took his police vehicle or anything of

13

that sort of information?

14

A

He did.

He indicated that he was in uniform, I

15

he came to the interview in uniform, so I asked him if he was

16

dressed like he was and he indicated he was.

17

indicated that he took his police vehicle (inaudible).

18
19

Q

He also

And did he indicate to you whether he was, in fact,

on duty at the time that call came in?

20

A

He did say he was, yes.

21

Q

What did you ask him next?

22

A

Basically went into what he found when he arrived

23

at the home.

24

who he contacted.

25

Q

Wanted to find out what his observations were,

Did he tell you where this home was at?
4
r·~

~

He said it was about four blocks from the police

1

A

2

department.

3

report, but he said it wasn't very far, it didn't take him

4

that long to get from his office to the home.

I had the address on - I'm sure it's in the

5

Q

Now, which police department are you talking about?

6

A

Kamas Police Department where he is the chief.

7

Q

So how did he respond to that question?

8

A

He indicated that he met his brother Travis at the

9

door.

His observation was that his brother was intoxicated

10

and he said that his brother basically told him to go into

11

the garage and talk to Ms. Martinez and get the story from

12

her about what happened.

13
14
15

Q

Did he describe his brother's physical appearance

to you?
A

He said he appeared to be intoxicated, I think he

16

used the term drunk.

He did note that he had some scratches

17

on his chest. I guess his brother answered the door in his

18

shorts, so he could see the scratches on his chest.

19

he spoke with him and he got a good indication that he did

20

appear to be intoxicated.

21

Q

Did he speak with Ms. Martinez?

22

A

Yes.

He - so

He proceeded to the garage, that's where Ms.

23

Martinez was. He spoke with her about her condition.

24

Apparently Ms. Martinez indicated to him that Travis was out

25

of control and that Chief Jones was the person that could
5

1
2

Did Mr. Jones tell you whether that night when he

was investigating this incident, whether Darcy Martinez had

4

reported any kind of assault by Travis Jones?
A

He did.

He said that Ms. Martinez had told him

6

that Travis had kicked her in the leg. He said that he looked

7

at her leg and didn't see any marks and didn't see any damage

8

to any of the car or anything that - they were in the garage

9

and the car was in the garage.

10
11
12

Q

So how did - did Mr. Jones - I should say Adam

Jones tell you how he decided to resolve this case?
A

He went back in and talked to Travis because of the

13

scratches on the - on Travis's chest.

14

and found out that Travis had actually self-inflicted the

15

scratches.

16

17

18

__

Q

3

5

__..

talk to him and control him.and get him to settle down.

Q

He resolved that issue

He Now, did you know why Travis had self-inflicted

those scratches?
A

Apparently what he'd been told was that he wanted

19

to get Darcy in trouble, or Ms. Martinez in trouble, and that

20

was his original purpose, I guess, in placing the scratches

21

on his chest, and so he found out that they were self-

22

inflicted.

23

Q

Okay.

24

A

He basically put Travis to bed, I believe is what

25

So what did he decide to do with this case?

his statement was, and told them that if they wanted police

,

6

1

involvement he couldn't get involved because he was Travis's

2

brother, but if they wanted to make a police report or get

3

the police involved, they would need to call Summit County

4

Sheriff's office.

5

Q

Okay.

Now, did you ask him any questions about his

6

knowledge of Travis's - of Travis and Darcy's history

7

together?

8
9

A

Yes.

We discussed - I think Chief Jones seemed to

be frustrated with their history together. They have had a

10

history apparently of this type of domestics, and he was - he

11

seemed to be frustrated with both their behaviors.

12

aware that when his brother got drunk that he would get

13

violent and had had some past history with those things.

14
15

Q

Okay.

He was

Did Mr. Jones indicate whether he was aware

that Travis had ever assaulted Darcy before?

16

A

17

in the past.

18

aware when they were living I believe in West Valley, he

19

mentioned that when they were in West Valley, he had been

20

called before by them to try to resolve issues.

21

22
23

Q

I believe he stated he had been aware of assaults
It was some years ago, but yes, he had been

Okay.

What did Mr. Jones tell you - Mr. Adam Jones

tell you about his brother when his brother gets drunk?
A

He said he can get stupid. He can be violent. He

24

can be unreasonable.

25

him back down verbally, but he does get - he can get

He said normally Chief Jones can calm

7

.~
\//!!JI

1

extremely violent.

2

agencies or - I don't know if it was Summit County or who he

3

was specifically talking about, but he said that he has told

4

them that he will fight with police and he will run.

5

told me that.

6

Q

Okay.

He said that he has told other police

@

Now, what did - let's finish that question

7

we started a few minutes ago.

8

about how he ended up resolving this situation?

9

A

He had

What did Chief Jones tell you

He basically again went back, put them to bed, made

10

sure that - put Travis to bed is how he - put him in his

11

bedroom, put him to bed, told them to stay away from each

12

other, and then left the residence.

13

Q

Did he tell you whether he did anything to comply

14

with the requirements of the Co-habitant Abuse Act as far as

15

citing, arresting, writing reports, providing information?

16

A

Right, I asked him some questions regarding that

17

because that's obviously the nature of a police officer's

18

duties when they respond to a domestic violence case -

19

MR. YENGICH: Objection.

Ask that that be stricken

20

because that is not necessarily what the law says.

He can

21'

indicate what questions he asked, but can't make the legal

22

conclusion.

23

THE COURT: Sustained.

24

THE WITNESS: Do you want to re-ask that or do you

25

want me to try to re-phrase my answer?
8

1

MR. BATES: Your Honor?

2

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).

3

MR. BATES: If I could just respond briefly to

4

counsel's objection.

5

THE COURT: Okay.

6

MR. BATES: This case is not simply about what the

7

law requires.

Under the third count that I have filed in

8

this case, it is a criminal act to fail to comply with a duty

9

that is imposed by the law, or a duty that is clearly

10

inherent in the nature of the employment or the office.

11

believe it's appropriate for this witness to not only testify

12

about what the Co-habitant Abuse Act requires, but also to

13

testify about what would be inherent and clear as far as the

14

duties of a police officer responding to a domestic violence

15

situation.

16

believe he's qualified to make that sort of testimony.

17

He's an officer of 30 years' experience.

So I

I

MR. YENGICH: And I object to that, Your Honor.

The

18

act itself actually is not as cut and dry as counsel believes

19

it to be, at least in my opinion.

20

and other officers should do.

He can't indicate what he

He can indicate what this

gentleman told him at the time that he interviewed him
22

because he has not been established as an expert on this act,

23

or how an individual should respond, and that was the

24

character of the question, Your Honor.

25

THE COURT: I believe Mr. Yengich is right, Mr.
9

1

Bates.

2

domestic violence matter or not.
MR. BATES: Well, I'll lay some foundation.

3

4

I don't know if this man has ever investigated a

Q

(BY MR. BATES) Agent Gibson, during your 30 years

5

of experience as a police officer, how many times did you

6

investigate domestic violence crimes?

7
8
9

A

I honestly don't know, because I've investigated

several.
Q

Okay.

Have you ever received any kind of training

10

on, you know, proper police tactics and procedures in

11

responding to domestic violence crimes?

12

13
14
15
16

A

Yes, sir.

violence training.
Q

Can you estimate approximately how many hours over

how many years?
A

I honestly can't give you an estimate of the hours

17

I have.

18

I honestly can't.

19

Over the years I've received domestic

Q

Any estimate I would give would be just a guess, and

Okay.

Can you estimate at least how many times in

20

your career, whether it was on an annual basis or every five

21

years, you might have received domestic violence training?

22

A

When I first went to West Valley, the department

23

was piloting a victim's advocate program for a victim's

24

advocate to respond to domestic violence, and so West Valley

25

at that time was very involved in the investigation, and

10

1

proper investigation, proper handling of domestic violence

2

cases.

3

Q

4
5

Okay.

And did you receive training from West

Valley during that time?
A

Yes, I did.

6

MR. YENGICH: May I voir dire quickly, Your Honor?

7

THE COURT: You may.
VOIR DIRE

8
9

BY MR. YENGICH:

10

Q

When did you leave West Valley?

11

A

2004, sir.

12

Q

2004.

13

A

Yes, sir.

14

Q

You didn't work at West Valley after 2008.

15

A

Correct.

16

Q

All right, and you've been with the Attorney

17

General's office since when?

18

A

Since 2009.

19

Q

2009.

20
r'\ 1

L.1.

22

MR. YENGICH: It's irrelevant, Your Honor.
Everything he did predates this statute.
MR. BATES: And Your Honor, this is not just about

23

the statute.

The statute is one way to make out this crime.

24

Another way to make out this crime is to demonstrate what is

25

clearly inherent in the duties of the office of a police
11

1

2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9

officer.
THE COURT: Why don't we concentrate on what the
statute says?

Worry about that, okay?

MR. BATES: Now, are you referring to the criminal
statute at issue here or the Co-habitant Abuse Act?
THE COURT: I'm assuming you're referring to count
three, aren't you?

MR. BATES: Yes.
of count three.

And Your Honor, you have my copy

Perhaps I'm mis-remembering the language of

10

the statute.

11

knowingly refrained from performing the duty imposed on him

12

by law, or clearly inherent in the nature of his office.

13

I think regardless of whether a particular act is required by

14

the Co-habitant Abuse Act, if there's some function that is

15

clearly inherent in the nature

16

would be the proper subject of this preliminary examination.

17

It requires that I demonstrate that he

So
Q

O .c
L

a-

police officer, that

MR. YENGICH: The problem with that argument - and I

18

don't mind making this statement in front of the gentlemen -

19

is that there is nothing inherent in performing the duties of

20

an officer, because officers are given general discretion

21

consistently to make determinations on the basis of what they

22

observed at the time.

23

inherent in count three, as well as is inherent in count two,

24

if you read the statute carefully.

25

that he believes police officers have to do a particular

Indeed, I would argue that that's

He can't make a judgment

-··-

12

1

thing, because it's inherent in their duties to have

2

discretion, and the Court can take judicial knowledge of

3

that.

4

THE COURT: Okay.

5

MR. YENGICH: It happens every day, and the Court

6

hears testimony relative to that every day.

7

MR. BATES: And Your Honor, I think what counsel's

8

asking this Court to do is to substitute its judgment about

9

what proper police procedure. is for the judgment of an

10

officer with 30 years' experience.
MR. YENGICH: I'm not asking the Court to do that.

11

12

I'm asking the Court to make a determination that it's not

13

this officer's judgment as to what the purpose behind either

14

count two or three is relative to the determination made by a

15 ·

police officer on the scene.

16

to get the Court to do.

17

has foundation not been adequately laid, it's an opinion that

18

I would submit to the Court is - doesn't fall under the 701

19

and 702 and that sequence of evidentiary rules even at a

20

preliminary hearing because it's speculation on his part.

01

That's what they're attempting

And that is an opinion that not only

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Bates, I'm going to allow you

L..l.

22

to have him testify as to what this man did, and what he said

23

he was supposed to do.

24
25

Okay?

MR. BATES: Okay.

Ill
13

DIRECT EXAMINATION (resumed)

1

BY MR. BATES:

2
3

Q

Agent, will you please describe for the Court what

4

Mr. Jones told you that he either did or did not do relevant

5

to the investigation of this incident on February 15 th ?

6

A

I asked him if he had provided or facilitated

7

medical attention for either his brother Travis or Ms.

8

Martinez and he indicated he had not.

9

provided written material to either his brother or Mr.

I asked him if he had

10

Martinez regarding options available to them for victim's

11

assistance and he said he did not.

12

completed a report when he left the area, and he indicated

13

that he did not.

14

Q

I asked him if he

And did you ask him whether he had either cited or

arrested Travis Jones based on this incident?

15
16

A

I don't remember asking him specifically if he

C<.

~

17

cited or arrested him, but he told me that he put him to bed

18

and left.

19

he cited or arrested either party.

So I don't know that I specifically asked him if
I

don't think I did.

20

MR. BATES: Can I have just a moment, Your Honor?

21

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).

22

MR. BATES: Your Honor, that's all the questions I
have of this witness right now.

23

THE COURT:

24

( Inaudible) .

Ill

25
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1
2

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. YENGICH:

3

Q

Good afternoon.

4

A

Mr. Yengich.

5

Q

You never interviewed Darcy, am I correct in that?

6

A

I did interview Darcy.

7

Q

v.I.VI..(
..... ,, -

8

A

Yes, sir

9

Q

- you were the interviewer, or were you present for

10

were

the interview?

11

A

I actually was the interviewer.

12

Q

You were the interviewer.

13

A

It was a co-interview, but I was the primary

14
15
16

interviewer, if that helps.
Q

Okay.

All right, but you interviewed Adam first,

am I correct?

17

A

No, no.

I interviewed Darcy first.

18

Q

First?

19

A

Ms. Martinez first.

20

Q

I got that wrong.

Okay.

When you interviewed Adam, the

21

defendant in this case, he

22

his private phone; is that correct?

23

A

That's correct.

24

Q

All right.

25

a call from Darcy on

He didn't receive it on - through the

switchboard or through dispatch for Summit County or Kamas
15

1

City; is that correct?

2

A

That's correct.

3

Q

And that when he received that phone call, he

4

didn't know who it was from initially, true?

5

A

Correct.

6

Q

But he responded to that phone call and found out

7

it was Darcy, correct?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Who he knew by voice?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

And that he felt that the reason she was calling

12

him was because earlier that day or at some point, his

13

brother had brought him some photograph - or some picture

14

drawings that were done by Darcy's son; is that correct?

15

A

That's what he told me.

16

Q

And that that had concerned his brother, for

17

whatever reason that is irrelevant here, and that that's what

18

he thought Darcy may be calling him about, correct?

19

A

That's what he told me, yes.

20

Q

And that had nothing to do with domestic violence,

A

That particular statement has nothing to do with

21
22
23

24
25

true?

domestic violence.
Q
his words.

Okay.

And so - and he told you - in fact, here are

"So I says, Well, you know, those drawings he

16

1

gave me, all those drawings, and so my first impression was,

2

she was talking about something about that.

3

come over here."

4

A

So she's like,

Correct?

She said - I'd have to look at that, Mr. Yengich,

5

to make sure that's exactly how it - in context, but I

6

believe that that's what he told me, yes.

7

Q

Okay.

8

A

Is it from the transcript?

9

Q

-

10

I'm reading from the

transcript that has been provided to me by

counsel through you.

11

A

I've got the same one I had, sir. Then that's good.

12

Q

She doesn't say in that initial conversation, me

13

and Travis are in a fight and I want you to come over here

14

and break it up, does she?

15

A

Not that she told me or Chief Jones told me.

16

Q

All right.

In fact, neither one of them told you

17

that that initial call involved domestic violence at all, did

18

it?

19

A

No.

20

Q

All right.

And he said, anytime somebody's - his

L.L

r\.,

brother's in a problem with somebody, they call me.

22

words to that effect.

Again,

23

A

He has said that.

24

Q

And I tell them, don't call me, call the sheriff's

25

office.

Right?
17
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1

A

He's given them that advice.

2

Q

Well, okay, counsel asked you as an experienced

3

officer.

4

you have a problem that involves a family member or a friend

5

and you get a call, do' you see a problem there?

6

initially?

7

someone that you know, or maybe love, or are related to?

8

9

A

I'll ask you a question about, as an officer, if

Just

If you're called as a police officer involving

I

don't think I really - is that the end of the

question, then?

10

Q

Yeah, it is.

11

A

Okay, good.

12

Q

Do you see the - let me put it this way.

13

Do you

see the potential for a problem?

14

A

No.

15

Q

You don't?

16

A

No.

17

Q

So you don't feel as though you should refer that

18

to somebody else if you receive a call about somebody that

19

you know or are related to or love?

20

A

No.

21

Q

Okay.

22

A

Not initially, no, sir.

23

Q

All right.

24

25

And that's because you don't know

exactly what the problem is.
A

True.

18

1
2
3

Q

Okay.

But, do you see at least there to be a

potential for a conflict of interest?
A

There's always a potential for a conflict of

4

interest when it involves a family member.

5

general statement.

6

Q

That's a fairly

Okay, and as an officer, you sometimes have to use

7

your discretion, based upon your judgment and training,

8

how you'll respond to it, correct?

as to

9

A

Yes, sir.

10

Q

Officers use their discretion every day in their

11

line of work, don't they?

12

A

Yes, sir.

13

Q

Okay.

But he says, I tell them to call somebody

14

else because I can't deal with it.

Then he said, so I

15

over and knocked on the door, correct?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

Now, he told you at that time, you testified

went

18

generally about his statements.

19

walked in the door, he wasn't going there for a domestic

20

violence response, correct?

22

A

That's correct.

Q

And in fact,

Do - he told - when he

when you interviewed Darcy, she said

23

she wasn't calling him over there as a domestic violence

24

victim, correct?

25

A

She didn't - she stated that she wasn't calling him
19

®

1

over there as a police officer.

2

his brother.

3

Q

4

Thank you very much.

And that's - those are her

exact words almost, aren't they?

5

6

She was calling him over as

A

They're - without reading them verbatim, that's

pretty close, sir.

Okay.

And that's - and again, Adam told you the

7

Q

8

same thing.

9

did he tell you that he did with his brother before he ever

10

"When I got there,

dealt with Darcy?

I saw my brother," and what

Do you recall?

11

A

I don't recall specifically.

12

Q

All right, he said -

13

A

I'd have to look that up, but -

14

Q

Let me - I ' l l read this -

15

A

I'll let you read it and refresh my memory, thank

16

you.

17

Q

- I'll read it very carefully.

Q

Adam Jones.

Oh,

I'm sorry.

18

Six.

19

drunk, again levels of intoxication, how drunk would you say

20

he was?

21

is an idiot when he is drunk.

22

figure that is what he was at."

And his answer, "Typical normal drunk ass self.

23

A

Okay.

24

Q

Okay?

25

You asked him, did he lo'ok - when he was

He

I can see it, and that is - I
That's what he said to you.

But then you asked him, "Did he look kind of

mad, or was he - was he pretty calm with you?"

And his
20

1

answer, "No, he was calm with me at that time.n

2

A

That's correct.

3

Q

Okay.

You go on - or he goes on as you interview

4

him, and as you're talking to him, Brother says, Darcy's in

5

the garage, and go talk to her.

6

effect.

Or again, words to that

7

A

Very - yes.

8

Q

So when he gets there, they're net even in the same

9

room, correct?

10

A

That's correct.

11

Q

Okay, and there's no yelling back and forth between

12

them, correct?

13

A

That's correct.

14

Q

And although he - his brother says he's got

15

scratches on him, he doesn't tell Adam when he got them or

16

the location of where he got them, within the house or

17

outside the house, correct?

18

19
20

A

I don't recall him telling any - giving any of

those specifics.
Q

Okay.

All right.

So he goes into the garage, and

21

at that time he meets up with Darcy, and once again Darcy

22

tells him that they had been drinking, and that they got into

23

an argument, or words to that effect.

24

she's drinking, she's a complete idiot too.

25

A

But he says that when

Based on his statement, that's what ...
21

1

All right.

Q

And he says

-

or

-

and she says to him,

2

again, this is what Adam tells you, "She is like, no.

3

want you

4

bed, and he needs to know he can't do this to me.

5

looked at her - he told you at least he looked at her shin

6

and could see no visible injuries, correct?

-

A

That's correct.

8

Q

Okay.

10

just

want him to calm down, I just want him to go to

7

9

I

"I am like, that is fine.

I

,,

And he

says" - this is

what Adam tells you - "Do you want me to call the sheriff?"
He asks her that, correct?

11

A

That's - by his statement, yes.

12

Q

Well, Darcy also told you, you said, do you want me

13

to do anything, you want me to call the cops?

14

A

Right.

15

Q

And she says no.

16

A

Correct.

17

Q

All right.

By her statement also.

And he says - "I says, do you want me

18

to call the sheriff's office, because if you want to file a

19

report, they need to come here."

That's what he tells her.

20

A

Correct.

21

Q

Darcy also iterates that when you talk to her.

22

A

According to their statements.

23

Q

And she said no.

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

All right.

Right?

Both Adam says she says no, and she
22
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1

says she says no, correct?

2

A

Correct.

3

Q

Later on, before he leaves, he says, "Do you want

4

me to take him," meaning Travis, "with me?" Correct?

5

A

I don't recall that, Mr. Yengich.

6

Q

You don't?

7

A

No, sir.

8

Q

Did he - then let me ask it this way.

9

10

11

Okay.
I'll let you Did he offer

to separate the two of them?
A

As I recall, he told them that they should

separate.

12

Q

Okay.

13

A

Both of them, that they should not be together.

14

Q

But -

15

A

I know that part.

16

Q

But they both said, no, we're okay, we're going to

17

stay here.

18

A

Correct.

19

Q

All right.

20

A

Neither wanted to leave.

21

Q

Neither one wanted to leave, and in fact, Darcy

22
23

just basically said, you're his brother, put him to bed.
A

I don't recall that specifically, but that was what

24

Chief Jones did, and I - if you found that in there, I'd be

25

happy to (inaudible).

23

1

Q

I just said it a minute ago.

2

A

Okay.

3

Q

She said, I just want you to calm him down,

4

just

want him to go to bed.

5

A

_According to Chief Jones's statement.

6

Q

Okay.

7

I

And - well - so did you suggest that one of

them leave the house?

You asked that question?

8

A

Uh-huh (affirmative}.

9

Q

And he nods in the affirmative, at least consistent

10

with the -

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

All right.

13

And - "Okay, did you suggest it to your

brother, or just her?"

14

"I told him he needs to leave too when I first got

15

there.

I'm like, you just need to get away, you guys have

16

been drinking. You need to get away from one another."

17

That,s what he -

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

- he says he told them.

20

A

That's what he said.

21

Q

All right.

22
23

You ask him, "Did you offer to

facilitate that in any way, give your brother a ride?"
And he says, and I'll read the whole thing in

24

fairness, page 9.

"Every time my brother gets into this

25

state, if I try and do anything, he has a tendency to want to
24
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1

get violent - to get not violent with me, but kind of want to

2

push me, and he always wants to fight when he gets drunk, and

3

I just didn't want to deal with it because I have dealt with

4

it a hundred times before.

5

before in the middle of the night. I've tried to take him in,

6

and then it turns out - into a complete ass.

7

like done.

8

been drinking.

9

doesn't call me, he doesn't come over when he gets like that.

10

He has come pounding on my door

And so I am

I'm not dealing with you any more when you've
And he knows that, because now he know - he

He will talk to me afterwards."
He told you that.

11

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

In regards to treatment, you ask him, and I want to

14

get the specific statement in here, you, Agent Gibson.

15

"Okay, as far as the injuries" - yeah, 9 again.

16

I'm sorry.

17

as far as injuries, I don't know how superficial the

18

scratches were, if you saw her injuries.

19

facilitate any kind of medical treatment calls?"

That's not fair of me, and I apologize.

"Okay,

Did you offer to

His answer, "There was just a superficial scratch

20
21

Thank you.

on his chest."

That was his answer?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

Did you - "What about Darcy's leg?"

24

His answer, "I did not see anything."

25

Your statement/question, "Okay."
25

1
2

And he says, "And she was walking around.

She

walked up the stairs in the garage, and she seemed normal."

3

Ask him if you gave him a - he gave them a

4

pamphlet, and he says no.

5

any verbal notice? 11

You ask him, "Did you give them
Q

And he says, "I told Darcy she could call the

6
7

victim advocate if she needs to file a restraining order,

8

because we have dealt with this a hundred thousand times.

9

told her, I'm like, you guys are not good for each other, you

I

10

guys cannot be together, if you are not - if you're together

11

you can absolutely not drink."

12

That's what he said to you, right?

13

A

Correct.

14

Q

Now, at that time, at any time in your interview

15

with Adam, did you ask him, did you judge either one

16

people to be victims under the domestic violent act?

17

A

Specifically, no.

18

Q

Okay.

19

And did Adam offer to you,

Q

I believe one or

the other of them was a victim.

20

A

No.

21

Q

Did he offer that?

22

A

Not that I recall.

23

Q

Okay.

When he's ready to leave again, when he's

24

ready to leave, he once again tells Darcy, if you have a

25

problem, call Summit County.

Right?
26
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1

A

He told her that a number of times.

2

Q

A number of times.

3

that right?

4

A

That's correct.

5

Q

Okay.

And Summit County Sheriff; is

Did he ever admit or say to you,

I told her

6

not to call them because it was my brother, I didn't want him

7

to get into trouble or anything like that?

8

A

That statement was never made.

9

Q

All right.

10

Was there any statement that was close

to that made?

11

A

No.

12

Q

And Darcy never said he said anything like that

13

14

either, did she?
A

15
16

MR. YENGICH: That's all the questions I have of
this gentleman, Your Honor.

17
18

THE COURT: Do you have any other questions, Mr.
Bates?
MR. BATES: Yes, if I could just have 30 seconds,

19
20

No, she did not.

Your Honor.

21

THE COURT: Please.

22
23

24
25

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BATES:
Q

Agent Gibson, did you ask Mr. Jones - Mr. Adam

Jones why he did not take his brother out of the house or
27

1

give him a ride somewhere or take him to jail?

2

A

I didn't ask him specifically why he didn't give

3

him a ride or specifically why he didn't take him to jail, I

4

did not ask that specific question.

5

Q

Okay.

6

A

But I did -

7

Q

Do you know -

8

A

- ask him why he didn't facilitate or - if he

9

Q

facilitated a ride - and I'd have to probably go back and

10

look at the statement, if you have a specific page I can

11

probably -

12

Q

Okay.

13

A

-

14

Q

Would you refer to page 9 of your -

15

-,,.
l"i

Sure.

16

Q

- of this transcript?

look at that.

And I'd like you to just

Q

17

look at the - I'm going to start at the first full paragraph

18

on that page that starts with your name, and just read that.

19

Read the rest of the page there to yourself.
MR. YENGICH: Where are you at, you're on page 9,

20

21

top of the page?

22

MR. BATES: Page 9.

23

THE WITNESS:

24

25

Do you want me to go just from my

name?
Q

(BY MR. BATES) Just read it to yourself.
28

1

2

A

Okay.

This is the - basically the paragraph that

Mr. Yengich read -

3

Q

Yes.

4

A

- regarding - I asked him specifically, "Did he

5

offer to facilitate Travis leaving the house."

6

Q

Okay.

7

A

Give his brother a ride, and that's when he -

8

Q

What did he tell you, why he didn't facilitate

9

10

Travis leaving the house?
A

He said that - this is the one again that goes back

11

to Mr. Yengich - that Mr. Yengich just read regarding the

12

fact that when his brother gets into that state, he has a

13

tendency to get not violent with him, but want to push him

14

around, and then - I'm paraphrasing a little bit, since you

15

just read it, Mr. Yengich.

16

and essentially -

He's been pounding on his door

THE COURT: Wait a minute.

17
18

question.

19

tell me what this says.

20

else that I don't know?

You can answer the question.
I can read this.

MR. BATES: No, Your Honor.

21

What - he's asking you a
You don't have to
Is there something

I think what's in there

22

speaks for itself.

23

that copy of the transcript that I provided the Court a

24

couple of months ago.

25

Q

I didn't realize that the Court still had

(BY MR. BATES) Officer, I'm sorry, Agent Gibson,
29

1

did you talk to Adam about whether he was aware of anything

2

that happened at the Jones - Darcy Martinez and Travis

3

Jones's house later on that night?

4
5

A

I talked to him if he knew there'd been a followup

call, and I asked him about that.

6

Q

Okay, what did he tell you?

7

A

He said he got a text from Ms. Martinez later in

8

the night.

9

that evening, he missed a phone call from her, and he noticed

10

He said he also - as he was getting ready for bed

He also - I believe he was turning

that on his phone later.

11

off his computer, or turned on his computer and noticed that

12

there had been a returned call back to the residence later.

13

Q

Okay, did he - is there anything else he told you

14

that he did to try to discover what had happened with this

15

subsequent dispatch to the house?

16

A

I could flip back through my notes here, but -

17

Q

If you would.

MR. YENGICH: Your Honor, may I ask a question of

18
19

Would you just turn to page 14?

the Court?

20

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). Yes?

21

MR. YENGICH: Are we going to mark the transcript?

22

THE COURT: Okay, probably appropriate.

23

MR. YENGICH: In any event?

24

MR. BATES: Sure.

25

We can.

Yeah, if you want to

mark it.
30
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1

MR. YENGICH: We marked that as Exhibit 1, because I

2

think it should be offered for the purpose of the preliminary

3

hearing.
THE COURT: Why don't we use my copy as Exhibit l?

4
5
6

7

Q

(BY MR. BATES) I'm sorry, Agent, did you get a

chance to read page 14?
A

I did.

I looked at the section I think your

8

question is regarding.

He said his computer was still on

9

when he was getting ready for bed, and he saw that there was

10

a call that had popped up, and he said it was about quarter

11

to 11. He said he did turn on his radio and listened to the

12

response.

13

Q

Okay.

Now, in your opinion, as an officer with 30

14

years' experience, in your opinion, after having interviewed

15

Mr. Jones and hearing what he had to tell you about this

16

case, in your opinion was either Travis Jones or Darcy

17

Martinez a victim of domestic violence -

MR. YENGICH: Objection, Your Honor.

18

19

Q

(BY MR. BATES) - under the Cohabitant Abuse Act?

20

MR. YENGICH: Objection.

His opinion is irrelevant.

21

THE COURT: It is.

22

MR. BATES: Your Honor, I don't believe it's

23

irrelevant.

Mr. Jones's state of mind is relevant here, and

24

counsel has elicited from this witness that Mr. Jones has

25

never made any direct statements to anybody about whether he

31

1

believed anybody was a victim of domestic violence.

2

think it's entirely relevant to have another officer with a

3

substantial amount of experience, both in police work and

4

domestic violence at West Valley City to render an opinion

5

about whether one of these was a victim of domestic violence,

6

because that tends to establish whether Mr . . Jones - although

7

we don't have his testimony on the subject - whether Mr.

8

Jones believed that one of these people was a victim of

9

domestic violence.

But I

THE COURT: No, I think what you need to have is you

10

11

need to have one of these parties come in here and testify.

12

And afte-r they testify, you can ask these kind of questions.

13

But to have him testify as to, someone said to me that

14

someone said to him that someone else said they were a

15

vic~im, is a little bit farfetched.
I

.j-

I

16

MR. BATES: Well, I'm not asking whether someone

17

else said to him, I'm - what I'd like to know from him is

18

whether in his opinion as an experienced police officer - and

19

keep in mind, Your Honor, we're not here to determine whether

20

or not one of these people was, in fact, a victim of domestic

21

violence.

22

official misconduct case.

23

Jones's position have come to the conclusion that one of

24

these people was a victim of domestic violence, and if so,

25

does that trigger the Co-habitant Abuse Act procedures?

The question is, a police officer - this is an
Should a police officer in Mr.
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1

MR. YENGICH: May I?

2

THE COURT: Yes.

3

MR. YENGICH: I disagree that that is the standard

4

that we have to apply here.

5

what his opinion was, or not what my client's opinion was, I

6

asked him, did you ask him did he think either one of them

7

was?

8

Indeed, the evidence is what my client told him he observed

9

when he got there.

And the answer was no,

I asked him the question not

I didn't ask that question.

That's where the Court makes the

10

determination.

Otherwise, we can put on 15 different

11

officers to have 15 different opinions.

12

prohibits that, but 701, 702, and that sequence of Rules of

13

Evidence - and I know the Rules of Evidence don't always

14

apply at preliminary hearings, but the theory at least behind

iS

them does, and in this instance, with due respect to the

16

gentleman, who seems like one and apparently is an

17

experienced officer, he is not experienced to testify to

18

that.

And that - and 403

19

THE COURT: I think he's right, Mr. Bates.

20

MR. BATES: No further questions, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.

MR. YENGICH: These -

22
23

just to follow up on a

specific question THE COURT: Oh, are you going to ask him another

24

25

You may step down, sir.

question?

'------------------~

1

MR. YENGICH: Yes.

2

MR. GIBSON: Oh.

3

I -

I thought you said I was

dismissed, I'm sorry.

4

MR. YENGICH: He probably did.

5

THE COURT: I did.

6

ask a question.
MR. YENGICH: Well, I - and it's just a couple very

7
8

quick questions.
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION

9

10

BY MR. YENGICH:

11

12

I didn't know he was going to

Q

The computer that he observed, and the texts that

he received, were both after he was off duty, correct?

13

A

I believe that is correct.

14

MR. YENGICH: Thank you.

15

THE COURT: Thank you.

16

MR. BATES: Your Honor, the State will call Officer

17

That's all I have.

Ken Jones - Deputy Ken Jones.

18

RICHARD JONES

19

Having first been duly sworn, testified

20

upon his oath as follows:

21

THE COURT: Please state your name and spell your

22

name for the court clerk.

23

MR. JONES: Richard Jones, J-O-N-E-S.

24

THE COURT: You may proceed.

25

Ill
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DIRECT EXAMINATION

1
2

BY MR. BATES:

3

Q

Deputy Jones, what agency are you employed with?

4

A

Summit County Sheriff's Office.

5

Q

How long you been doing that?

6

A

About 10 years.

7

Q

Okay.

9

A

Yes, sir.

10

Q

And were you dispatched to the home of Darcy

8

11

Were you on duty on February 15 th of this

year?

Martinez on that night?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Okay, about what time were you dispatched out

14

there?

15

A

It was about a quarter to 11.

16

Q

Okay.

17

A

Dispatch - it was an open 9-1-1 call, they heard

What was the nature of the dispatch?

18

arguing in the background, the specific nature wasn't given.

19

They heard the name Travis, and they gave a partial address.

20

21
22

Q

Okay.

Now, when you arrived at that address, what

did you find?
A

I knocked on the door and initially I didn't have a

23

response.

I knocked again when I heard raised voices and

24

announced myself as an officer with the sheriff's office, and

25

then I heard them answer, and Darcy came and answered the
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1

door.
Q

2
3

Will you describe Darcy's appearance when

she came to the door?

4
5

Okay.

A

She was crying. She kind of covered her mouth and

she pointed inside. She was obviously distraught.

6

Q

Okay.

What did you do next?

7

A

I asked her if she was the one who called 9-1-1,

8

she said that she was. When she said that, I heard Travis - I

9

still hadn't seen him at this point - yell in a very angry

10

tone, "you called the sheriff's,n with an explicative.

11

stepped in at that time, got in between her and Travis.
Q

12
13

Okay.

I

Will you please tell the Court what Travis

looked like that night?

14

A

He was just wearing drawers, nothing else. He had a

15

large scratch on his chest, kind of an up and down zig-zag,

16

superficial scratch on his chest.

17

- he was loud, red, puffed up face, clenched fists -

18

Q

Okay.

19

A

Very aggressive, bearing.

20

Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

21
22
23

24
25

He was - he had emotional

Did he appear - did he appear intoxicated to

you?
He was - showed several symptoms of alcohol

intoxication.
Q

Okay.

While you were investigating this incident,

how did Travis behave?
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1

MR. YENGICH: Objection, it's irrelevant.

2

THE COURT: Why isn't it relevant?

3

MR. YENGICH: It's irrelevant because, unless they

4

can establish that the defendant was there at the time - he -

5

this is after the defendant has left.
MR. BATES: It's after the defendant left, Your

6
7

Honor, but it's relevant to establish the level of

8

intoxication and aggression that Mr. Travis Jones was

9

exhibiting that night, and it corroborates the defendant's

10

own testimony that his brother is extremely violent when he

11

gets drunk.
THE COURT: So?

12
13

defendant was there.
MR. BATES: Well, the defendant - Your Honor -

14
15

Doesn't mean he was drunk when the

I'm

sorry.
THE COURT: In fact, he says when he is very drunk

16

17

he acts this way.

18

testimony we've had from the transcript, so -

He ~idn't act that way according to

MR. BATES: Correct, Your Honor.

19

But the defendant

20

did tell Agent Gibson that when he arrived, his brother was

21

drunk.

22

his brother was drunk.

23

when he is drunk, can be very violent and very angry.

24

fact of the matter is he's not that way with his brother, his

25

brother has some kind of calming effect on him.

Your Honor, the defendant knew when he showed up that
The defendant knew that his brother,
The

Agent - or
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1

Deputy Jones is here to testify that when his brother's not

2

there, he is, in fact, a very angry, violent drunk.

3

that's part of the crux of this case, is that Mr. Jones left

4

somebody that he knows is a very angry, violent drunk, who

5

has a history of abusing his wife, in the home that night,

6

instead of following the procedures under the Co-habitant

7

Abuse Act, and removing his brother from the home.

MR. YENGICH: That requires - I don't know that the

8
9

And

State of Utah, with due respect to my brother at the bar,

10

understands what their theory means.

That means every

11

officer, that officers that are in uniform, even an old

12

officer like Sergeant Car, Sergeant to me, have to - they

13

have to make a judgment.

14

under their theory.

And they have to predict the future

15

At the time under the evidence the Court has here

16

today, he left, he was calm, and he went to bed, as was the

17

other lady, and he told them, I'm not an - he wasn't even

18

called as an officer.

19

you, Your Honor.

20

explicit in the testimony.

21

sometime in the future something bad may happen under their

22

theory.

23

the statute says.

He wasn't - that's the evidence before

He wasn't called as an officer.

That is

He's got to make a judgment that

That's not what the statute says.

24

THE COURT: Mr. Bates?

25

MR. BATES: Your Honor -

It is not what
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1
2

MR. YENGICH: And what he observed later on is
irrelevant.

3

MR. BATES: Your Honor -

4

THE COURT: What he observed later on is irrelevant,

5

because we don't know that's how it was when this officer was

6

here, the defendant was there.
MR. BATES: Under the Co-habitant Abuse Act,

7
8

2.2, sub 2, sub B, sub little I,

9

probable cause to believe that there will be continued

7736-

if a peace officer has

10

violence against the alleged victim, or if there is evidence

11

that the perpetrator - well, if you have probable cause to

12

believe there will be continued violence, he must arrest the

13

perpetrator.
Now, Your Honor, out of the defendant's own mouth

14
15

to Agent Gibson, he told Agent Gibson, my brother is an

16

angry, violent drunk.

17

into - forgive me language, he turns into an asshole.

18

he's been violent and abusive with Darcy Martinez in the

19

past.

20

when he leaves, there is potential demonstrated, based on his

21

experience and his history with his brother, that there will

22

be violence.

23

When I try to arrest him, he turns

When I'm there, he's calm.

And

But Mr. Jones knows that

Deputy Jones is here to testify that, in fact,

24

there was violence.

Just as Mr. Jones had to suspect that

25

there would be based on his history with his brother.

He
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1

told Agent Gibson, I don't even want to deal with the guy,

2

because when I try to arrest him he's such a jerk and becomes

3

so violent and angry.

MR. YENGICH: Well, he has to have probable cause.

4
5

Probable cause is not the determination of what might or what

6

one suspects will happen.

7

before the individual at the time.

8

The number of cases on that are - they are legion.

9

officer makes the determination of probable cause on the

It's based upon the evidence
It cannot be in futuro.
That an

10

basis of what he observes at the time, in the place, under

11

the circumstances.
The only evidence you have is that he went to bed,

12
13

he put him to bed, she said fine, she said I don't want you

14

to call anybody.

15

County, and they got that much in, that's apparently what she

16

did.

He said, if something happens, call Summit

He can't be - we can't expect him to make a

17
18

probable cause determination about what is in the future.

He

19

can't.

20

with - and I'm going to mispronounce this word, expectatory

21

warrants.

22

in the future such and such is going to do this, because we

23

believe it based upon their reputation, you're not going to

24

sign that kind of warrant because there's not probable cause.

25

THE COURT: I think he's right, Mr. Bates.

It's like - it is akin to the old cases that deal

And that is, you go to a judge and say, we believe
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1

MR. BATES: Your Honor, that's exactly what the Co-

2

habitant Abuse Act requires.

3

probable cause determination about whether THE COURT: Not what's going to happen in the

4
5

Is for officers to make a

future.
MR. BATES: Well,

6

it says, if the peace officer has

7

probable cause to believe that there will be continued

8

violence against the alleged victim.

9

a report that the victim had already been assaulted by Travis

Now, Officer Jones had

10

Jones - he kicked her. He has evidence - he knows that his

11

brother's a violent drunk. He knows that he's drunk right

12

now, he has to have probable cause to think that if he leaves

13

that house, there's going to be continued violence.

14
15

THE COURT: I don't think so, because he said he's
already in bed when he leaves.

16

MR. BATES: Sure, he's in bed because when he's

17

dealing with his brother he's calm.

18

handle him.
THE COURT: That's not what he said.

19

20

His brother knows how to

That's not

what this transcript says.
MR. YENGICH: Right.

21

In fact,

he said, he told the

22

gentleman, Officer Gibson, he and I can - we get into

23

arguments.

24

was calm that night and I put him to bed.

25

satisfied with it at the time.

That's why I don't want to deal with him.

But he

And she was
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MR. BATES: And Your Honor, can I just point out,

1
2

Ms. Martinez's belief, her thoughts, what she thinks is going

3

on, is entirely irrelevant to this.

4

Co-habitant Abuse Act is to put the authority and the

5

discretion of when somebody's a victim, and what to do with

6

that scenario, in the hands of the police, and to require

7

them to act in certain ways, even when the victim doesn't

8

want it because victims so often, as Ms. Martinez did here,

9

are unwilling to take action against their perpetrators.

10

The whole point of the

That's the point of the Co-habitant Abuse Act.
MR. YENGICH: Well, but he's making that same

11

12

judgment.

13

she determined because they haven't called her.

14

information, and I let it in because I didn't object to it,

15

but it's before the Court, is their only information is

16

she and the Defendant Jones in this case said, there wasn't a

17

victim here.

18

case.

19

As

she determined to do here.

We don't know what
The only

He's got to have probable cause that that's the

A law enforcement officer - when we start out here,

20

he's not responding as a law enforcement officer - and I

21

don't want to get ahead of myself - who responds to an

22

allegation of domestic violence, he's not responding to an

23

allegation of domestic violence, he shall use all reasonable

24

means to protect the victim.

25

he did not do that, in fact, they went to their respective

He - there's no evidence that
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1

quarters, and then it gives him discretion.

2

exactly the point.

3

things that are listed.

It does.

He has the discretion, including those

Those aren't the only things he can do.

4

That's

He can

5

determine if he believes it's correct that there are no

6

victims, and that nobody's going to be harmed.

7

that in this case.

8

Monday morning quarterbacking by this gentleman with the

9

Chevron on his arms, who I'm sure is a good officer,

And he did

That's the only evidence you have.

doesn't

10

cut it.

And what he has to say about what he would've done,

11

or what should've been done, is irrelevant to this case, Your

12

Honor.
MR. BATES: Your Honor, I don't believe there was

13
14

any evidence as to whether Mr. Jones thought there was or

15

wasn't a victim.

16

question that Mr. Gibson answers was, he didn't ask that, and

17

Mr. Jones didn't answer it.

18

before the Court about whether Mr. Jones thought there was or

19

wasn't a victim.

I believe that the State - that the

We don't have any evidence

20

MR. YENGICH: There was no objection to my question

21

about the interview with Darcy, where she - I asked him, did

22

she claim to be a victim, and he said no.
MR. BATES: And I said that's irrelevant, Your

23

24

Honor.

25

Darcy thinks she's a victim is pointless here.

Co-habitant Abuse Act makes it irrelevant.

Whether
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1
2

THE COURT: Well, what do you think you're going to
get out of this officer, is what I want to know?

3

MR. BATES: Your Honor, I believe it's important -

4

THE COURT: We've now argued all kinds of concepts

5

here.

6

MR. BATES: Sure.

7

THE COURT: But the issue is, what is this officer

8

I -

going to supposedly tell me?

9

MR. BATES: Your Honor, what this officer is going

10

to do is corroborate Mr. Jones - Mr. Adam Jones's statement

11

that, when my brother is a drunk, he becomes very violent and

12

very angry.

13

showed up that night after Mr. Jones had left, that was, in

14

fact, the case.

15

Jones;s state of mind when he was there -

16

And what this officer will say is that when he

He's establishing - he's corroborating Mr.

THE COURT: Well, first of all, that's not what Adam

17

Jones said.

18

observed·when he got there.

19

realm of his ability to testify.

You can have this officer testify that what he
That's certainly within the

20

MR. BATES: Sure.

21

THE COURT: But his interpretation of what Mr. Jones

22

said to the investigator, whether or not that meets it, is

23

not for him to decide.

24

25

MR. BATES: No.

No.

He has not interviewed Mr.

Jones. He has not read the transcript of this investigator's
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1

interview with him.
THE COURT: Okay.

2
3

Q

(BY MR. BATES) Deputy Jones, will you please

4

describe for the Court Travis Jones's behavior and conduct

5

while you were conducting this investigation?

6

A

Very early in the investigation, he was - made

7

aggressive moves toward me, he'd almost mock charge me. Any

8

time I'd ask Darcy a question, he would turn his aggression

9

towards her. He would curse at her and call her a liar.

At

10

this time, I placed him in handcuffs because I didn't feel

11

safe to be there alone.

12

him down at a kitchen chair, and just very briefly continued

13

to try to investigate, but it would elicit such a response

14

from him that my investigation was hampered.

15

it.

16

shouting match, to just calm down until another officer

17

arrived.

18

investigation.

19
20

After I got him in handcuffs, I sat

I couldn't do

So I just told them both to - they kind of got into a

Q

Once that other officer arrived I continued my

Okay, now at some point that night did you arrest

Travis Jones?

21

A

I did.

22

Q

And how did he behave when you were arresting him?

23

A

Same way.

At one point he actually ducked under my

24

arm and ran for a little bit.

Didn't - he made these mock

25

charges towards me and towards Darcy all night. This time

I
I
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1

when I interposed myself in between him and Darcy, he ducked

2

around a table and turned on a light with his hands still

3

cuffed behind his back, I can't even guess why, but we got a

4

hold of him. We took him out to my car. On the way there he

5

screamed and yelled, and he said he was going to bite my

6

face, bite my nose and my ears if he got a chance. He lashed

7

out and kicked a traffic cone, and just kept up with a

8

violent, vulgar tirade the whole way to the jail.

9

Q

Okay.

Now was there anyone else at the house

besides Darcy?

10
11

A

Yes.

12

Q

Who else was there?

13

A

There was two children there, a 10-year-old who

14

identified himself as Ryan Degrazio and Ryan Martinez, I'm

15

not sure which is the proper one, and then a 2-year-old named

16

Jackson who Ryan appeared to be watching.

17

Q

And did you observe any injuries on anyone at the

house besides Travis Jones?

18
19

A

Yes, I observed injuries on both Darcy and Ryan.
MR. BATES: I think that's all I have of this

20

officer, Your Honor.
22

THE COURT: Questions of this officer, Mr. Yengich?

23

MR. YENGICH: Just a couple.

24

Ill

25

Ill

I

Thank you, Your Honor.
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CROSS EXAMINATION

1
2

BY MR. YENGICH:

3

Q

Did you ever call Adam Jones that night?

4

A

No.

5

Q

Did either - and I don't want to hear what they

6

said, but did either Darcy or Travis tell you that Adam had

7

been there earlier?

8

A

Not to me.

9

Q

Not to you.

10

A

There was another officer at the scene there.

11

Q

And who was that?

12

A

Deputy Nakiishi.

13

Q

Nakiishi.

14

A.

Yes, sir.

15

Q

That's the correct way to pronounce it.

16

That was Officer?

Okay.

I have his

report.

17

A

Yeah.

18

Q

Who told him in your presence that Adam had been

19

there earlier?

20

A

It wasn't in my presence.

21

Q

It was not in your presence.

22

A

No.

23

Q

Okay.

And before you cleared the scene, were you

24

aware that Adam Jones had been to that house earlier that

25

night?
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1

A

I wasn't.

2

THE COURT: You were, or not?

3

THE WITNESS: I wasn't.

4
5
6

Q

(BY MR. YENGICH) When did you find out

chronologically that Adam had been there earlier?
A

I

left Deputy Nakiishi with several tasks that I

7

was unable to perform while I was there, collecting the

8

statistics of the little kids, taking pictures of the

9

injuries, and doing some followup interviews.

I just wasn't

10

able to do it at the scene due to Travis's behavior.

11

went en route to the jail with Travis, or at the jail, Deputy

12

Nakiishi called me and briefed me with the things I -

After I

13

Q

Information that Adam had been there earlier?

14

A

Yes, sir.

15

Q

And what time of the day was that?

16

A

It was around midnight.

17

Q

Did you call Adam then?

18

A

No.

19

Q

Did you ever - did you call him the next day?

20

A

I never called Adam.

21

Q

Did you direct anybody to call him and take a

22
23

Day or night?
Q

0

~

statement of what he had observed?
A

I did a command staff notification.

One of the

24

criteria we use for a command staff notification is any

25

incident that could adversely effect interagency
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1

relationships.

2

Lieutenant Wilkinson, and briefed him about the case.

3

4

Q

So I called my immediate supervisor,

Did you tell Lieutenant Wilkinson, Adam Jones, the

police chief in Kamas, may have some information about this?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Did you say that we probably should interview him

7

to find out what he had observed?

8

A

I left that up to Lieutenant Wilkinson's

9

discretion.

10

Q

You were the initial officer on the scene, correct?

11

A

Right.

12

Q

Were you also the followup officer?

13

A

There was a deputy who went the next day to do some

14

photographs.

15

Q

Who was that?

16

A

Deputy Buhler.

17

Q

Okay, so whose case would this be in the -

18

A

My case.

19

Q

It would be your case in the normal terminology.

20

A

Right.

21

Q

And so did you make any effort to call Adam and

22

say, Adam, what did you see?

23

you observe?

24

A

No, I didn't.

25

Q

Ever?

What did you hear?

What did
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1

A

Ever.

2

Q

When Travis - you first saw Travis, he was coming

3

out of the bedroom?

4

A

Coming down the hallway.

5

Q

Coming down the hallway.

6

A

The bedroom's that way too, so -

7

Q

Okay.

8

A

- I don't know.

9

Q

Corning from the direction of the bedroom.

10

A

Corning down the hallway.

11

this same hallway, so -

12

Q

Okay.

13

A

Yes.

14
15

There's other rooms down

Is a bedroom down that hallway too?

MR. YENGICH: That's all I have of the gentleman,
Your Honor.

16

THE COURT: I guess we ought to have one point in

17

clarification, Officer Jones, since this seems to be a big

18

family affair.

Are you related to any of these people?

19

THE WITNESS: No.

20

THE COURT: Thank you.

21

MR. YENGICH: Well done.

22

THE COURT: You may step down.

23

MR. YENGICH: Can we take a three-minute break?

24

THE COURT: Certainly.

25

C\
,.q

(Whereupon a recess was taken)
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1

THE COURT: Call your next witness.

2

MR. YENGICH: He has one more question of the last

3

gentleman, Your Honor, as I understand it.

4

THE COURT: Okay.

5

MR. BATES: Your Honor, I didn't get a chance to

6

redirect Deputy Jones.
THE COURT: Okay.

7

8
9

10

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BATES:
Q

Deputy, counsel on cross examination asked you

11

whether you had talked - interviewed Adam Jones about this

12

case, or about the - his report that night and you responded

13

that you hadn't.

14

didn't?

15

A

Would you explain to the Court why you

I didn't think that - from what Nakiishi told me,

16

that Darcy told her that Adam really had a lot to add to my

17

case, which was the Travis Jones case, and I figured that

18

once I let Lieutenant Wilkinson know about his involvement,

19

that the matter was a little above my pay grade.

20

21

Q

And where on Darcy Martinez did you observe

injuries?

22

A

It was on her shin area.

23

Q

What kind of injuries were there?

24

A

Bruising, or the starting of bruising.

25

MR. BATES: That's all, Your Honor.
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RE-CROSS EXAMINATION

1
2

BY MR. YENGICH:
Q

3

So you made the call, you used your discretion as

4

an officer, not to follow through in any regard; is that

5

correct?

6

A

To follow through?

7

Q

By calling Jones.

8

A

I didn't feel I needed to talk to Adam about this

10

Q

That was your decision.

11

A

That was.

12

Q

Thank you.

13

A

It wasn't a task I was given by anyone to follow up

9

14
15
16
17

case.

with Adam.
Q

And you didn't ask, should I or shouldn't I of

anybody, or did you?
A

No.

18

MR. YENGICH: Thank you. No further questions.

19

THE COURT: You may step down.

20

MR. BATES: Your Honor, the State would call Deputy

21
22

Trace Thomsen.

He's out in the hall, I'll grab him.
TRACE THOMSEN

23

Having first been duly sworn, testified

24

upon his oath as follows:

25

THE COURT: Please state your name and spell your
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1

name for the court clerk.
MR. THOMSEN: Spell my name, sir?

2
3

Thomsen, T-R-A-C-E T-H-O-M-S-E-N.
DIRECT EXAMINATION

4
5

Corporal Trace

BY MR. BATES:

6

Q

Corporal, what do you do for a living?

7

A

I am a corporal corrections officer assigned to the

8

Summit County Sheriff's Office. I work back in their

9

detention facility.

10
11

Q

Okay.

And were you on duty on February 16 th of

this year?

12

A

Yes, I was.

13

Q

And where were you assigned to work on that date?

14

A

I'm actually a rover. I work wherever I'm needed

15

basically.

16

occurrence, I was actually up relieving central or having

17

lunch inside of central command.

18
19

Q

So at the time I was actually - of this

Okay, and at that point - let's see, what time did

you come on your shift that morning?

20

A

6:00 a.m. we start.

'"'.,
L.L

Q

And at that point was Travis Jones in the detention

22

It would've been a day shift.

facility?

23

A

Yes, he was.

24

Q

And where was he located?

25

A

Over in a booking cell, H3.
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1

2

Q

Okay.

And do you recall that morning Adam Jones,

his brother, coming over to the jail?

3

A

Correct.

4

Q

Did you speak with Adam?

5

A

I did, briefly.

6

Q

What did Adam tell you as to why he was at the

8

A

Check on his brother, make sure he was okay.

9

Q

Okay.

10

A

I did.

11

Q

And where did this visit happen?

12

A

Over in booking where Steven, his brother, was.

13

Q

Okay.

7

©

jail?

Did you allow him to check on his brother?

14

THE COURT: Steven?

15

MR. BATES: Does he go - it's Travis - Steven

16

©

Travis?

17

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, yeah it's Travis - yeah,

18

it's Steven Travis, I'm sorry.

19

brother Steven Travis Jones.

20

I work in back, so his
Q

THE COURT: Okay.

21

Q

(BY MR. BATES)

22

A

Yeah.

23

Q

Okay.

24

speak?

25

A

I believe he goes by Travis.
Q

So did you see Adam Jones and Travis Jones

I did.
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1

Q

Okay, how far away from them were you?

2

A

Seven feet maybe,

3

of the cells, maybe seven feet or so, not very far at all.

4
5

just right at the booking counter

Q

Okay.

Were you able to overhear what they were

talking about?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

Will you please just describe for the Court the

8

substance of that conversation?

A

9

I MR. YENGICH: Objection as to the substance.

10

Excuse

11

me.

If he recalls specific words, I'd ask him to testify

12

exactly what he heard, and then if he can't, that he advise

13

that it's the substance under the rule, Your Honor.

14

THE COURT: Very well.

15

THE WITNESS:

Proceed that way, please.

He - they were standing over by H3, I

16

was in the middle by the booking counter between the two

17

computers to observe them, and I observed Adam tell Travis

18

that he was at his residence last night, and that he was

19

passed out in bed while he was there.

20

him he was obviously intoxicated. They said something -

21

And you know, he told

THE COURT: Who - I thought you just said you heard

22

Adam say this, and now you're saying - who said - Adam's

23

saying this?

24

brother, Travis?

25

You're saying Adam is saying this to his
Steven Travis?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

55

THE COURT: Okay.

1

2

Q

{BY MR. BATES) So tell us - Adam told - tell us,

3

what did Adam tell his brother, Travis?

4

as best a quote as I can.

5

A

If you could just -

I'll refer to my report, or my statement.

He said

6

that when he got to his residence he was passed out on his.

7

bed.

8

given to Travis, his brother, that he needs to do something

9

about his drinking.

I then heard something regarding a truck, and advice

10

Q

Okay.

11

A

Adam then told his brother goodbye, came up behind

12

the booking counter, and sat by me to speak with me.

13

conversation was pretty brief.

14
15

16
17
18
19
20

21

The·

Q

Okay.

What did Adam tell you when you spoke with

A

Adam sat right next to me and he informed me that

him?

him and his wife fight all the time Q

Now, when you say him and his wife, was he specific

as to who him is?
A

Referring to Travis, who was incarcerated for

domestic violence.

22

Q

Okay.

23

A

And he informed me that his sister-in-law called

24

him the night of, or when the incident as occurred, as to why

25

he was in jail, and told Adam that he needed to come over and
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1
2

talk or take care of his brother.
Q

Okay.

Did he say any - did Adam say anything about

3

what he found to you, did he say anything.about what he found

4

at the residence or the state that Travis was in when he got

5

to the residence?

6

A

Again, he informed me that his brother was passed
And then told me that he told

7

out, intoxicated in his bed.

8

his - I guess it would be his sister-in-law, or his brother's

9

girlfriend or wife - I'm not sure if they were married - that

10

he instructed her not to wake him up.

11

Q

Okay.

12

A

Because he was intoxicated.

13

Q

So this statement that when he got there Travis was

14

passed out asleep in bed, is that essentially what you heard

15

him tell Travis?

16

A

Yeah.

17

Q

In the holding cell?

18

A

By the cell, and then he came up and told me,

19
20

21

22
23

I

don't know why, but he did.
Q

Okay.

Now, did he say anything to you about what

happened after he visited his brother's residence?
A

Like after when he was over there when he was

passed out in his bed, or?

24

Q

No, my question is -

25

A

I'm sorry.
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1
2

Q

- Adam Jones obviously told you some things that he

saw when he was at his brother's residence.

3

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

4

Q

When he left that residence.

5

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

6

Q

Did he say anything to you about what he saw or

7
8
9

heard or do after he had been at his brother's residence?
A

Yeah, prior to him leaving, he told his - sorry -

Travis - that told his wife or girlfriend, whoever she is,

10

that if she wanted to do anything about it, that she needed

11

to contact the sheriff's office about the incident to - I

12

guess why he was there.

13
14

Q

So that's what he told you that he told Darcy

before he left her home?

15

A

Correct.

16

Q

Okay.

17

Or that -

Corporal, will you - do you have your

statement that you wrote about this incident before you?

18

A

I do.

19

Q

Will you just look on page 2? The paragraph at the

20

top of that page, and just read that to yourself?

21

A

Yes.

Chief Jones stated -

22

Q

No, I'm sorry.

23

A

I'm sorry.

24

Q

Yeah.

25

A

Okay.

Just read it in your mind.

Okay.

That's all right.
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Q

1

Okay, does that refresh your recollection about

2

anything that Adam Jones might have told you that happened

3

after he left Darcy Martinez's house?
A

4

He stated that Darcy called him on his cell phone.

5

And he specifically stated to me he knew it was Darcy because

6

he looked at the number and saw that it was Darcy calling

7

him.

And -

8

Q

Did he say whether he answered the phone?

9

A

He didn't answer the phone.

10

Q

Did he say why he didn't answer the phone?

11

A

Well, he didn't answer the phone, he informed me,

12

because he knew what she was calling for.

13

Q

Okay.

14

A

It was about his brother.

15

Q

Okay.

And then did he indicate to you whether he

16

learned anything else about what had happened at that night

17

after she called?
A

18

He indicated to me that he - after he knew that she

19

called, that he turned on his police radio and heard the

20

dispatch call out for - I don't know what kind of call was

21

called out, but he did hear dispatch place a call out for - I

22

don't know what reason, but he didn't explain that to me.
MR. BATES: That's all the questions of this

23

24

witness, Your Honor.

25

Ill
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1
2

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. YENGICH:
Q

3

4

When you were in the jail listening to this

conversation, were you taking any notes?

5

A

No.

6

Q

Was it tape recorded?

7

A

No.

8

Q

And relative to the distance between you and Adam

9

and his brother, we've been referring to him as Travis, okay?

10

A

Okay.

ii

Q

All right, between him and Travis, distance in the

12

courtroom from where you're seated, how far away were you

13

from them?

14

A

From where I'm seated right now?

15

Q

Yes, sir.

16

A

Probably here to Mr. Bates.

17

Q

All right.

18

don't know.

I

THE COURT: Would you like to estimate how far that

19
20

At counsel table in the courtroom.

is?

21

Q

(BY MR. YENGICH) Would you like to estimate?

22

A

Eight feet or so?

23

Q

Okay.

24

A

Maybe more.

25

Q

- it's more than a free throw, so I'd go 12.

10 feet?

Eight to 10 feet.

I would go - I don't know -

Maybe
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1

a weak measure.
THE COURT: I'd say it's closer to 20 feet,

2
3

it?
(BY MR. YENGICH} All right.

4

Q

5

Right?

6

overhearing them?

7

A

Yeah, it's a way away.

And you weren't doing any investigation as you were

No,

I was concerned - it was odd that he was in
I've never seen his brother or I

8

there, but I was - you know,

9

rarely saw Chief Jones, and so I wasn't doing an

10

isn't

investigation-

11

Q

Yeah.

12

A

- but I was listening to - you know.

13

Q

Did they say hello to one another?

14

A

They did.

15

Q

That's not in your report, is it?

16

A

No.

17

Q

All right.

What did they say?

Hi Travis. Hi Adam?

18

Hey bro, how you doin'?

You dumb ass, you're in jail?

19

you know, 'kick you - beat you up - what did they say?

20

was their initial statement to one another?

21

A

If I can refer to my report -

22

Q

You can.

23

A

- I can.

24

Q

Is it in there?

25

A

Steven greeted his brother.

I What
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1

Q

What did he say?

2

A

I say - I reported he greeted his brother.

I

3

didn't state what he stated - greeted his brother, that's

4

what I put.

5

Q

That's what you put.

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

Okay.

9

A

Do I

10

Q

All right.

8

And did his brother greet Steven?

Do you

know?
know?

I

would assume that he did.

I'm not asking you any assumption.

11

you recall what he said to him specifically?

12

back?

13

being in jail at that initial greeting, or do you know?

Did he say hello?

Do

Did he say hi

Again, did he admonish him for

14

A

Not at the initial greeting.

15

Q

Do you know?

16

A

He was checking on his brother - No, I don't know

17

if he said hi or hello.

18

Q

All right.

19

A

I would assume that they - that you would.

20

Q

All right.

Again, I don't want assumptions.

I'm

21

trying to get exactly what was said, not your - necessarily

22

your summary of it.

23

if they - if he greeted his brother back, what was the very

24

next words that were used?

25

A

What was the next thing that was said,

All I can refer to is what's in my statement.
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1

Q

Okay, so you don't recall?

2

A

No,

3

Q

Do you recall word for word the very next words

4

just what's in my statement I can recall from.

that were said?

5

A

No.

6

Q

All right.

7

A

- I recall what's in - what I wrote in my

8

Just -

statement.

9

Q

All right, do you recall what preceded the - what

10

is in your statement where it says, "I did hear Chief Jones

11

state that he did go over to his brother's residence." What

12

did he say immediately before that, if you know?

13

A

I don't know.

14

Q

After that, you put in your statement, Chief Jones

15

stated to Steven, "When he got to his residence, he was

16

passed out in bed."

17

If you know, by either one of them.

What was said immediately before that?

A

I can only refer to what I put in my statement,

20

Q

So the answer is you don't know.

21

A

No.

22

Q

All right.

18
19

sir.

Did he say to his brother Travis, you

23

were passed out when I left the residence?

24

any time?

25

A

If you know, at

No, he informed me that he was passed out when he
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1

left the residence.

2

Q

Okay, he told you that.

3

A

Correct.

4

Q

Okay.

5

What was said immediately before that, if you know?
I can only refer to what's in my

statement.
And so in reality, the exact words that were

Q

8
9

Like I say,

A

6

7

Then you heard something regarding a truck.

employed by either of these two men, you don't know.

10

A

Bits and pieces, but no, I don't have exact.

11

Q

Thank you.

But you do recall him - him meaning

12

Adam, telling you that he had told - well, let me strike

13

that.

14

was that your assumption?

15
16

Did he refer to the woman as his sister-in-law?

Sister-in-law, wife,

A

That was my

assumption, I guess.

17

Q

All right.

18

A

I

19

I'm not sure.

Or

don't know if they're married or what,

I

wasn't
Q

going to -

20

Q

All right.

No one's trying to put you on the spot

L.

'"'..,j_

here.

22

in-law, girlfriend, wife, do you recall?

I want to know what words he used.

Did he use sister-

23

A

I can only recall what he put in my statement.

24

Q

Did he use that word?

25

A

I put spouses.

Sister-in-law?

I don't have sister-in-law in
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1

there.

2

Q

You do too -

3

A

Do I?

4

Q

- at the bottom of page one.

5

A

Okay.

6

Q

Adam further stated to me that he told his sister-

7

in-law.

Did he

A

Well, that's what I'll testify to then.

10

Q

Did he use that word, or was that an assumption, is

11

my question.

12

A

I would assume he used the word.

13

Q

You would assume that.

8

9

14
15

I don't

know.

You don't - you can't say

for one hundred percent sure, can you?
A

No.

I don't know if they're married or not.

They

16

probably cohabitated together, so I'm assuming, you know,

17

boyfriend, girlfriend, wife -

18

Q

All right.

19

A

- husband.

20

Q

Some of what you put in here is your assumption on

21

certain things; is that correct?

22

A

As far as the sister-in-law -

23

Q

As far as other things.

Some of what you put in

24

relative to this conversation are your assumptions of certain

25

things, correct?
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1
2
3

A

As if they were married or not married, yes,

because I did not know that.
Q

You've indicated on direct examination that he told

4

you, Adam Jones told you, that he told either - whoever she

5

was, the woman in his brother's life, that if she had a

6

problem to call Summit County.

7

A

Correct.

8

Q

Is that in your report?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Where?

11

A

I put, "Adam further stated to me that he told his

12

sister-in-law that if she wants to do anything about

13

tonight's incident, she needs to call the sheriff's office to

14

report it."

15

Q

Okay.

16

A

I didn't have anything to do with his

Did you ask him any questions about that?

17

investigation. I didn't know why he was there or what was

18

happening with the case.

19
20

Q

I had no knowledge of the case.

Your report is an email to Lieutenant Katy Booth;

am I correct in that?

21

A

Correct.

22

Q

Were you asked to prepare that email by anyone?

23

A

By my lieutenant, Katy Booth.

24

Q

And when - did she indicate to you why she wanted

25

you to prepare a report about Adam talking to his brother?
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1
2

MR. BATES: Objection, Your Honor.

Hearsay,

relevance.
THE COURT: I think it's very relevant.

3

4

Q

(BY MR. YENGICH) Did she tell you why?

5

A

Yes, she did.

6

She wanted to know why he would - he

came back into the jail.

7

Q

To see his brother.

8

A

Correct.

9

10

Overruled.

And what our conversation was, or if

there was any conversation, that was it.
questions asked.

There was no

She wanted to know why -

11

Q

He was there.

12

A

Correct.

13

Q

Other than this email, were there any other notes

14

or - on scraps of paper, in a book, or anything else,

15

prepared by you?

16

A

No.

17

lieutenant.

Just the statement that I gave to my

18

MR. YENGICH: That's all the questions I have.

19

THE COURT: When did you prepare this report?

20

THE WITNESS: It would've been the same day.

I

21

don't know if the exact time's on here, but it would've been

22

the same day.

23

MR. YENGICH: At 5:25 p.m.

24

THE WITNESS: Yeah.

25

THE COURT: Do you work a 12-hour shift?

5:25.
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1

THE WITNESS: I do.

2

THE COURT: Okay.

3

MR. YENGICH: I have nothing further.

4

THE COURT: You may step down.

5

THE WITNESS: Did you have anything?

6

MR. BATES: Just quickly.

BY MR. BATES:

9
10

Q

To the best of your knowledge, is everything you

put in that report true and accurate?

11

A

Yes.

MR. BATES: Your Honor, that's my last witness.

12

13

Anything further?

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

7

8

Okay.

do have one exhibit to offer.

14

THE COURT: Okay, what is it?

15

MR. BATES: Let me provide a copy to Mr. Yengich.

16

I'll mark this as State's Exhibit #2.

I'll drop some things on the floor while I'm doing

17
18

19

I

it.
Your Honor, State's Exhibit #2 is a copy of

20

ordinance #02-1 from Kamas City, establishing a police

21

department and establishing a chief of police, and I'd offer

22

that in as Exhibit #2.

23
24
25

MR. YENGICH: No objection, Your Honor.

And I

forgot a question of the last witness, I apologize.
THE COURT: Is he still here?

----·--
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1

MR. YENGICH: May I?

2

MR. BATES: If he's still here, I'll grab him.

3

MR. YENGICH: He's here.

4

THE COURT: Yes.

5

8
9

May I?

Let's let him get back on the

witness stand before you do.
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION

6

7

I can -

BY MR. YENGICH:
Q

Other than the email document that we've been

talking about.

10

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

11

Q

Did you file any other report regarding domestic

12
13

violence as it related to Travis Jones?
A

No.

14

MR. YENGICH: Thank you.

15

THE COURT: Did you file anything related to Darcy

16

Martinez?

17

THE WITNESS: I haven't.

18

MR. BATES: Can I just follow that up, Your Honor,

19

real quick?

20

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).
FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION

22
23

BY MR. BATES:
Q

Were you - at the time you were speaking to Mr.

24

Jones, were you aware of any domestic violence, personal

25

knowledge, as far as aware of domestic violence between
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1
2

Travis Jones and Darcy Martinez?
A

Never.

I rarely saw Chief Jones, and probably the

3

first time seeing his brother, I wasn't aware of a history or

4

what their family history is.

5

like that.

FURTHER RE-CROSS EXAMINATION

6

7
8
9

I wasn't aware of anything

BY MR. YENGICH:
Q

Have you ever filed a report - I mean you know why

we're here today, right?

10

A

Yeah.

11

Q

Have you ever filed a report, you personally, about

12

Travis or Darcy in domestic violence?

13

A

No.

14

Q

Okay.

15

A

Correct.

16

Q

You work there still, right?

17

A

I do, yeah.

18

Q

And, in fact, he's in jail for subsequent domestic

19

Never.
Travis is in jail now, isn't he?

violence, correct?

20

A

I believe so.

21

Q

Okay.

Between this date,

February 17 th ,

and the

22

day he entered in the jail, did you ever file a report of

23

domestic violence?

24

A

No.

25

Q

Did you follow up and do any investigation?
70

1

A

Nope.

2

Q

You did become aware, however, that he had been

3

arrested for domestic violence, correct?

4

A

Travis or -

5

Q

Yes, sir.

6

A

I was aware that day, yes.

7

I don't keep track of

everybody that comes in and out my door.

8

Q

No, but you were aware of it that day.

9

A

Yeah.

10

MR. YENGICH: That's all.

11

THE COURT: You may step down.

12

No further questions.
You're free to

leave.

13

Anything further?

14

MR. YENGICH: We have (inaudible).

15

THE COURT: Yes.

16

MR. YENGICH: I have one witness -

17

THE COURT: Okay.

18

MR. YENGICH: - to call.

19

And I'm going to recall

Agent Gibson to the stand just for about four questions.

20

THE COURT: Okay.

21

CRAIG GIBSON

22

having been first duly sworn, testified

23

upon his oath as follows:

24
25

Ill

Ill
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1
2

DIRECT EXAMINATION
©

BY MR. YENGICH:

3

Q

When did you interview Darcy?

4

A

March 3, 2011.

5

Q

When did you interview Adam?

6

.M.

7\

March 7, 2011.

7

Q

Did you file a domestic violence report in Summit

8

County after interviewing them?

9

A

No, sir, I did not.

10

Q

Okay.

11

A

No, sir, I did not.

12

Q

Okay.

13

the report?

14

A

15

Did you ever interview Travis?

And in fairness to you, why didn't you file

Because Summit County was handling the domestic

violence involving Travis and Darcy.

16

Q

You are a category one peace officer?

17

A

That's correct.

18

MR. YENGICH: No further questions.

19

THE COURT: Thank you.

20

Anything further of this

witness?

21

MR. BATES: No, Your Honor.

22

THE COURT: You may step down.

23

Any other witness, Mr. Yengich?

24

MR. YENGICH: I have none, Your Honor.

25

Your Honor, I'd asked previously to brief this
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1

matter.

I've spoken to counsel for the State.

2

would like to brief it after we receive a transcript,

3

been working on it anyway, but I didn't know how the evidence

4

would come in.

5

will - I'll have my secretary make the request immediately,

6

I ' l l email her right now,

7

the transcript to file my brief.

I

I would like 30 days after we get

THE COURT: Okay.

9

MR. BATES: That's fine,

Acceptable?
Your Honor.

MR. YENGICH: And giving counsel the same amount of

11

time.

12

days, a week?

13

we've

And I would like, depending upon when -

8

10

We will - I

And then giving me a week after his - instead of five

The only question I have, Judge, is this.

I have a

14

homicide I'm getting ready for and that comes up after the

15

first of the year, and I've also got a federal case that they

16

claim is going to go, though I doubt it.

17

get me the transcript until the Christmas holidays,

18

need more than that 30 days.

So if they don't
I may

19

THE COURT: All right.

20

MR. YENGICH: And ask the Court to indulge me.

21

THE COURT: Okay.

22

Thank you very much.

We'll be in

recess waiting for the memos.

23

MR. YENGICH: Thank you,

24

MR. BATES: Your Honor?

25

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).

Judge.
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1

MR. BATES: Could the Court return the copy of the

2

amended information that I gave the Court?

3

find the copy we filed?

Did the Court

4

THE COURT: Yes.

I have the -

5

MR. BATES: Okay.

Thank you.

6

THE COURT: - I have the -

7

MR. BATES: Thanks, Your Honor.

8

THE COURT: - original signed by you.

9

MR. YENGICH: May we be excused?
THE COURT: Unless you want to file a collective

10
11

one.

12

MR. BATES: I can do that.

13

THE COURT: Why don't you do that?

14

MR. BATES: I'd be happy to do that.

15

THE COURT:

16

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

(Inaudible).

We'll be in recess.
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Interview of Chief Adam Jones
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Craig Gibson:

The reason I asked you to come in and talk to you is on the 15
you responded to a call from personal assistance from Darcy
Martinez.

Adam Jones:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Craig Gibson:

I'm not quite sure; I'll just call her Darcy Martinez, because I don't
know what the relationship is. I guess technicaliy now she is your
sister-in-law?

Adam Jones:

I'm not claiming her, so.

Craig Gibson:

Ok. So, let me slip the recorder on, we'll record this. We got a,
we got a request to look into that because when you responded,
obviously as a police officer, you understand that when you
respond to calls of domestic violence there are certain obligations
that we are required to, to kind of check the boxes on.

Adam Jones:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Craig Gibson:

Make sure that we take care of. And so we were asked to look at
your response. What you did, what you may have not done and so
really we are just wanting to get your side. I've talked to Darcy.
I've look at the interview with RB, which is Ryan, right, the ten
year old?

Adam Jones:

Ok.

Craig Gibson:

I've talk to him. I haven' t talked to your brother cause obviousiy
he is, he is facing charges of domestic violence so I really can't
discuss with him right now without, you know, maybe crossing
those boundaries of, of getting into the criminal investigation that
is handled by Summit County. So, I haven't talked to him. I may
still talk to him. I don't know, it depends on what we talk about
today. So, I'm going to talk to you, you are free to go. There is no
issue of Miranda.

Adam Jones:

Ok.

Craig Gibson:

You know where the door is. You might get lost in our building
but I promise you can go. We'll help you get out. Sothere is you
are not in custody. This is a criminal investigation. Basically if a
police officer does not charge or take care of their duties, uhm,
then there is actually a crime involved. It is a Class A
Misdemeanor. It is basically neglect of duty, uhm and that is one
of the reasons sometimes the AG looks at things like that. We look
at cases that are a little bit outside the norm. We also look at cases
that might be a conflict of interest, ok? So, we are neutral, we
don't really have any political interest in ....

Adam Jones:

Ok.

Craig Gibson:

In anything going on up in your neck of the woods, ok. We will
look at the facts of the case. We present the facts of the case to our
attorneys here at the AG's Office, they will evaluate it and if there
is any merit then we will go from there.
j

Adam.Jones:

So is th.is coming off from the Sheriffs Office, specifically?

Craig Gibson:

It came from their investigation, to my boss, which is our chief,
our division chief, Chief Wallentine to me.

Adam Jones:

Ok.

Craig Gibson:

And so, I a..111 charged with just looking at it, just. ....

Adam Jones:

Ok, I have no problem. I'll tell you everything that happened.
You want me to tell you (inaudible).

Craig Gibson:

Super. Let, let me go through my questions.

Adam Jones:

Ok.

Craig Gibson:

Cause I took the time to prepare them. I'd appreciate it if you'd let
me at least take the time to do it. So, I've got some questions and
what that will do is keep us focused.

Adam Jones:

Ok.

Craig Gibson:

On the focus of really the case so that the questions that are
involved in your response.

Adam Jones:

Ok.
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Craig Gibson:

So once we get those, Pwm kind of give you time at the end if you
want to, you know, you know want to (inaudible).

Ed Spann:

If we haven't answered, if we haven't filled in the blanks on things
you think we should know, please (inaudible).

Adam Jones:

Ok.

Craig Gibson:

Let us do it. Again the questions just keep me focused and so that

will help a lot So, it really kind of goes from, from what my
perception of what the focus of any problems or any issues that are
with this case.
Adam Jones:

Ok.

Craig Gibson:

How did you recall, how did you receive the call to respond to the
incident?

Adam Jones:

She called my personal cell phone.

Craig Gibson:

Ok and when you use she ....

Adam Jones:

Darcy. Darcy called my personal cell phone.

Craig Gibson:

Darcy. Ok, all right, Darcy called. And from what number did she
caH?

Ada..rn Jones:

I would have to look it up.

Craig Gibson:

Ok.

Adam Jones:

I don't have her in my phone.

Craig Gibson:

Do you recognize, did you recognize the number?

Adam Jones:

No.

Craig Gibson:

No? Ok, so you just got a number on your personal phone?

Adam Jones:

Uh huh (affirmative).

Craig Gibson:

Ok. About what time did you, did she call you?

Adam Jones:

I would say it was about quarter to ten.

Craig Gibson:

Ok.
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Adam Jones:

Right around there.

Craig Gibson:

And where were you at the time?

Adam Jones:·

I was sitting in the office.

Craig Gibson:

At the office?

Adam Jones:

Yes.

Craig Gibson:

So, did you go directly over to the house or kind of what was your
response?

Adam Jones:

Well, when she called me she asked me if I would come over and
talk to her. And I was trying to ask her about what, because earlier
in that day, my brother had brought over a bunch of drawings that
Ryan had drew, and then saying that he was trying to kill himself
and so he was asking me what he can do because he has been down
several avenues and no one seems to be helping him. So, I says
well you know, those drawings, he gave me all those drawings and
so my first impression was she was talking something about that,
so she's like, come over here. Well, I'm like what's going on,
because every person my brother has ever been with, they always
call me when there is a problem. And I tell them, do not call me.
Call the Sheriffs Office. Call somebody else because I can't deal
with it. So, I am like, maybe it has to do with that. So I went over
there and knocked on the door.

Craig Gibson:

Ok, let me back up. One little thing, cause you are starting to
free ...

Adam Jones:

Ok.

Craig Gibson:

You are trying to give me the story, which is good. But on this
(inaudible) that I will want to interrupt you too often. V/hen you
drove over, and this may be a two-part question, were you on duty
and did you drive your patrol vehicle?

Adam Jones:

Yes.

Craig Gibson:

Ok. So both, answers?

Adam Jones:

Yes.

Craig Gibson:

Ok. About what time did you, do you think you arrived?
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Adam Jones:

Like a minute after the phone call, maybe.

Craig Gibson:

So, from your office to their house, I know Kamas isn't huge, but
how far would you say?

Adam Jones:

Four blocks, maybe if that.

Craig Gibson:

Four blocks?

Adam Jones:

Might be a little longer, I mean I could count them.

Craig Gibson:

No, it is good. You kno\v, we aren't going to ...just
approximations.

Adam Jones:

Right there.

Craig Gibson:

Ok, all right. So, just maybe a minute after?

Adam Jones:

I would assume so.

Craig Gibson:

Ok, so you knocked on the door?

Adam Jones:

Uh huh (affirmative).

Craig Gibson:

Ok, who let you in?

Adam Jones:

My brother.

Craig Gibson:

Ok, so Travis let you in?

Adam Jones:

Uh huh (affirmative).

Craig Gibson:

Were you in uniform?

Adam Jones:

Uh huh (affirmative).

Craig Gibson:

Just like (inaudible)?

Adam Jones:

Uh huh (Affirmative).

Craig Gibson:

And so you talked to Travis first, right?

Adam Jones:

Uh huh (affirmative).

Craig Gibson:

What did Travis tell you?
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Adam Jones:

He said that Darcy is in the garage, go talk to her.

Cr;-aig Gibson:

What did?

Adam Jones:

So, I went into the garage and ....

Craig Gibson:

I guess, let me back up to Travis when you first encountered
Travis. When you talked to Travis, what was your impression of
Travis, you know your brother?

Adam Jones:

That he was drunk.

Craig Gibson:

That he was drunk. Ok. And that was basically, did you see
anything else?

Adam Jones:

No.

Craig Gibson:

Did he look, when he was drunk, again levels of intoxication, how
drunk would you say he was?

Adam Jones:

Typical, normal, drunk ass self. He is an idiot when he is drunk. I
can see it ~nd that's, I figure that is what he was at.

Craig Gibson:

Ok.

Adam Jones:

Has kind of a glazed look like he was looking through you.

Craig Gibson:

Did he look kind of mad or was he, was he pretty calm with you?

Adam Jones:

No, he was calm with me at that time.

Craig Gibson:

Ok. All right. And he basically just directed you to ....

Adam Jones:

He just said Darcy is in the garage and go talk to her.

Craig Gibson:

Ok.

Adam Jones:

I asked him 'Nhat was going on.

Craig Gibson:

Ok, that was my next question.

Adam Jones:

Yeh, I asked him what was going on when he answered the door.

Craig Gibson:

What did he say?

6

Q

Q

r-.
w

G

Adam Jones:

Uhm, he said look what she did to me? Cause he had three
scratches on his chest.

Craig Gibson:

So, he pointed out some scratches.

Adam Jones:

Yes, he just in his underwear when he answered the door.

Craig Gibson:

Ok.

Adam Jones:

He said, she did this to me, go talk to her.

Craig Gibson:

So, where did he go after that?

Adam Jones:

Just in the living room. I don't know where he went after that.

Craig Gibson:

That's where he went (inaudible). This jumps out a little bit, this
jumps ahead a little bit. How long do you think you stayed at the,
at the house between the time you got there and the time, the time
you left? What would you say?

Adam Jones:

Fifteen, twenty minutes.

Craig Gibson:

Sorry, that is a little out of order with my questions. Uhm, so
when you, when you went to talk to Darcy, then what happened?
What did she tell you and where was she?

Adam Jones:

She was in the garage, in the car, on the phone. And then when I
\.Valked in there she got off the phone, stepped out of the car and
said, he can't do this to me anymore. I am like, what is he doing?
She is like, he kicked me. I said, ok, where? She said like in the
leg. I said, ok, I says, she's like you are the only one who can calm
him down, so I just want you to calm him down. I said, ok. I said,
but here's the problem, I said, he's my brother; I says I cannot deal
with him. I says if you want to file a report I'll call Summit
County right now and have them come over here. She's like, no; I
don't want to do that. And so I began to talk to her and ask her
what had happened and she said they had been drinking. This is
probably the, I don't know, the fourth or fifth time this has
happened between these two.

Craig Gibson:

Ok, and that goes a little ahead.

Adam Jones:

Sorry.

Craig Gibson:

She caUed you in the past, no that is good, cause I will just jump.
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Has she called you in the past, because you said this is the fourth
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or fifth time that this has happened? Has she ever called you in
past?
Adam Jones:

She called me, she use to call me all the time when they lived in
West Valley, when all this stuff would happen in West Valley.

Craig Gibson:

How long ago was that? Long time?

Adam Jones:

Like six, six years ago.

Craig Gibson:

All right. How about within the last year, would you say?

Adam Jones:

No.

Craig Gibson:

Ok. All right go ahead, now you go back, this happened about four
or five times you said?

Adam Jones:

So, I asked her what had happened. And she is like, we got
drinking and we just talked not even three days ago, how they
can't drink anymore, because she turns into a complete idiot when
she is drinking and he turns into a complete idiot when he is
drinking, and then when they both start drinking it just turns into a
mess, so. She is like, no I just want him to calm down, I just want
him to go to bed and he needs to know she cannot do this to me. I
am like, that is fine, I says, do you want me to call the Sheriff's
Office because if you want to file a report they need to come here?
And she said, no. So, I said, ok, so I taiked to her and then I went
and talked to my brother again and asked him what had happened.
Well, so I asked her what happened and he come in while we were
in the garage and again said, look what she did to me. I'm like
Travis just go back into the house and I will come talk to you in a
minute. And so then she began to show me a flagstick that was
broken, saying he took that flag stick and did that to himself. And
so I said, ok, I said, but still, I asked her, I asked her 18 thousai,d
times, do you want to call the Sheriff's Office? And she is like,
no, we can't afford to have him go to jail again. I can't afford it
again. I'm like, well ifhe has done something to you, and he is
beating you up, then you need to call. You need to have someone
do this. She's like no. So, I said is there any marks? I looked,
looked her body; I did not see any marks on her at all. I said, is the
only thing he did was kick you? And she said, yes. I said, where?
She's like in her leg. So, I said ok and went to talk to Travis. And
then he admitted to me that he had made the marks on his body
with the stick himself. And so, cause he's like I am going to get
her in trouble cause he went on to tell me that she had warrants and
blah, blah, blah and she would go to jail. So, I am like ok,
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whatever. I said, you guys just need to go to bed cause I knew he
was on the verge of, of passing out, just because he was almost
gone. So, I said, go to bed. I said, and deal with it in the morning.
Then I went back and talked to Darcy again. Said, ok Travis is in
bed, I said do you want to call the Sheriffs Office, do you feel safe
here, do you want to leave, do you want to go somewhere? Have
you been drinking? Do you need to go somewhere to call
someone, do you want someone here? And she is like, no, she's
like, I will be fine. As long as he is calmed down and in bed, I will
be fine. So, I said, ok, if anything else happens you need to call
the Sheriff's Office. And then I left.
Craig Gibson:

Ok. So, you did, you did suggest that one of them leave the house?

Adam Jones:

Uh huh, (affirmative).

Craig Gibson:

Ok. Did you suggest it to your brother or just her?

Adam Jones:

I told him he needs to leave too, when I first got there. I am like,
you just need to get away. You guys have been drinking. You
need to get away from each other.

Craig Gibson:

Did you offer to facilitate that in any way? Give your brother a
ride?

Adam Jones:

Every time when my brother gets into this state if I try and do
anything, he has a tendency to want to get, not vioient with me, but
kind of wa.."lt to push a..T1d he always wants to fight when he gets
drunk, and I just didn't want to deal with it because I have dealt
with it a hundred times before. He has come pounding on my door
before in the middle of the night. I have tried to take him in and
then he turns into a complete ass. And so I am like done, I am not
dealing with you anymore when you are drinking. And he knows
that cause now he doesn't call me, he doesn't come over when he
gets like that. He will talk to me afterwards.

Craig Gibson:

Ok. As far as the injuries, I don't know how superficial the
scratches were, if you saw her injuries? Did you offer to facilitate
any kind of medical treatment, calls?

Adam Jones:

There was just a superficial scratch on his chest?

Craig Gibson:

What about for Darcy's leg?

Adam Jones:

I did not see anything.
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Craig Gibson:

Ok.

Adam Jones:

And she was walking around. She walked up the stairs in the
garage and she seemed normal.

Craig Gibson:

Did you give either one of them, since there was some allegations
of domestic violence, did you give either of them any written
notice of their rights and remedies available to them under the,
under the domestic violence?

Adam Jones:

I didn't give them a pamphlet, no.

Craig Gibson:

You didn't give them a pamphlet?

Adam Jones:

No.

Craig Gibson:

Did you give them any verbal notice?

Adam Jones:

I told Darcy she could call the victim advocate if she needs to file a
restraining order because we have dealt with this a hundred
thousand times. I told her, I'm like, you guys are not good for
each other. You guys cannot be together. If you are together you
can absolutely not drink.

Craig Gibson:

Ok. And Darcy told you that Travis kicked her?

Adam Jones:

Yeh.

Craig Gibson:

Did she say that he pushed her or kicked her?

Adam Jones:

Said that he kicked her in her shin.

Craig Gibson:

Ok. Uhm, did Travis break anything? Was there any damage to
anything tha~ you saw?

Adam Jones:

No.

Craig Gibson:

Ok. Did Darcy tell you about any dai-nage or did you see any
damage? And Travis told you, he told you about the story with the
flagstick when he crune into the garage?

Adam Jones:

No, when I come back out. Cause when I was talking to Darcy, he
come and opened the door and said, she did this to me.

Craig Gibson:

Oh, ok, that is what I.. ..
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Adam Jones:

And that is when Darcy said, no he took this flag stick and she
showed me that flag stick and said he ran it down his chest. And
then after I sent him back and was talking to her I went back to
him and he told me, yeh I did that to myself.

Craig Gibson:

So he admitted it after you went back in?

Adam Jones:

Yes.

Craig Gibson:

Did you have to work a little to get him to do it, to make that
admission or did he just?

Adam Jones:

Not a whole lot, because once I saw the flag stick there and she
said that, I asked him, I am like, what are you doing? And that is
when he said, I did it to myself because I was going to get her in
trouble.

Craig Gibson:

Ok. All right. Ok. Not necessarily even Darcy, but let's say in the
last year have you, have you ever had to go over and kind of deal
with Travis?

Adam Jones:

Luckily I have been off every time something has happened.

Craig Gibson:

So you haven't gone over and he hasn't called you, nobody has
called you personally to go over in the last year?

Ada..111 Jones:

No.

Craig Gibson:

Ok. And can you control Travis when he is drunk?

Adam Jones:

Uhm, I can control him pretty well. I mean he will listen to me.
Uhm, as far as like what he does, no.

Craig Gibson:

Ok. (Inaudible)

Adam Jones:

But, I mean, I can sit down with him and I can say, heh, you need
to relax and you need to calm down, you need to stop and he will
stop and be calm and just start talldng about whatever.

Craig Gibson:

Ok. When he drinks does he get violent?

Adam Jones:

Oh, very violent.

Craig Gibson:

He gets very violent. You have seen that in the past?
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Adam Jones:

Yep. I've, Summit County has dealt with him before. When he
lived in Oakley they went there. I told them, heh, he likes to fight
with police because he fought with the police in West Valley. So,
I have told every body. He will run from you, he will fight with
you, be careful.

Craig Gibson:

Ok. Did you know that, did you find out about the, or did you
know about the 911 call she made to Summit County after you
left?

Adam Jones:

No, cause I checked, after I left there I checked off. I was
checking off at 10:00.

Craig Gibson:

Ok, so ..... .

Adam Jones:

So it was like 10, 10: 10 when I checked off.

Craig Gibson:

Ok, what was your schedule that day?

Adam Jones:

Uhm, I was working. My schedule changes everyday.

Craig Gibson:

And I appreciate that with a small department.

Adam Jones:

Yes, cause it changes all the time. Sometimes i go in at 12, .
sometimes I go in at 2, sometimes I'll go in at 1. Depending on
':"'hat hours I have, I'll cut it down to an 8 or 9 hour day.

Craig Gibson:

\\That would you, on that day, what would you say your, your
schedule that day?

Adam Jones:

Uhm, I was working 12 to 10 that day.

Craig Gibson:

12 to 10, ok. And you checked off there about?

Adam Jones:

After I was done with them about, I am guessing, about 10: 10, I
don't recall exactly what time I checked out.

Craig Gibson: ·

Do you check off on dispatch or do you just... ?

Adam Jones:

Sometimes, well most of the time I will check off with them if they
have me on, then I'll always check off. Sometimes I will go to
work without checking on. A call comes out then they check me
on, but I pretty much always check off with them if I am locked in
one of the computers. So, then there has been, you know, times
where you check on and they don't hear you and then you just go
about your day.
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Ed Spann:

So that night, did you think you checked off or you know that you
checked on?

Adam Jones:

No, I checked off.

Craig Gibson:

You checked off. Did you do a report? Did you go in and do a
report of the incident?

Adam Jones:

No.

Craig Gibson:

You didn't do a police report on that?

Adam Jones:

No, cause I figured, my thinking of when I did it, is she called my
personal phone. I said, you know, I said, I can't be here as a law
enforcement officer, if you want that, I will call Summit County
right now. And she said, no, I don't want to do that. And so, I'll
just let you go on.

Craig Gibson:

Ok, good. I have to go back a little bit to the 911 call. Did you
hear about it, or when did you find out that she called 911 and then
there was some further ... ?

Adam Jones:

She sent me a text at like 1:00 in the morning.

Craig Gibson:

Ok, so, about O100 she sent you that text?

Adam Jones:

I don't know. She calied me ....

Craig Gibson:

Did she call you or anything after that?

Adam Jones:

I had a missed phone call from her.

Craig Gibson:

What time was that, would you say?

Adam Jones:

Uhm, I don't even remember. It was after I checked off, so.

Craig Gibson:

Ok, so some time after that. Did you, did you see the number or
did you see that she called you again?

Adam Jones:

Afterwards I saw that I had missed a phone call from her.

Craig Gibson:

From her?

Ed Spann:

(Inaudible)

Adam Jones:

I can see if I can see what time it was. What was that?
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Ed Spann:

You say afterwards? What time? When would you have noticed
that?

Adam Jones:

Before I went to bed. When I put my phone on the charger.

Ed Spann:

Ok. Do you know what time you went to bed?

Craig Gibson:

Sometime after 10: 10.

Adam Jones:

I probably didn't go to bed until 12 midnight, 11 :30 midnight,
something like that.

Craig Gibson:

Did you, did you turn your, did you have your police radio on
during that time and hear anything on the response?

Adam Jones:

No, my computer was still on and I saw on my computer that
another call had popped up. Well, I saw a call pop up and then it
went away and then I was doing some other stuff getting undressed
and I saw they were going back to, back to her house.

Craig Gibson:

You saw that, about what time was that, do you remember?

Adam Jones:

Quarter to eleven, somewhere around there.

Craig Gibson:

Did you flip your radio on and take a listen to the response and
everything?

Adam Jones:

Yeh.

Craig Gibson:

Did you? Ok. Uhm, have you received training in the
investigation of domestic violence?

Adam Jones:

Uh huh (affirmative).

Craig Gibson:

Do you remember when, do you remember when? When was the
last time you attended specifically domestic violence training?

AdaiTi Jones:

I don't know. I think it was while I ·was at the Sheriffs Office.

Craig Gibson:

Ok. So it has been a little while. How about a legal update? You
have a legal update for a while?

Adam Jones:

Just all the legal updates that we, that they do every year.

Craig Gibson:

A year? Yearly. So you probably have had 2010?
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Adam Jones:

Uh huh (affirmative).

Craig Gibson:

Let me ask you this. This is going to be retrospective question?
Looking back now that you have had time to kind of look back on
what happened and all the things, what would you have done
differently?

Adam Jones:

Nothing. Absolutely, nothing.

Craig Gibson:

Would you have maybe thought to caii the Sheriffs Office when
you saw this and who it was and thinking oh this is kind of.... ?

AdaiLI Jones:

Based on the circumstances that I'd seen with no physical injuries
and she felt safe I would do absolutely nothing different.

Craig Gibson:

Ok.

Adam Jones:

Especially after the first time when she claimed that she went after
him with a knife in Alaska and (inaudible) and she is still with him
and the time before that where he spent 6 months in jail and the
time before that. She said she is absolutely not scared of him.

Craig Gibson:

So, is this, how long has those guys, how long has those two been
together?

Adam Jones:

The first time or the second time?

Craig Gibson:

Well, if you can separate it ok. When did they, I guess when did
they first get together, obviously?

Adam Jones:

Like 6 years ago, they were together when they lived in West·
Valley. I wouldn't even dare venture to guess what, when it was.

Craig Gibson:

How long have they been back together up in Kamas, up in your
area?

Adam Jones:

I wouldn~t be able to tell you. A year, maybe longer. I have no
clue. Cause he was with another girl, got her pregnant~ they
always had their problems. I think he went to jail with her for
domestic violence. And I don't know what happened on the last
one. I just, I just try to stay out of it, because he just needs to go to
jail in my opinion.

Craig Gibson:

Has he, has he, when did he start, does he have any drug problems?
Or is there drugs involved?
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Adam Jones:

I'm sure he does.

Craig Gibson:

Does he?

@

Adam Jones:

I don't know any of his drug history. He doesn't talk about it. I
know he drinks. I know that he has used drugs. As to what drugs
he has used, I don't know, but I know, I mean, when he was
married to his first wife, his first wife tried to kill herself in front of
the kids. I know they were doing drugs then. I don't know what.
He is crazy, when he drinks, when he, I really couldn't tell you
what drugs he does. I've asked him recently. He said he hasn't
been doing anything, just drinking and smoking spice, so.

®

Craig Gibson:

Is that, is that, so he has been drinking and smoking spice?

Adam Jones:

That is what he said.

Craig Gibson:

That is what he told you? Another question that popped in. When
you knew about this second response, did you, again going back to
retrospective, did you think to let Summit County know that you
had been over there and to give a little heads up that he was
drinking?

Adam Jones:

No. In retrospect, I probably would have but, I mean, they all
know, they all know I have told them. I told everybody if you ever
deal with him, he is an ass. He gets mean when he is drunk and he
just wants to fight. So, I mean everybody knows that, everybody
had dealt with him. Evef'Jbody YJ1ows who he is.

@
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Craig Gibson:

Do you think he will go to jail on this one?

Adam Jones:

I will be surprised ifhe doesn't. He should have went to jail on the
last one. I still don't know what they are doing with that. He had a
court appearance today. Him and her went to it. I have no idea
what happened. I wanted to go and find out what was going on but
with everything that is going on I just want to stay, stay out of it.
My parents were there. They called me, said that he showed up
late and then th.ey just rescheduled it, but to my understanding the
one today was an order to show cause on his last one. I don't even
know ifhe has been charged with this other one.

Craig Gibson:

Adam Jones:

Yeh, I'm not sure what he's, I honestly don't know what his
charges are right at the moment. I kind of stayed out of that, again
that is why I didn't tell you too much.
I have no clue.
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Craig Gibson:

You have been, you've given, you know, you have the best
(inaudible).

Adam Jones:

He just needs, first of all he needs to go either to an alcohol class
and quit drinking. I think if he would quit drinking and her quit
drinking they would be fine. But the second thing is he needs to
go to jaii for like 5 years. I don't even lmow if that would do any
good. He was in Salt Lake County for 6 months after he got into a
fight with her last time.

Craig Gibson:

And that was down here?

Adam Jones:

Yes.

Craig Gibson:

That was his last domestic?

Adam Jones:

Well, not his last domestic. That was his last domestic, I guess I
can't say his last domestic with her, but that was his last long jail
time because he was with her.

Craig Gibson:

And that was the result of it? I mean that's pretty, six months is a
long time in Salt Lake County.

Adam Jones:

Well, I think he had, I think he had other domestic violence
charges, I think he had like three or four cases.

Craig Gibson:

It must have compounded, because six months in jail is, at ieast i...11
Salt Lake County, is a pretty long stretch for domestic violence.

Adam Jones:

Yeh, I don't know, I think he had some domestic violence charges
with Judge Stoney and I think he had some sort of burglary charge
going into a friends home and I don't know what he was in jail for
what and what he got charged with, with each thing, so.

Craig Gibson:

Ok.

Adam Jones:

I know every girlfriend he's ever had, they have had problems with
him, because the one before Kim was always t-ying to call us. \Ve
are like, we can't do anything for you, you need to call the
Sheriffs Office. (Inaudible) out in the county.

Craig Gibson:

Now do you guys have, does Kamas have an arrangement with
Summit County on, because obviously there are just two guys, yeh
two people in the department, which makes 24-7 coverage I would
guess impossible, do you guys have an arrangement with them
then?

~
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Adam Jones:

Yes, when we are off they handle the calls. We use to be on call
24-7, but we were getting way too many hours and so· I met with
the Sheriff and we arranged it to when there is any calls when we
are off they will handle it.

Craig Gibson:

And when you guys are on do you have certain calls that you
handle. Is there times when you call, call the Sheriffs Office to
handle certain types of calls, and again I am not that informed.

Adam Jones:

There is a, there is a little list of some things, like, unattended
deaths, ulun, I'd have to look at my sheet, there is like four of
them. Felonies with only suspect information, which I mean, we
take care of felonies all the time and don't really call them. I think
just more of kind of if we need help, I think it was their way of
setting some guidelines as to what they wanted to do, cause on
every felony that we have suspect information we don't always call
them to deal with it, because we just deal with it ourselves.

Craig Gibson:

Right. Now do you guys do your own follow-ups and your own, do
you have your own CSI stuff?

Adam Jones:

We don't have any, that is what we call the County in for if we
needed stuff like that.

Craig Gibson:

Ok. That's probably just more for me to know, out of curiosity. It
seems like it would be difficult to have two guys trj to cover
everything all the time.

Adam Jones:

We tried it and we were there for about 2 ½ to 3 years before we
finally were just so worn out and beat up that we had to get some
help. I tried to beat City Council up to get more people and they
just won't do it.

Ed Sparm:

How long have you been with Kamas?

Adam Jones:

About 5 years.

Ed Sprum:

Are you from that area?

Adam Jones:

Uh huh (affirmative).

Craig Gibson:

Any questions for us?

Adam Jones:

No, I don't think so.
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Craig Gibson:

You have my phone number if you have any questions give me a
call.

Adam Jones:

I just, I've thought of this a lot, in hindsight, there is really nothing
that I could have done different. I mean if she was obviously
beaten and bruised and it would have been a different story but
there were no marks on her or no nothing. It is not like this is her
first rodeo. I don't know what else to do.

Craig Gibson:

Yeh, I think, you probably ought not to, if! was going to give you
any advice, which is free, but, I, if you got a call from either of
them to respond, I think the next thing I would do personally
would be to call the Sheriffs Office and have them go and not deal
with it. Family (inaudible).

Adam Jones:

(Inaudible) on my phone with text messages like when he was in
jail, she would say stuff, like what would you do, I mean she is
crazy.

Craig Gibson:

Yeh, that is one of those things you just have to, again you would
have to try to distance yourself and not respond.

Adam Jones:

And I tried, like I said the only reason why I went over there was
because I thought it had something to do with Ryan, because he
has been saying he wants to kill himself. They have had him down
to different places and they just refuse to help him. So, I initially
thought it was that. Knowing it wasn't, I says lei's can the
Sheriff's Office and she didn't want to. She didn't want to. She
refused. There was really no marks on her that would lead me to
believe that it was anything, you know, that she was going to die
from. Then she goes and marries him. I don't understand that.

Craig Gibson:

That is a little curious.

Adam Jones:

It blows my mind. I don't think those two should be together. I
don't know why they ever got back together after the first time.

Craig Gibson:

Yeh, that is ....

Adam Jones:

But what do you do?

Craig Gibson:

Not really much you can do, from an outside perspective. And
again for you, the problem you have, I guess to a certain extent is,
being a law enforcement officer then you really have to distance
yourself from being involved in any of their problems and make
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sure they always have a third, third party, third agency that comes
in and deals with it.

Ed Spann:

And I would just add this in there, especially since you've said,
that you have outlined a pretty good history for both of them, that
he has gotten violent, he was drunk, and if it hadn't been,
somebody could draw the line and say he wasn't yet, but he could
be and they have already reported it, so you say you weren't a cop,
but you are in uniform and (inaudible), I came from a small agency
so I understand this, I understand what you are saying. Sometimes
I don't want to be (inaudible) but you got a call. That's just free
advice, he gave you, that is mine. Whether they want you to or
not, ..... .

Craig Gibson:

Just call.

Ed Spann:

That is the easiest way to do it and then when in doubt, put a report
out.

Craig Gibson:

(Inaudible). It's one of those things that the obligation of a law
enforcement officer (inaudible) the statute is fairly clear on the
domestic violence of what law enforcement officer's shall do, shall
do this, shall do this, shall do this. And again, you know, you were
on the scene, you made the determination, and that is just what we
have to look at is those steps to what you should do.

Adam Jones:

Ok. And then, well I'm not going to go there, it's ail good.

Craig Gibson:

All right, any questions for us? If you think of one, call, you have
my number. In fact, I'll give you my card (inaudible).

Adam Jones:

I don't think so.

Craig Gibson:

All right.

Adam Jones:

But, here is my question. If I see this, I don't know, is there any
way I can just talk to you without it being recorded? Just for
advice questions, stuff iike that? It doesn't matter. I'll record it. It
doesn't matter.

Craig Gibson:

Uh, you can, you can. Ok, go ahead.

Adam Jones:

So, let's say the Sheriffs Office is doing the same thing. That they
respond to these things and aren't doing anything and there's, and
you know there is different situations going on. Where do I go at
that point? Do I come to you guys and say, heh these guys are not

®
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doing their job? Because I personally, believe that this is a
personal vendetta between Dave and me.
Craig Gibson:

And that is why we look at these things, because we are a neutral
agency.

Adam Jones:

Ok.

Craig Gibson:

We are neutral. And many people could argue that but we are
neutral and that is why people give it to us. We get a fresh look.
We look at it. I don't know, obviously I don't know you, you
don't know me. I have no allegiance to w7.y department, well
except the ones that I retired from and even then I would be fair.
And so that is why we are looking at it. We are going to look at it
fairly. Yeh, we are pointing out some things and that is why we
ask in retrospect, you know. (lnaudible)-we have to look at it.

Adam Jones:

Sure.

Craig Gibson:

And the political issues up there, whatever' s going on up there, not
my interest.

Adam Jones:

But what can I do as a law enforcement officer to see that these
guys are obviously doing the exact same thing and would have
done the exact same thing. I talked to several officers afterwards
and they would have done the exact same thing.

Craig Gibson:

Let me go back to that. I'll answer that specific question. For an
officer to say that I would have done the exact same thing, ok, I
can't deal with that, because they weren't there. You were there
and that is why we are talking to you. And cops will say, well I
would have done the same thing, or I wouldn't have done anything
different, etc, etc, etc. With what they said they would have done,
can't do anything with. Now, if you had instances say, on this
particular instance this happened and this happened and this
happened, and we would do exactly the same thing. If you called
a..11d said, a Summit County Deputy responded to this call and did
this, this and this, we wouid look at that. Do it the exact same way.

Adam Jones:

Ok, but this is another thing, I mean, did Summit County or
anybody ever come and talk to me, no. I personally think that is a
little ridiculous, but that is just my own opinion.

Craig Gibson:

And maybe, I don't know, you just alluded to the fact that there's,
there might be some p·olitical issues up there and so perhaps., and
again I don't want to conjecture something inappropriately, but
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you know, that is why, maybe, they may want us to look at it and
have an outside look and see. If this looks like a problem we want
an outside agency to look, that way there is no bias and if there is
no problem, there is no problem.
· Adam Jones:

And I understand that, but why didn't they do that with the first
Chief of Police they did this to?

Craig Gibson:

I don't know. (inaudible)

Adam Jones:

You know, that's why I just don't know (inaudible). I understand
you guys aren't but it is frustrating for me.

Ed Spann:

I'm just basing everything on (inaudible).

Adam Jones:

I completely understand. That is why I wanted to talk to you guys
as, I mean, you guys are dealing with the same thing that I am
doing, it is just frustrating that you have two nut cases that are
going to try and destroy everything that you try and do. And when
I say nut cases, I am talking about Darcy and my brother and now I
have to go through all this because of them.

Craig Gibson:

And having been around for a long time (inaudible) and we both
have been in administrative positions in police work and you know
we have had a lot of times look at those things because and the
players in it a lot of times are the ones that, that, you know, they
are the ones that got the problems but then law enforcement
sometimes has to answer questions about what we do. And we
know, you know sometimes we are dealing with people with
mental illness, you know people with problems, but sometimes we
have to answer then questions. Then again we have to make split
second decisions, and that is all you are going through and I will
tell you it is never fun to have anybody ask you or second guess
you about your tactics, your activity, that is never fun.

Adam Jones:

Well, it is just like now, why did they not throw him in jail? He's
obviously got a problem, so why don't they throw his ass in jail?

Craig Gibson:

And that goes to a question that you could go .....

Adam Jones:

I don't understand.

Craig Gibson:

You could go through any case we ever see with anybody, that you
have ever seen, that we've ever seen, you could ask that question
about a lot of those kind of things and if you ever find the answer
to that let me know.
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Adam Jones:

and I am doing everything I can in my best power to do anything
and then now I am the one getting raked over the coals.

~

Craig Gibson:

So, and it is never comfortable. So, we sympathize with you.

Adam Jones:

And all the other history just kind of frustrates me and I don't
know what to do.

Craig Gibson:

I don't have any great advice for you. Wish I did. Wish I did.

Adam Jones:

So, what is going io happen from here? What's going on?

Craig Gibson:

Right now. I just put the report together. We have what we call a
staffing. The attorneys here in the AG' s Office and this division
get together and they just look at the case and they look at the
statutes and the law and your statement and what Darcy said and
look at the case and basically see if there is any criminal liability
there. And that is pretty much it. I'll keep you posted.

Adam Jones:

So, like what about, and I know they got to do stuff, what about the
Sherifrs Office bringing her, bringing Darcy in over there and like
sitting there telling her like, sitting there pretty much saying, do I
intimidate her? And trying to go at some angle that I am
intimidating her. That my family is intimidating. What, what can
anything be done about that?
·

Craig Gibson:

Probably not, because that, those are just interview questions any
more than any of the questions that might have been uncomfortable
for you.

Adam Jones:

And I understand that. But the way they are going about it and
who they are going about it with, is all because they are trying to
attack me. Because Dave is trying to attack me. That is what I am
saying. Do I have to get hold of a Civil Attorney and find that out?

Craig Gibson:

Yes, you probably, you probably, I interviewed Darcy last week
but the subject of intimidation never came up. It was essentially
these type of questions, as a matter of fact, ...

Adam Jones:

I know that is what I am saying, the Sheriffs Office is now calling
her and bringing her in there and saying that we are intimidating
her. I don't care, first of all, I don't want her to be with my
brother, I don't want my brother to be with her, because I
· · guarantee this is going to happen again. And then they go and get
married.

t:i)
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It is just frustrating. Here you have this person doing something
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Craig Gibson:

And that's an issue, that again, that goes back to my, the only
sound advice I probably could give you today, is that if they,
because they are together, and because it is unpredictable of what
may happen because of their past behavior, now you can hope, we
will all hope that maybe they have learned from this one and that
will be good and you wont have to deal with it again. I am just
going to tell you, don't deal with it, don't go, ...

~
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Adan1 Jones:

Well and I don't.

Craig Gibson:

I know.

Adam Jones:

On the last one while married to Kim, I did the same thing. They
are always calling me. I'm like don't call me. But what do you
say, what do you do?

Craig Gibson:

I would just call and say look if you have a problem, or I'll call the
Sheriff's Office for you, and you call the Sheriff's Office and let
them respond. I'd call the Sheriff's Office, that's just me, I would
call the Sheriffs Office.

Adam Jones:

Even if you don't see anything, even if they were having a verbal
argument?

Craig Gibson:

Absolutely. Absolutely

Ed Spann:

Especially in your type of position you have a situation, you are
from there, I just would.

@

~

G
Craig Gibson:

Absolutely. That's my advice and that's if I've given you any
good advice that's it. Do not deal with it. No matter what. If you
can see it is going down the road and you have the vision to see
that, you see that going down the road.just tell them, (negative) as
a matter of fact, I am calling the Sheriffs Office, I don't care what
you guys want to report, what you want to do; I am calling them.

Ed Spann:

Yeh.

Craig Gibson:

And then you can step away and then do a report. You are in a
tough spot because it is hard to separate the two halves between
being a family member and being a cop.

Ed Spann:

That's just it, you live there, you are from there and you've got
your brother there, you get the call and you get there on this aspect
of it and then you get there like Craig said, now call.
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(Inaudible)
Adam Jones:

Even, even like they said something happened to Ryan. I have no
clue what happened to Ryan. But, I want to know but yet I don't
want to go fishing and try to find out what happened.

Craig Gibson:

Did you talk to those kids or see any kids while you were there?

Adam Jones:

No, everybody was in bed and I asked them, I am like where are
the kids. They are all asleep. Have they been out here? They are
like no.

Craig Gibson:

And this is what happened, obviously what now we know, because
hindsight is twenty-twenty, when you left, it spun up again and it
got, it went further and there were bigger problems, alleged. So,
then Ryan gets involved and it just got out of hand because
obviously your brother was drunk and he gets violent, and
allegedly he did, and allegedly ...

Adam Jones:

Why would she stay with him? I don't get it. I don't understand.

Ed Spann:

Do you have two cell phones? Work phone and a cell phone?

Adam Jones:

Yes, yes. You guys called me on my personal phone.

Craig Gibson:

Ok, that's the only number.

Ed Spann:

W~hat is your work phone number?

Adam Jones:

That is 435-731-0594. So how did you get my personal number?

Craig Gibson:

Darcy gave it to me.

Adam Jones:

Ok.

Ed Spann:

What is the last four, I am sorry?

Adam Jones:

0594. So, I mean do I need to save these text messages from her?

Craig Gibson:

I would.

Ed Spann:

I would go through and save them all.

Craig Gibson:

Yep. Save everything. Did you find the one that she sent yet? At
1:00 that morning?
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Adam Jones:

1:08.

Craig Gibson:

1:08.

Adam Jones:

(inaudible)

Craig Gibson:

No,_you might have to (inaudible).

@
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Ed Spam1:

Do you have his (inaudible) license?

Adam Jones:

Do you need me to read it?

Craig Gibson:

Glasses, no I can see it?

@

Inaudible
Adam Jones:

Craig Gibson:

Adam Jones:

Ed Spann:

So, I mean at this point that is exactly what I did. I ignored it
because I didn't want to deal with it. I told her to call the Sheriff's
Office. So, when she, you know, when she sent me the text
message, I didn't even respond to it.
That is when you probably, that is when you probably should have
just called the Sheriff's Office and said, I am out of here. I'll call
the Sheriff's Office they can .....
Well, I think in the incidence that something would have happened
to the kids in the first time, that is a different story, but where they
got into an argument, he scratched himself there is no physical
injuries on him. It's, you know, I mean how many, how many
times do you respond to stuff like that?

It would be difference being in this one though, your brother,
someone else, and then you, you have kind of gone through and
this one you are asking in hindsight You talked about having it
happen with her before, but the next girlfriend; his first wife and
when he gets drunk he gets, what did you say?

Adam Jones:

If he is dumb enough to stay with them, why is it our problem?

Ed Spann:

Ok, well.

Adam Jones:

Do you know what I am saying?

Ed Spann:

Ok, well, we've been doing this a long time and so we have all
seen these where we wonder why, but we just get to go. So, he is
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. saying in hindsight, you get something with family members,
someone you know, get someone else to look at it.
Craig Gibson:

Yeh, get somebody else, just bring him in. That's just, that's just
get that other, get that other, you've got the luxury of having
another agency that you got kind of a MOU, MOA with. You've
got an agreement that they will come in and use that agency and
have them come in and you know there is nothing like being able
to give your problem over somebody else's problem to somebody
else.

Adam Jones:

And see that is the other thing, I mean, he is my brother and he is
always going to be my brother. I can't change family. It's not like
I am not going to talk him.

Ed Spann:

No, you can talk to him (inaudible)

Adam Jones:

What I am saying is that I don't want to go there because I don't
want to be involved in the bull shit because she, she is just as crazy
as he is half the time. She is nuts.

Craig Gibson:

And you've got to have the vision to say, ok, maybe I just, maybe
I've got to see my brother. He is still your brother. But maybe
you have to see him on your terms.

Adam Jones:

I mean when he was in Salt Lake County., like a dumb ass I went
and seen him, but once a week. I hope to hell he goes to Summit
County and they don't let me go see him cause I don't want to deal
with it. I'm done.
·

Ed Spann:

As a brother you can do that. The difference when you went there,
you went as a visitor, here you went, whether you said you were or
not, you're dressed like that, what would any one else assume you
are? You're a police officer. And that is a tough thing to do,
because \Ve cai~'t tUa.11 it on and off.

Adam Jones:

But, if I, but I guess the hard thing is, it doesn't matter if I am in
uniform or not they are going to always look at me as a police
officer. If I went there in my underwear.

Ed Spann:

And there is some truth in that?

Craig Gibson:

There is yeh. There is truth.
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Adam Jones:

It wouldn't have mattered. And ifI don't answer the phone call, if
I ignored her or something happened, then something else can
happen to me anyway.

Craig Gibson:

Actually on that one probably not.

Ed Spann:

But, here is the deal. You went, yo1:1 saw and you just have to go,
ok, normally could, but on this one, family member, you got to get
someone in there. In the allegations, you go back and look at the
code, it says, there is allegations of she said, he kicked her,
whether you can see or not.

Adam Jones:

But this is the other problem I have with that, we took a case just
like this, where the mother hit the daughter, and we took it to the
County Attorney's and they said, we should never have arrested
her because there was no mark. So, now I am going off of that,
too.

Craig Gibson:

Ok. You did the report and you let those guys make those
determination. Cause we do the investigation .... (inaudible).

Adam Jones:

And I understand that. I'm sure you probably know how hard it is
to, you know, here you are fighting the County Attorney's and they
are not going to do anything. It is just frustrating.

Craig Gibson:

In your case, in this case, we are going to go back to this case a
little bit. Again my advise, and l have repeated this too many
times, this will be the last time I promise, in this particular case
when youwalked in and you saw what it was looking like, which
was a mess, your brother's drunk, you've got allegations of, even
though he has recanted, ...

Adam Jones:

He is always like that, though.

Craig Gibson:

rl..l

Adam Jones:

So, I can't go over there?

Craig Gibson:

You need to go, well in this particular instance, you need to back
out and say, I am just calling Summit County and let them come
over and deal with it. Again, we're not saying, of course we are
not saying you don't mess, you don't mix with family, but you just
have to recognize when you get, if they are being like that, like you
describe them, because you know that, you are not walking in to
this totally blind. You walk in and go, this just looks bad, this just

And that;
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doesn't looking right, I am backing out and then I am calling
Summit County. Again ..... (Inaudible)
Adam Jones:

I understand, it just happens so much, and everybody is just .....

Ed Spann:

You stay and keep the peace and call them. As soon as your
brother said she is out in the garage, look what she did to me, right
there, you just don't put yourself in that position. Back off, get the
phone, call, get the radio, saying have a Deputy run this for me.

Adam Jones:

I guess this is hard, cause my brother has hurt himself, he has done
all kind of stupid things before and it is just, I guess I (inaudible).

Craig Gibson:

And that is why we are asking you cause we want your perception
at the time, based on your history and those kind of things. We
can't, we weren't there and that is why we wanted to.talk to you
about it.

Ed Spann:

I'm not really, I'm just based on what you told me ...

Adam Jones:

I know, it's, it's just frustrating because you are stuck between a
rock and a hard spot. (inaudible)

Craig Gibson:

(Inaudible) You truly are.

Adam Jones:

So, but, you know I mean it, I don't know.

Craig Gibson:

It's a tough spot. It really is. And again we appreciate that. So.

Adam Jones:

So, as far as, do I need to go talk to POST, what I don't .... ?

Craig Gibson:

You don't have to do anything right now.

Adam Jones:

A thing with this?

Craig Gibson:

There is nothing to do right now, as I kind of finish this up, we are,
I'm going to, are we done with this interview? Let's be done with
this interview. It is, what time is it?

Ed Spann:

11: 12.

Craig Gibson:

11:12, 3-7-11 we finished our interview with Chief Adam Jones.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SILVER SUMMIT
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
RULING and ORDER

Plaintiff,
Case No. 111 500 107 FS
vs.
Judge: L.A. DEVER
ADAM HOWARD JONES,
Defendant.

This matter came on for a Preliminary Hearing on November 28, 2011. The
State was represented by Matthew Bates. The Defendant was present and
represented by Ronald J. Yengich.
Testimony was taken and argument made. The parties requested to brief the
issues involved before the Court issued a decision on bindover. The matter was initially
assigned to Judge Shaughnessy, as the trial judge. However, the parties and Judge

Q

Shaughnessy determined that the Magistrate that heard the Preliminary Hearing was
the proper party that should be ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence fm bindover.
The case was then re-assigned to Judge Dever, who had sat as the Magistrate.
This Court, having reviewed the transcript and the mernoranda submitted by the
parties as well as considering the testimony presented at the Preliminary Hearing

makes the following Findings and Ruling.
Background
1.

The Defendant is the Police Chief of Kamas City.

2.

(?n February 15, 2011, the Defendant received

a telephone call from

Darcy Martinez, the live-in girlfriend of his brother, Travis Jones. The call was made to
the Defendanf s personal cell-phone.

3.

The call wa_s received just before the Defendant's shift was

to end. He

was asked by Ms. Martinez to come to his brother's house. (P.H. p.19)
4.

There is no evidence from Ms. Martinez or the Defendant that the

conversation mentioned any domestic violence.

5.

The Defendant, in an interview, stated that he had no idea that any issue

concerning domestic violence was involved but that he was being asked to come over
because of a famiiy issue concerning his nephew. (Ex 1, p.19)
6.

VVhen the Defendant arrived he was met by his bmthei who vvas obviously

intoxicatedt but calm, and was informed by his brother that he should talk with Ms.
Martinez, who was in the garage. (P.H. pp. 5; 21)

7.

The Defendant met with Ms. Martinez. She stated that she wanted him to

talk to his brother and calm him down. Ms. Martinez stated that his brother had kicked

her in the leg. The Defendant stated he did not see any injury. The Defendant stated
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that he asked Ms. Martinez if she wanted him to call the Sheriff's Office. (P.H. pp. 7, 22)
He also informed her that if she wanted to make a police report he would call the
Summit County Sheriff's Office for her, as he could not be involved since he was a
family member. (P.H. p. 7) Ms. Martinez said she did not want him to contact the
~

Sheriff, just to put his brother to bed. (P.H. p. 22)

8.

The Defendant again offered to call the Summit County Sheriff's Office

but both his brother and Ms. Martinez declined the offer.

9.

After putting his brother to bed, the Defendant !eft the residence and went

home. This was shortly after 10:00 p.m. The Defendant was now off duty.

10.

Approximately 10:45 p.m., Summit County Sheriffs Office received a call

about a domestic disturbance at Jones/Martinez residence. They responded and found

a violent altercation in progress. Travis Jones was arrested. The Defendant later saw
~

the information about the call to Summit County Sheriff's Office on his poiice computer.
He did not become invofved and let the Sheriff's Office handle the matter.
11.

The next morning the Defendant went to the Summit County Jail to check

on his brother.

12.

There is conflicting testimony as to what conversation was had between

the Defendant and his brother at the jail.
3

Standard for Bindover
13.

As pointed out by the State, the bindover standard is relatively low. The

State bears the burden of demonstrating probable cause.

As pointed out in State v.

Clark, 2001 UT 9, ,i 16, the proof needed to esta~lish probable cause is the same as
required to support an arrest warrant.

14.

Additionally, the magistrate does not sift nor weigh the evidence. The

magistrate "must view all evidence in the fight most favorable to the prosecution and
draw all ieasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution. ibid.
15.

ii 9

However, the prosecution must still produce believable evidence of all the

elements of the crime charged. Ibid. ,I 15 Additionally, the prosecution must present
sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that the defendant committed the
offense charged. Ibid.

,r 16.
Conclusions based on the Evidence

16.

It is true that the magistrate is not to "weigh" the evidence. Tllis

prohibition applies to conflicts in the testimony presented to the Court not to the
requirement that there be sufficient evidence to establish that the elements of the crime

have been met by the prosecution in its case in chief.

·17.

The elements of the charges contained in Count II and Count flf of the

Amended information are somewhat similar. Count II charges the Defendant with being

4

a municipal officer that willfully omitted performing a duty imposed. Count Ill charges
the Defendant, with the intent to benefit another to knowingly refrain from performing a
1

duty imposed upon him by law.
18.
~

Addressing Count II, the State contends, in. its memoranda, that the

Defendant is a Municipal Officer with duties that include suppressing riots and
disturbances and enforcing ordinances, citing to the Kamas City Ordinance #02-1.
According to the State's argument, anyone who holds a position of trust and authority or

;;)I
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command and is authorized to exercise a specific function is a municipal officer. Under
the State's argument all police are municipal officers. The Court disagrees. The
statute, UCA 10-3-826, talks about official neglect and misconduct and encompasses
the special functions of the municipal officer. Those type of functions do not relate to
the general duties of a police officer. In fact, the Ordinance #02-1 talks in ,i 3 of the

~

additional powers and duties of the chief of police and all police officers. It is this
section of the Ordinance that the State ciaims tile Defendant has violated and therefOie
the correct statute, for this incident, is UCA 76-8-201. The Court therefore declines to
bindover the Defendant on the Charge of Official Neglect as a Municipal Officer, a class
A misdemeanor.

19.

The State claims that the Defendant failed to follow the obligations

imposed on him under UCA 76-8-201. The Defendant argues that he responded to the

5
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· call from Ms. Martinez as a family member and not as a police officer. The State
argues that he appeared in his uniform and before the end of his shift and was
therefore on duty. There is no question that he received the phone call from Ms.
Martinez on his personal cell phone and a few minutes before the end of his shift. The
State argues because he appeared in his uniform and police car it somehow changes
the facts of his appearance. If this was a case of an appearance at a stranger's door
this claim might have some merit. This was his brother's home, the fact of his dress
has no bearing on the knowledge of his brother or Ms. Martinez nor does it imput that
he was appearing as a law enforcement official.
20.

The State argues that the Defendant was responding to a call of domestic

violence. There is no evidence of that claim. Nor is there any evidence of his
encountering domestic violence when he arrived at the residence. In fact, the only
testimony was that his brother and girlfriend were calm. If there was an altercation in
progress when he arrived, his obligations as a police officer to prevent criminal activity
would have been in play. That is not the evidence. Additionally, there was no sign of a
previous altercation.

21.

The State argues that the Defendant shouid have cited or arrested his

bmthei for domestic violence. The evidence establishes that the Defendant asked Ms.
Martinez if she was injured, if she wanted to file a compiaint, or wanted an officer from
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the Summit County Sheriff's Office to come and take a report. He pointed out that he
could not take a report because he was Travis' brother. Ms. Martinez declined and said
she wanted the Defendant to put his brother to bed.
22.
G;

The elements to be established for a violation UCA 76-8-201, as they

apply to this case are
a.

To knowingly refrain from performing a duty imposed by law, and

b.

To do so with the intent to benefit himself or another.

In order to find a violation, the State must prove both elements. There
certainly isn't a question that determining intent or a knowing violation is a question for
the fact finder. However, the question of whether a duty is imposed is one of law and is
the province of the Court. In order to determine whether a duty existed, the Court must
look to the requirements of the Cohabitant Abuse Act. Before reviewing that Act, the

vu

Court notes that the argument that Ms. Martinez is a ''vuinerable adult" under UCA 765-111.1 has no merit. The term "vulnerabie adult" is defined undei UCA 76-5-111 (1)(s)
and there is no showing that she fits under the definition. The State contends that there
are three requirements imposed on law enforcement by the Cohabitant Abuse Act.
However. alt requirements of the Act are predicated on the an officer responding to an

~

allegation of domestic violence. That is not the fact of the instant case. The evidence
establishes that the Defendant received a phone call on his personal cell-phone from

7

the girlfriend of his brother. While there may be conflict as to the content of the
conversation, it is clear that there was no mention of any domestic violence in the call.
It is not disputed that Ms. Martinez was calling the brother of her boyfriend, not the
police. It is also clear that there was no altercation occurring when the Defendant
arrived at the house. The statute requires that a law enforcement officer has certain
duties when responding to an allegation of domestic abuse. There is no showing that
the Defendant was responding to an allegation of domestic abuse, therefore the statute
and the duties arising.under it have no application to the Defendant in this incident.
The Court would note that the Defendant asked Ms. Martinez, more than once, if she
wanted to make a claim of domestic violence and stated that if she did, he would
contact the Summit County Sheriff's Office for her and have an officer respond. There
is nothing to contradict this evidence.
23.

This count is charged as a ciass B misdemeanor, therefore the Court will

treat the Defendant's request as a Motion to Dismiss for failure to allege an essential
element of the crime. That Motion is Granted.
24.

Count i charges the Defendant with V\/itness Tampering, a third degree

felony. The elements of the cha;ge are that the accused
a.

believing that an official proceeding was pending or about to be
instituted, or with the intent to prevent an investigation

8

b.

attempted to induce another to testify falsely or withhold
information.

25.

There is no evidence presented that an official proceeding was pending or

about to be instituted when the Defendant visited his brother at the Summit County jail
~

the morning after February 15, 2011. Nor is there any evidence that the Defendant
believed that an investigation was pending The State argues that the Defendant should
have known there would be an investigation. That is not the standard required by the
statute. The question then is theie sufficient evidence

to find

that the Defendant's

action was an intent to prevent an official investigation. Likewise, there is no showing of
this aspect of the element. As pointed out in Melessa v. Randall, 121 Fed.Appx. 803
(10 th Cir. Feb. 1, 2005) (unpublished), Utah law requires
... the offender must subjectively believe that an official proceeding
or investigation is currently pending or will be initiated in the future,
and he must induce false or incomplete testimony from a witness
who may be called to testify or provide evidence concerning that
proceeding or investigation.

ld. at 807
26.

There is no evidence that the requirement of "belief' as outlined by

lVlelessa has been met by the State's presentation of evidence.
27.

The second element of the crime is that the Defendant attempted to

induce another to testify falseiy or withhoid information. There is some conflict between
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the witnesses as to actually what was said. The jailer has given the Court two versions.
However, for the purpose of this Ruling, the Court considers only the one relied upon by
the State.

28.

In order to address this issue, there must be a discussion at to what is

potentially being investigated. In this case, the investigation centers on the claim by the
State that the Defendant failed to comply the requirements imposed on an officer by
tile cohabitant abuse act. That act directs certain actions to be performed for the
benefit of a victim of domestic violence. The alleged victim in this case is Darcy
Martinez. \/\/hat relevance does the Defendant's conversation with his brother
concerning his being awake or asleep or when he was awake or asleep have to do with
the issue of whether the Defendant complied with the requirements alleged to be
imposed on him by the statute. Ms. Martinez is the only witness, other than the
Defendant as to what occurred between the Defendant and Ms. Martinez in the garage.
The evidence estabiishes that Travis was in the house during the exchange. VVhether
he was asleep or not is immaterial as he was not present in the garage. If he is not
present and had no participation he is not a witness and therefore there can be no
issue of witness tampering. The Court declines to bindover on Count f.
Conc!usion
29.

The Court concludes that the State has not met its burden to establish
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sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that there has been Witness
Tampering, Count I, a·third degree felony or Official Neglect and Misconduct, Count II,
a class A misdemeanor, and therefore denies a bindover on those two counts.
30.
~

The Court concludes that the State has not met its burden to establish an

essential element of the charge of Official Misconduct, Count Ill, a class B
misdemeanor, and therefore grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss that count.
This constitutes the Final ORDER of the Court
Dated this 9 th day of August, 2012.

BY THE COURT
·.-·) ...-.. •,•.:

~·

L. A. DEVER
DISTRICT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing RULING was mailed
this

(0

day of August, 2012, to the following:

Ronald J. Yengich
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
175 East 400 South, Ste 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Matthew D. Bates
SUMMIT COUNT ATTORNEY'S OFFiCE
6300 North Silver Creed Drive, #4
Park City, UT 84098

/~

<5l/.02ff\¾uNJ,,'v
/ \

Deputy Court Clerk
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